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The male-propose mechanism is strategy-proof for the men

Proved
AGT.male_propose_strategyproof

by Shuze Chen · Sep 13, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorymarket-designmechanism-designstable-matching

No man can game the male-propose mechanism: any mechanism selecting the male-optimal stable matching is strategy-proof for the men (Theorem 10.13 of Algorithmic Game Theory; Dubins–Freedman, Roth) — this mission's goal. Let FFF be any mechanism that, on every profile of strict preferences, returns a male-optimal stable matching in the man-by-man sense of Gale–Shapley — the Deferred Acceptance outcome, unique by strictness, and equivalently characterized by the book's no-Pareto-improvement form of Theorem 10.11. Then for every profile, every man mmm, and every misreported ordering of the women, the wife FFF assigns mmm after the misreport either equals or is truly-worse than the wife FFF assigns him under truth.

A note on the rendering. Only the men are protected: the women can famously manipulate the male-propose mechanism, and nothing of the sort is claimed for them. The mechanism is pinned by its defining property rather than by algorithm internals, and it is quantified before the misreport, so the witness must serve every deviation — nothing is chosen with hindsight. The hypothesis that FFF selects male-optimal stable matchings is satisfiable by Theorem 10.11.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_agt_matching
Formal statement
namespace AGT

/-- The male-propose mechanism is strategy-proof for the men (Theorem 10.13
of *Algorithmic Game Theory*; Dubins–Freedman, Roth) — the capstone of the
mission.  Formally: any mechanism selecting, on every profile of strict
preferences, the male-optimal stable matching (the male-propose Deferred
Acceptance outcome, Theorem 10.11) leaves no man able to obtain a wife he
truly prefers by misreporting his ordering.  The women, famously, can
manipulate; nothing of the sort is claimed for them. -/
theorem male_propose_strategyproof {M W : Type*} [Fintype M] [Fintype W]
    [DecidableEq M]
    (F : (M → W → W → Prop) → (W → M → M → Prop) → M ≃ W)
    (hF : ∀ PM PW, IsPrefProfile PM → IsPrefProfile PW →
      IsMaleOptimal PM PW (F PM PW)) :
    ∀ PM PW, IsPrefProfile PM → IsPrefProfile PW →
      ∀ m (r' : W → W → Prop), IsStrictTotalOrder W r' →
        F (Function.update PM m r') PW m = F PM PW m ∨
          PM m (F PM PW m) (F (Function.update PM m r') PW m) := by
  sorry

end AGT
Source
N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, V. V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press 2007, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800481, Section 10.4.2, Theorem 10.13, pp. 258-259
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5

Read-back: male_propose_strategyproof

Setting. Let MMM and WWW be finite types, with decidable equality assumed on MMM (needed for the pointwise profile update below); either may be empty. Profiles: PMP^MPM assigns to each m∈Mm \in Mm∈M a binary relation PmMP^M_mPmM​ on WWW (write PmM(w,w′)P^M_m(w,w')PmM​(w,w′) when the relation holds of (w,w′)(w,w')(w,w′)), and PWP^WPW assigns to each w∈Ww \in Ww∈W a binary relation PwWP^W_wPwW​ on MMM. The theorem is about an arbitrary given function

F:{men’s relation families}×{women’s relation families}⟶{bijections M≃W},F : \{\text{men's relation families}\} \times \{\text{women's relation families}\} \longrightarrow \{\text{bijections } M \simeq W\},F:{men’s relation families}×{women’s relation families}⟶{bijections M≃W},

total on all inputs (including non-profiles), with no construction (such as deferred acceptance) appearing in the statement. Note a hidden consequence of the binder itself: since relation families always exist, the mere assumption that a function FFF into the type of bijections M≃WM \simeq WM≃W exists forces that type to be nonempty, i.e. ∣M∣=∣W∣|M| = |W|∣M∣=∣W∣; no explicit cardinality hypothesis is stated.

Hypothesis hFh_FhF​. For all pairs (PM,PW)(P^M, P^W)(PM,PW) in which every PmMP^M_mPmM​ is a strict total order on WWW and every PwWP^W_wPwW​ is a strict total order on MMM (trichotomous, irreflexive, transitive), the bijection μ:=F(PM,PW)\mu := F(P^M, P^W)μ:=F(PM,PW) is male-optimal, which unfolds to the conjunction:

  1. μ\muμ is stable: ∀m ∀w, ¬(PmM(w,μ(m))∧PwW(m,μ−1(w)))\forall m\, \forall w,\ \neg\big( P^M_m(w, \mu(m)) \wedge P^W_w(m, \mu^{-1}(w)) \big)∀m∀w, ¬(PmM​(w,μ(m))∧PwW​(m,μ−1(w))) — no blocking pair;
  2. for every bijection ν:M→W\nu : M \to Wν:M→W that is stable in the same sense, and every m∈Mm \in Mm∈M: μ(m)=ν(m)\mu(m) = \nu(m)μ(m)=ν(m) or PmM(μ(m),ν(m))P^M_m\big(\mu(m), \nu(m)\big)PmM​(μ(m),ν(m)).

Conclusion. For every pair of profiles (PM,PW)(P^M, P^W)(PM,PW) with all individual relations strict total orders, for every man m∈Mm \in Mm∈M, and for every strict total order r′r'r′ on WWW, writing P~M:=PM[m↦r′]\widetilde{P}^M := P^M[m \mapsto r']PM:=PM[m↦r′] for the men's family agreeing with PMP^MPM except that mmm's relation is replaced by r′r'r′:

F(P~M,PW)(m)=F(PM,PW)(m)orPmM(F(PM,PW)(m), F(P~M,PW)(m)).F\big(\widetilde{P}^M, P^W\big)(m) = F\big(P^M, P^W\big)(m) \quad \text{or} \quad P^M_m\Big( F(P^M, P^W)(m),\ F(\widetilde{P}^M, P^W)(m) \Big).F(PM,PW)(m)=F(PM,PW)(m)orPmM​(F(PM,PW)(m), F(PM,PW)(m)).

That is: the woman mmm is matched to when his slot carries r′r'r′ is the same as under the original profile; or mmm's original relation PmMP^M_mPmM​ holds of the ordered pair (partner under the original profiles, partner under the deviated profiles). The disjunction is inclusive; the comparison always uses PmMP^M_mPmM​, never r′r'r′, which enters only through the input handed to FFF.

Points to note.

  • Only men deviate, and only the men's profile is updated; the women's profile PWP^WPW is held fixed throughout, and nothing whatsoever is claimed about deviations by women.
  • Nothing is asserted about the partners of men other than mmm, nor about outcomes on inputs that are not strict-total-order profiles (FFF's values there are unconstrained by both hypothesis and conclusion).
  • The conclusion is the literal disjunction shown, not the formally different "¬ PmM(deviation partner,truthful partner)\neg\, P^M_m(\text{deviation partner}, \text{truthful partner})¬PmM​(deviation partner,truthful partner)".
  • Degenerate cases: if MMM and WWW are both empty, all quantifications over mmm are vacuous and the statement holds trivially; if exactly one is empty no FFF of the displayed type exists, so the theorem is vacuous for such instances. If no FFF satisfies hFh_FhF​ (e.g. if male-optimal matchings fail to exist for some profile), the theorem is vacuously true for every such FFF; it asserts the implication for every FFF of the displayed type satisfying hFh_FhF​.
Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Sep 13, 2026

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 13, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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