Proposition 6, p. 24 — if V − I ∈ [π_F − (2/3)b + (1/3)(s^Imp − s^RB), π_F), sharing is feasible in a portfolio but not in a single alliance
ProvedAlliancePortfolio.Sharing.proposition_6Consider the alliance-portfolio model of §4.1: a focal firm with partners and , alliance value , total knowledge-sharing cost , focal outside option , synergy , substitutability in implementation and substitutability in rival benefits , with the partners' outside options . In the portfolio, the gross payoffs are the Shapley value of the Table 1 coalition game, and knowledge sharing is feasible when , and . In the single – alliance, knowledge sharing is feasible when both Nash-bargaining payoffs and are nonnegative.
Suppose . If
then knowledge sharing in the portfolio is feasible, while knowledge sharing in the single alliance is not.
Adding a second partner can therefore make knowledge sharing sustainable where a single alliance fails, through synergies between the partners and substitutability in rival benefits.
Formalization Note The conclusion includes the focal firm's constraint , which the paper assumes on p. 23 "to facilitate the comparison"; under the standing ranges it is a consequence of , so it is concluded, not assumed. The single alliance is the – alliance of §4.1 with . The interval can be empty for some parameters (for instance and ); it is nonempty, for example, at , , , , , .
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Supermodularity_Cooperative_ShapleyValue import Definitions.Def_AlliancePortfolio_Sharing_Model
namespace AlliancePortfolio.Sharing
theorem proposition_6 (V I b πF sImp sRB : ℝ) (hstd : Standing V I b πF sImp sRB) (hVI : I ≤ V)
(hlo : πF - (2 / 3) * b + (1 / 3) * (sImp - sRB) ≤ V - I) (hhi : V - I < πF) :
PortfolioFeasible V I b πF sImp sRB ∧ ¬ SingleFeasible V I πF 0 := by sorry
end AlliancePortfolio.Sharing
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.