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Theorem 7.1 — the imported short-key base

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FourMsgQMA.Supplement.theorem_7_1

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

complexity-theorycryptographyp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1quantum-information

This is Theorem 7.1 (imported short-key base, [GKNV25, Theorem C.2]) in the pinned-down version requested by the operator.

Fix ε∈(0,1)\varepsilon\in(0,1)ε∈(0,1) and assume Hyp(ε)\mathrm{Hyp}(\varepsilon)Hyp(ε). Then every QMA promise problem LLL with verification family FFF has an independent-challenge base (Definition 3.8) that

  1. is uniform and polynomially bounded, with challenge length m≤poly(λ,∣x∣,log⁡(T+1))m\le\mathrm{poly}(\lambda,|x|,\log(T+1))m≤poly(λ,∣x∣,log(T+1));
  2. has a uniform challenge of exactly λ+2\lambda+2λ+2 bits (c=(b,h,s)c=(b,h,s)c=(b,h,s));
  3. has short public and secret commitment keys: PK0PK_0PK0​ and the secret key in rrr come from a key generator whose coins, key lengths and running time are poly(λ)\mathrm{poly}(\lambda)poly(λ), independent of xxx and TTT;
  4. is complete with error negl(λ)\mathrm{negl}(\lambda)negl(λ) for N(λ,T)N(\lambda,T)N(λ,T) copies of any witness in WQ(x,2/3)W_Q(x,2/3)WQ​(x,2/3);
  5. has selective soundness at most
1−λ−2+negl(λ).1-\lambda^{-2}+\mathrm{negl}(\lambda).1−λ−2+negl(λ).

This is the base of the six-message construction of Theorem 7.5; its inverse-polynomial gap g=λ−2g=\lambda^{-2}g=λ−2 enters the soundness bound there.

Differences from the source:

  • reading: "the quantum-secure LWE assumption for the commitment scheme of [GKNV25]" → Hyp(ε) for the given ε ∈ (0, 1) (published FourMsgQMA.LWEHyp); reason: the same reading as the published base_protocol_bkl22 and corollary_5_15; the paper fixes no parameter family
  • reading: "the preceding base with the prescribed post-hoc witness copies" → ∃ an ICBase with every stated property (pinned-down existential version); reason: the [GKNV25] commitment and the [ACGH20] post-hoc test are not reproduced in this paper; the existential form is the reading of the published base items
  • reading: "It satisfies Definition 3.8 with short public and secret commitment keys" → IsUniform, Bounded (challenge ≤ p(λ, |x|, ⌈log₂(T+1)⌉)), challenge length exactly λ + 2, and ShortKeys: PK_0 = PK and the first component of r = SK for a key generator with coins, key lengths and time ≤ poly(λ), independent of x and T; reason: §7.1 (pp.49–50): "The key lengths and generation time are poly(λ), independent of N"; "PK_0 = PK_QC"; c = (b, h, s) ∈ {0,1}^{λ+2}
  • encoding: "the prescribed post-hoc witness copies" → N(λ, T) copies, computable and ≤ poly(λ, T), of any ρ ∈ W_Q(x, 2/3); reason: QMA threshold 2/3 (p.10); the base mission's honest-resource convention
  • encoding: 1 − λ^{-2} + negl(λ) → 1 − ((λ : ℝ)^2)⁻¹ + ν(λ), which is 1 + ν(0) at λ = 0; reason: Lean division convention; a single trivial point
  • encoding: QPT adversaries, local resource T, selective soundness quantifiers → IsQPT strategies; T = t_L(x); for every polynomial length bound and fixed no-instance sequence ∃ negligible ν; reason: pinned-down model of the base mission (§3.1 quantifier convention)
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_FourMsgQMA_LWEHyp
import Definitions.Def_FourMsgQMA_Supplement_ICBase
Formal statement
namespace FourMsgQMA

namespace Supplement

open QAlgorithms.Complexity

/-- **Theorem 7.1** (Imported short-key base), Goyal, Koppula, STOC 2027 submission
(sha256 6c523d45…), p.50 (PDF 52), pinned-down version (operator request): "Under the quantum-secure
LWE assumption for the commitment scheme of [GKNV25], the preceding base with the prescribed post-hoc
witness copies has completeness `1 − negl(λ)` and selective soundness at most `1 − λ^{-2} + negl(λ)`.
It satisfies Definition 3.8 with short public and secret commitment keys."

For every `ε ∈ (0, 1)`, under `Hyp(ε)`, every QMA promise problem `L` with verification family `F`
has an independent-challenge base (Definition 3.8) that is uniform and polynomially bounded, whose
challenge is a uniform string of length `λ + 2` (`c = (b, h, s)`), whose public setup and secret key
come from a key generator with keys and generation time `poly(λ)` independent of `x` and `T`, that is
complete with error `negl(λ)` for `N(λ, T)` copies of any witness in `W_Q(x, 2/3)`, and whose
selective soundness is at most `1 − λ^{-2} + negl(λ)`.

**Formalization Note** "The quantum-secure LWE assumption for the commitment scheme of [GKNV25]" is
read as `Hyp(ε)`; `T = t_L(x)`; the bound `λ^{-2}` is `((λ : ℝ)^2)⁻¹`, which Lean evaluates to `0`
at `λ = 0` (a single trivial point). -/
theorem theorem_7_1 (ε : ℝ) (hε0 : 0 < ε) (hε1 : ε < 1) (hLWE : LWEHyp ε)
    (L : PromiseProblem) (F : QMAFamily) (hLF : IsQMAVerifierFor L F) :
    ∃ B : ICBase, B.IsUniform ∧ B.Bounded F ∧ B.ShortKeys ∧
      (∀ lam m T, B.chalLen lam m T = lam + 2) ∧ B.Complete L F ∧
      B.Sound L F (fun lam => 1 - ((lam : ℝ) ^ 2)⁻¹) := by sorry

end Supplement

end FourMsgQMA
Source
Goyal, Koppula, Four-Message Arguments for NP ∘ batchQMA and Six-Message Arguments for QMA from LWE, STOC 2027 submission (sha256 6c523d45…), Theorem 7.1, p.50 (PDF 52); §7.1, pp.49–50 (PDF 51–52); Definition 3.8, pp.13–14

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