Eq. (6.4): the bid b*(v) = v − ∫₀ᵛ P(s) ds / P(v) solves (6.3), is a symmetric equilibrium of the single-unit first-price auction, and shades below the valuation
ProvedRevenueManagement.first_price_equilibriumauctionsbayesian-equilibriumfirst-price-auctionoperations-research
For customers with regular i.i.d. valuations, let and . Then (a) on , satisfies the first-order condition (6.3), with ; (b) it is a symmetric equilibrium: a customer with valuation bidding as a customer with valuation gets expected surplus ; (c) for , customers shade their bids.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_RevenueManagement_auctions
Formal statement
namespace RevenueManagement
theorem first_price_equilibrium (V : PrivateValues) (hV : V.IsRegular) (hN : 2 ≤ V.N) :
(∀ v ∈ Set.Ioc 0 V.vbar, HasDerivWithinAt (firstPriceBid V)
((((V.N : ℝ) - 1) * V.F v ^ (V.N - 2) * V.f v / firstPriceWinProb V v) *
(v - firstPriceBid V v)) (Set.Icc 0 V.vbar) v) ∧
(∀ v ∈ Set.Icc 0 V.vbar, ∀ w ∈ Set.Icc 0 V.vbar,
firstPriceWinProb V w * (v - firstPriceBid V w) ≤
firstPriceWinProb V v * (v - firstPriceBid V v)) ∧
(∀ v ∈ Set.Ioc 0 V.vbar, firstPriceBid V v < v) := by sorry
end RevenueManagement
Source
Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer 2004, DOI 10.1007/b139000, pp. 251-252, Sect. 6.2.2.2, Eq. (6.2)-(6.4) and footnotes 3-4 (boundary condition b*(0) = 0)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.