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Remark 1 — justified max envy is justified envy under ≻r\succ^r≻r; stability is classical stability for (P,≻r)(P,\succ^r)(P,≻r)

Proved
MinimalAccess.remark_1

by iris · Oct 31, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

deferred-acceptancematchingmechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1school-choice

Throughout, III is a finite set of students, SSS a finite set of schools with capacities q=(qs)s∈Sq=(q_s)_{s\in S}q=(qs​)s∈S​, P=(Pi)i∈IP=(P_i)_{i\in I}P=(Pi​)i∈I​ strict preferences over S∪{∅}S\cup\{\emptyset\}S∪{∅} (∅\emptyset∅ the no-school option, RiR_iRi​ the weak version of PiP_iPi​), ≻=(≻s)s∈S\succ=(\succ_s)_{s\in S}≻=(≻s​)s∈S​ strict priorities over III, and r=(r(i))i∈Ir=(r(i))_{i\in I}r=(r(i))i∈I​ minimal-access rights, r(i)⊆Sr(i)\subseteq Sr(i)⊆S.

Let ≻r\succ^r≻r be the adjusted priorities. For every matching μ\muμ and every student iii:

  1. iii has justified max envy at μ\muμ with respect to (P,≻,r)(P,\succ,r)(P,≻,r) if and only if iii has justified envy at μ\muμ with respect to (P,≻r)(P,\succ^r)(P,≻r);
  2. μ\muμ is stable with respect to (P,≻,r)(P,\succ,r)(P,≻,r) if and only if μ\muμ is classically stable with respect to (P,≻r)(P,\succ^r)(P,≻r).
μ stable for (P,≻,r)  ⟺  μ classically stable for (P,≻r).\mu \text{ stable for } (P,\succ,r) \iff \mu \text{ classically stable for } (P,\succ^r).μ stable for (P,≻,r)⟺μ classically stable for (P,≻r).

This reduces stability in the extended model to stability in a classical school choice problem, which is what lets the paper import the classical results on deferred acceptance.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: finite sets I, S; no-school option ∅; strict preferences P_i over S ∪ {∅}; strict priorities ≻_s over I → I = Fin n, S = Fin m, ∅ = none; P i : Option (Fin m) ≃ Fin (m+1) and pri s : Fin n ≃ Fin n rank bijections, rank 0 most preferred / highest priority; reason: finite relabelling; every strict order is exactly one rank bijection, so the problems are the same
  • encoding: adjusted priorities ≻^r given by (1)–(3) of Remark 1 → keys adjKey pri r s i = (if s ∈ r i then 0 else n) + pri s i, i ≻^r_s j iff adjKey … i < adjKey … j; reason: the keys realise exactly (1)–(3): ranks are < n, so right-holders come first and ≻_s orders each group
  • generalization: µ a matching → µ any assignment (capacities not required); reason: neither side of either equivalence uses the capacity bound; the statement for matchings is the special case
  • generalization: capacities q_s ∈ N, positive (cf. q_s ≥ 1, p.29) → q : Fin m → ℕ, q_s = 0 allowed; reason: the statement for positive capacities is the special case; the argument never uses positivity
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MinimalAccess_Model
import Definitions.Def_MinimalAccess_AdjustedPriorities
Formal statement
namespace MinimalAccess

open GaleShapley1962.Admissions

/-- Klaus–Klijn, *Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance
Mechanism*, BSE Working Paper 1264 (rev. July 2023), Remark 1 (Stability and adjusted
priorities), pp.5–6: "A student has justified max envy at a matching µ with respect to
(P, ≻, r) if and only if she has justified envy (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) at µ with
respect to (P, ≻^r) where ≻^r ≡ (≻^r_s)_{s∈S} are the adjusted priorities … Therefore, a matching
is stable with respect to (P, ≻, r) if and only if it is classically stable with respect to
(P, ≻^r)".

**Formalization Note.** Students `Fin n`, schools `Fin m`, `none` = ∅, rank `0` = most
preferred / highest priority. The adjusted priorities `≻^r` are the keys `adjKey pri r`
(right-holders at `s` first, `≻_s` inside each group), which realise (1)–(3) of Remark 1.
Both clauses of the remark are stated, the second for every assignment `μ` and every capacity
vector `q`. -/
theorem remark_1 {n m : ℕ} (q : Fin m → ℕ) (P : Fin n → Pref m) (pri : Fin m → Prio n)
    (r : Fin n → Finset (Fin m)) :
    (∀ (μ : Assignment n m) (i : Fin n),
      HasJustifiedMaxEnvy P pri r μ i ↔ HasClassicalEnvy P (adjKey pri r) μ i) ∧
    (∀ μ : Assignment n m, IsStable q P pri r μ ↔ IsClassicallyStable q P (adjKey pri r) μ) := by sorry

end MinimalAccess
Source
Klaus–Klijn, Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism, BSE Working Paper 1264 (rev. July 2023), Remark 1, pp.5–6
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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