One-entry tail bound, both sides (corrected: )
ProvedNoSignalPA.entry_tailcryptographynonlocalityp2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1privacy-amplificationquantum-information
Assume . Fix a key value and an entry ; let , and
For a uniformly random and ,
Since is the mean of , this says that one entry of deviates from by more than the right side of (6) only with doubly exponentially small probability.
Differences from the source:
- correction: no hypothesis relating Ns and Nr ('the chosen value for β satisfies the required constraint') → hypothesis Ns + √Nr ≤ Nr + 2; reason: without it the bound is false: for Nr = 144, Ns = 160, k arbitrary and the entry a₀ = b₀ = x₀ = y₀ = 0, every μ_a = 8^{−144} and the event Σ μ_a V_a ≥ 2^{−448} + 2^{−434} is the event h^{−1}(k) ≠ ∅, of probability about 2^{−16} > e^{−1024}; the hypothesis is exactly the constraint |β 5^M 8^{−Nr}| ≤ 1 of (14) for β = 2^{(√Nr+Nr+Ns)/2−1} 4^{Nr} 5^{−M}, half the printed β (the printed β only gives the bound 1)
- correction: |Γ_a⟩ built from the tables |γ₀⟩, |γ₁⟩ printed in Lemma 1 (p. 2) → |Γ_a⟩ built from their transposes (gammaCoef); reason: the printed tables are transposed relative to layout (3): for Nr = 1 and the nonsignaling box a = 1 ⊕ x, b = 0, P_{a=0|x=0} = 0 but the printed ⟨γ₀|P⟩ = 1; with the transposes Lemma 1 holds; this statement is unchanged by the transposition, because a ⊕ b ⊕ x·y is symmetric under (a, x) ↔ (b, y)
- reading: 'The expression obtained when replacing ≥ with ≤ above' → Prob{Σ_a μ_a V_a ≤ 2^{−Ns−2Nr} − T} ≤ e^{−2^{√Nr}/4}; reason: replacing only the relation gives a false statement (the event contains the mean); the lower tail at the same distance below the mean is the one (15) needs
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_NoSignalPA_gammaVec import Definitions.Def_NoSignalPA_ones import Definitions.Def_OAI_Probability_ThorpCompatibility_PermutationProbability
Formal statement
namespace NoSignalPA
/-- **The one-entry tail bound, both sides (hypothesis `Ns + √Nr ≤ Nr + 2`).**
Ll. Masanes, *Universally-composable privacy amplification from causality constraints*,
arXiv:0807.2158v4, Appendix, proof of Lemma 2, p. 5 (PDF p. 5): "`Prob{Σ_a µ_a V_a ≥ 2^{−Ns−2Nr} +
2^{(√Nr−Nr−Ns)/2} 4^{−Nr} 5^M} ≤ e^{−2^{√Nr}/4}`. Note that the chosen value for β satisfies the
required constraint. The expression obtained when replacing '≥' with '≤' above, can be derived in a
similar way."
Assume `Ns + √Nr ≤ Nr + 2`. Fix a key `k` and an entry `(a₀, b₀, x₀, y₀)`; let
`μ_s = Γ_s(a₀, b₀, x₀, y₀)`, `M = ‖a₀ ⊕ b₀ ⊕ x₀·y₀‖`, `c = 2^{−Ns−2Nr}` and
`T = 2^{(√Nr−Nr−Ns)/2} 4^{−Nr} 5^M`. For a uniformly random `h` and `V_s = [h(s) = k]`,
`Prob{Σ_s μ_s V_s ≥ c + T} ≤ e^{−2^{√Nr}/4}` and `Prob{Σ_s μ_s V_s ≤ c − T} ≤ e^{−2^{√Nr}/4}`.
**Formalization Note.** (1) Correction: the hypothesis `Ns + √Nr ≤ Nr + 2` is not on the page. It is
the constraint `|β 5^M 8^{−Nr}| ≤ 1` of (14) for the `β` that yields this bound,
`β = 2^{(√Nr+Nr+Ns)/2 − 1} 4^{Nr} 5^{−M}` (half the printed value, with which the exponent is
`0`). For long keys the paper's claim "the chosen value for β satisfies the required constraint"
is false. (2) The "≤" tail is the second conjunct, with `+T` replaced by `−T`. -/
theorem entry_tail {Nr Ns : ℕ} (hN : (Ns : ℝ) + Real.sqrt Nr ≤ Nr + 2) (k : Str Ns)
(a₀ b₀ x₀ y₀ : Str Nr) :
let μ : Str Nr → ℝ := fun s => gammaVec s a₀ b₀ x₀ y₀
let M : ℕ := ones (fun i => xor (xor (a₀ i) (b₀ i)) (x₀ i && y₀ i))
let c : ℝ := (2 : ℝ) ^ (-(Ns : ℝ) - 2 * Nr)
let T : ℝ := (2 : ℝ) ^ ((Real.sqrt Nr - Nr - Ns) / 2) * ((4 : ℝ) ^ Nr)⁻¹ * 5 ^ M
OAI.ThorpCompatibility.uniformProbability (fun h : Str Nr → Str Ns =>
c + T ≤ ∑ s, μ s * (if h s = k then 1 else 0))
≤ Real.exp (-((2 : ℝ) ^ Real.sqrt Nr) / 4) ∧
OAI.ThorpCompatibility.uniformProbability (fun h : Str Nr → Str Ns =>
∑ s, μ s * (if h s = k then 1 else 0) ≤ c - T)
≤ Real.exp (-((2 : ℝ) ^ Real.sqrt Nr) / 4) := by sorry
end NoSignalPA
Source
Masanes, Universally-composable privacy amplification from causality constraints, arXiv:0807.2158v4, Appendix, proof of Lemma 2, p.5
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.