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Theorem 4 — harmonic MIR sampling over a fixed range R is UT, EPIR with E[RS] ≥ W_R(N)/H_n, hence αH_n for an α-approximate range

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MoneyBurningSurplus.Harmonic.Supplement.theorem_4

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theorymechanism-designmoney-burningp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1

Let n≥2n\ge2n≥2 agents have valuations in domains ViV_iVi​ of nonnegative valuations on a nonempty finite outcome set OOO, and let R⊆OR\subseteq OR⊆O be a nonempty fixed range. Write WR(T)=max⁡o∈R∑i∈Tvi(o)W_R(T)=\max_{o\in R}\sum_{i\in T}v_i(o)WR​(T)=maxo∈R​∑i∈T​vi​(o) and W(N)=max⁡o∈O∑ivi(o)W(N)=\max_{o\in O}\sum_iv_i(o)W(N)=maxo∈O​∑i​vi​(o). The harmonic MIR mechanism draws k∈{1,…,n}k\in\{1,\dots,n\}k∈{1,…,n} with probability 1/(kHn)1/(kH_n)1/(kHn​) and a uniform kkk-subset RkR_kRk​ of agents, chooses the tie-broken maximizer ooo of ∑i∈Rkvi\sum_{i\in R_k}v_i∑i∈Rk​​vi​ within RRR, charges i∈Rki\in R_ki∈Rk​ the pivot WR(Rk∖{i})−∑j∈Rk∖{i}vj(o)W_R(R_k\setminus\{i\})-\sum_{j\in R_k\setminus\{i\}}v_j(o)WR​(Rk​∖{i})−∑j∈Rk​∖{i}​vj​(o) and everyone else 000. Then

  1. for every kkk and every sampled set RkR_kRk​, the resulting deterministic mechanism is truthful, ex-post individually rational and has nonnegative payments on the domains;
  2. for every admissible profile,
E[RS]=E[∑i∈N(vi(o)−pi)]≥WR(N)Hn;\mathbb E[RS]=\mathbb E\Big[\sum_{i\in N}\big(v_i(o)-p_i\big)\Big]\ge\frac{W_R(N)}{H_n};E[RS]=E[i∈N∑​(vi​(o)−pi​)]≥Hn​WR​(N)​;
  1. consequently, for every α>0\alpha>0α>0, if WR(N)≥W(N)/αW_R(N)\ge W(N)/\alphaWR​(N)≥W(N)/α at every admissible profile, then E[RS]≥W(N)/(αHn)\mathbb E[RS]\ge W(N)/(\alpha H_n)E[RS]≥W(N)/(αHn​) at every admissible profile.

With R=OR=OR=O this is Theorem 1; for a proper range it lets maximal-in-range approximation algorithms be used in place of exact welfare maximization.

Formalization Note The expectation is the finite average over kkk and over the kkk-subsets. The range and the tie-break rule are fixed and report-independent; agents outside the sampled set are ignored and pay 000.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: agents N = {1,…,n} with n ≥ 2, nonnegative valuations on a nonempty finite outcome set O → Fin n with 2 ≤ n, real-valued functions O → ℝ with pointwise nonnegativity carried by the domain, Fintype O, Nonempty O, DecidableEq O; reason: relabeling and decidable finite membership change no instance
  • encoding: a fixed, report-independent tie-breaking rule among maximizing outcomes → a universally quantified tb : Finset O → O with IsTieBreak tb (it returns a member of every nonempty set), applied to the computed maximizer set; reason: the rule receives no reports; every instance of the paper's rule satisfies IsTieBreak
  • generalization: every valuation profile (by default all nonnegative valuations) → every profile in arbitrary domains V i of nonnegative valuations, reports and deviations in V; reason: specializes to V = valuationDomain, the paper's default
  • reading: the harmonic MIR mechanism is universally truthful and ex-post individually rational → the same, plus nonnegative payments, for every seed (k, R_k) with 1 ≤ k ≤ n; reason: §2 requires every mechanism's payments to lie in ℝ≥0, and the Clarke pivot over R is nonnegative
  • generalization: R is an α-approximate range (α an approximation factor, α ≥ 1 by §2) → every real α > 0; reason: covers every α ≥ 1; for α < 1 the hypothesis forces W(N) = 0
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MoneyBurningSurplus_Harmonic_Model
import Definitions.Def_MoneyBurningSurplus_Harmonic_Supplement_Range
Formal statement
namespace MoneyBurningSurplus.Harmonic.Supplement

theorem theorem_4
    {n : ℕ} (hn : 2 ≤ n) {O : Type*} [Fintype O] [Nonempty O] [DecidableEq O]
    (tb : Finset O → O) (htb : IsTieBreak tb)
    (R : Finset O) (hR : R.Nonempty)
    (V : Fin n → Set (O → ℝ)) (hV : ∀ i, ∀ u ∈ V i, ∀ o, 0 ≤ u o) :
    (∀ k ∈ Finset.Icc 1 n,
      ∀ T ∈ (Finset.univ : Finset (Fin n)).powersetCard k,
        AGT.MechIncentiveCompatible V (rangeVCGOutcome tb R T) (rangeVCGPay tb R T) ∧
        AGT.IndividuallyRational V (rangeVCGOutcome tb R T) (rangeVCGPay tb R T) ∧
        AGT.NoPositiveTransfers V (rangeVCGOutcome tb R T) (rangeVCGPay tb R T)) ∧
    (∀ v : Fin n → O → ℝ, AGT.IsValProfile V v →
      rangeWelfare R v Finset.univ / (harmonic n : ℝ) ≤ mirSurplus tb R v) ∧
    (∀ α : ℝ, 0 < α →
      (∀ v : Fin n → O → ℝ, AGT.IsValProfile V v →
        welfare v Finset.univ / α ≤ rangeWelfare R v Finset.univ) →
      ∀ v : Fin n → O → ℝ, AGT.IsValProfile V v →
        welfare v Finset.univ / (α * (harmonic n : ℝ)) ≤ mirSurplus tb R v) := by sorry

end MoneyBurningSurplus.Harmonic.Supplement
Source
Tomer Ezra, Money Burning Mechanism Design: From Welfare to Surplus, STOC 2027 submission #585 (October 2026), https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/585.pdf, Theorem 4, PDF p. 18 (printed p. 17); App. B.1 definition of W_R and of the harmonic MIR mechanism, PDF p. 18 (printed p. 17); fixed master range, App. B intro, PDF p. 18

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