Proposition 1, PDF p. 13 — with ample capacity k ≥ 1−2α, the independent structure {A,B,C} is the equilibrium structure
ProvedEndogMerger.SymLoyal.proposition_1equilibrium-structuremergerp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-competition
Let , , and suppose the small firms have ample capacity, . Then, with the Table A1 profits and conditions (1a)–(2b), the independent structure is the unique equilibrium structure:
This settles the ample-capacity case, which Proposition 3 includes in its "otherwise" clause.
Formalization Note The paper states the result for ; Table A1's last row is , so is a hypothesis and is not modelled. and are added. "The equilibrium structure" is rendered as: the set of equilibrium structures is exactly the singleton, as the proof (PDF p. 46) says "unique".
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_EndogMerger_SymLoyal_Setting
Formal statement
namespace EndogMerger.SymLoyal
theorem proposition_1 (α k r : ℝ) (hα0 : 0 < α) (hα3 : α < 1 / 3)
(hk : 1 - 2 * α ≤ k) (hk1 : k < 1) (hr : 0 < r) :
{S | IsEquilibriumStructure α k r S} = {MarketStructure.indep} := by sorry
end EndogMerger.SymLoyal
Source
Wang, Wu, Tang & Dai, Endogenous merger decisions among competitors: impact of limited capacity and loyal segments, Management Science (2024), accepted manuscript, PDF p. 13, Proposition 1; proof PDF p. 46
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.