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Proof of Theorem 1, "The allocation is feasible", p. 12 — the limit allocation is feasible, full when valued, and goes to highest bidders

Proved
MultPacing.Existence.theorem_1_feasible

by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

limit-of-equilibriap2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pacingsmoothed-game

Fix a pacing game (v,B)(v,B)(v,B) and a convergent sequence of smoothed equilibria as in the proof of Theorem 1: ϵl>0\epsilon^l>0ϵl>0, ∑jvij+2ϵl≤M\sum_j v_{ij}+2\epsilon^l\le M∑j​vij​+2ϵl≤M, Hl>M/ϵlH^l>M/\epsilon^lHl>M/ϵl, ϵl→0\epsilon^l\to0ϵl→0, Hl→∞H^l\to\inftyHl→∞, αl\alpha^lαl a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the (ϵl,Hl)(\epsilon^l,H^l)(ϵl,Hl)-smoothed game, and αl→α∗\alpha^l\to\alpha^*αl→α∗, xijl→xij∗x^l_{ij}\to x^*_{ij}xijl​→xij∗​, pijl→pij∗p^l_{ij}\to p^*_{ij}pijl​→pij∗​, sijl→sij∗s^l_{ij}\to s^*_{ij}sijl​→sij∗​. Then the limit allocation is feasible:

  1. ∑ixij∗≤1\sum_i x^*_{ij}\le1∑i​xij∗​≤1 for every good jjj;
  2. ∑ixij∗=1\sum_i x^*_{ij}=1∑i​xij∗​=1 for every good jjj such that some buyer iii has vij>0v_{ij}>0vij​>0;
  3. if xij∗>0x^*_{ij}>0xij∗​>0 then iii is at least tied for the highest limit bid on jjj:
xij∗>0 ⟹ αk∗vkj≤αi∗vijfor every buyer k.x^*_{ij}>0\ \Longrightarrow\ \alpha^*_k v_{kj}\le\alpha^*_i v_{ij}\quad\text{for every buyer }k .xij∗​>0 ⟹ αk∗​vkj​≤αi∗​vij​for every buyer k.

These are the allocation conditions of Definition 2 at the limit point.

Formalization Note The sequence and its limits are bundled in IsSmoothedLimit; the sequence is assumed convergent, which is the paper's passage to a convergent subsequence.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: "this sequence must have a subsequence with a limit point … replace the sequence by this subsequence" → the sequence itself is assumed to converge; reason: the claims are stated after that replacement.
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultPacing_Existence_Limit
Formal statement
namespace MultPacing.Existence

theorem theorem_1_feasible {N G : Type*} [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] [Fintype G]
    (P : PacingGame N G) (ε H : ℕ → ℝ) (M : ℝ) (α : ℕ → N → ℝ) (αs : N → ℝ)
    (xs ps ss : N → G → ℝ) (hlim : IsSmoothedLimit P ε H M α αs xs ps ss) :
    (∀ j, ∑ i, xs i j ≤ 1) ∧
    (∀ j, (∃ i, 0 < P.v i j) → ∑ i, xs i j = 1) ∧
    (∀ i j, 0 < xs i j → ∀ k, αs k * P.v k j ≤ αs i * P.v i j) := by sorry

end MultPacing.Existence
Source
Conitzer, Kroer, Sodomka & Stier-Moses, Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets, arXiv:1706.07151v5, p. 12 (PDF 12), proof of Theorem 1, claim "The allocation is feasible"
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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