Remark 1 — justified max envy is justified envy under ; stability is classical stability for
ProvedMinimalAccess.remark_1deferred-acceptancematchingmechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1school-choice
Throughout, is a finite set of students, a finite set of schools with capacities , strict preferences over ( the no-school option, the weak version of ), strict priorities over , and minimal-access rights, .
Let be the adjusted priorities. For every matching and every student :
- has justified max envy at with respect to if and only if has justified envy at with respect to ;
- is stable with respect to if and only if is classically stable with respect to .
This reduces stability in the extended model to stability in a classical school choice problem, which is what lets the paper import the classical results on deferred acceptance.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: finite sets I, S; no-school option ∅; strict preferences P_i over S ∪ {∅}; strict priorities ≻_s over I → I = Fin n, S = Fin m, ∅ = none; P i : Option (Fin m) ≃ Fin (m+1) and pri s : Fin n ≃ Fin n rank bijections, rank 0 most preferred / highest priority; reason: finite relabelling; every strict order is exactly one rank bijection, so the problems are the same
- encoding: adjusted priorities ≻^r given by (1)–(3) of Remark 1 → keys adjKey pri r s i = (if s ∈ r i then 0 else n) + pri s i, i ≻^r_s j iff adjKey … i < adjKey … j; reason: the keys realise exactly (1)–(3): ranks are < n, so right-holders come first and ≻_s orders each group
- generalization: µ a matching → µ any assignment (capacities not required); reason: neither side of either equivalence uses the capacity bound; the statement for matchings is the special case
- generalization: capacities q_s ∈ N, positive (cf. q_s ≥ 1, p.29) → q : Fin m → ℕ, q_s = 0 allowed; reason: the statement for positive capacities is the special case; the argument never uses positivity
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MinimalAccess_Model import Definitions.Def_MinimalAccess_AdjustedPriorities
Formal statement
namespace MinimalAccess
open GaleShapley1962.Admissions
/-- Klaus–Klijn, *Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance
Mechanism*, BSE Working Paper 1264 (rev. July 2023), Remark 1 (Stability and adjusted
priorities), pp.5–6: "A student has justified max envy at a matching µ with respect to
(P, ≻, r) if and only if she has justified envy (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) at µ with
respect to (P, ≻^r) where ≻^r ≡ (≻^r_s)_{s∈S} are the adjusted priorities … Therefore, a matching
is stable with respect to (P, ≻, r) if and only if it is classically stable with respect to
(P, ≻^r)".
**Formalization Note.** Students `Fin n`, schools `Fin m`, `none` = ∅, rank `0` = most
preferred / highest priority. The adjusted priorities `≻^r` are the keys `adjKey pri r`
(right-holders at `s` first, `≻_s` inside each group), which realise (1)–(3) of Remark 1.
Both clauses of the remark are stated, the second for every assignment `μ` and every capacity
vector `q`. -/
theorem remark_1 {n m : ℕ} (q : Fin m → ℕ) (P : Fin n → Pref m) (pri : Fin m → Prio n)
(r : Fin n → Finset (Fin m)) :
(∀ (μ : Assignment n m) (i : Fin n),
HasJustifiedMaxEnvy P pri r μ i ↔ HasClassicalEnvy P (adjKey pri r) μ i) ∧
(∀ μ : Assignment n m, IsStable q P pri r μ ↔ IsClassicallyStable q P (adjKey pri r) μ) := by sorry
end MinimalAccess
Source
Klaus–Klijn, Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism, BSE Working Paper 1264 (rev. July 2023), Remark 1, pp.5–6
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.