Proposition 6.1: when capacity is unconstrained (N ≤ C), a fixed list price p* with J(p*) = 0 is an optimal mechanism
ProvedRevenueManagement.list_price_unconstrained_optimalauctionslist-pricemechanism-designoperations-researchoptimal-auction
In the private-value -unit model with customers, regular valuations and a strictly increasing virtual value with zero , the list-price mechanism at the price (every customer with valuation above buys at ) earns at least the expected revenue of every feasible, incentive-compatible mechanism with monotone allocations and zero surplus at zero: it is an optimal mechanism for the firm.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_RevenueManagement_auctions
Formal statement
namespace RevenueManagement
theorem list_price_unconstrained_optimal (V : PrivateValues) (hV : V.IsRegular)
(hJ : StrictMonoOn (virtualValue V) (Set.Icc 0 V.vbar)) (C : ℕ) (hNC : V.N ≤ C) (vstar : ℝ)
(hvs : vstar ∈ Set.Icc 0 V.vbar) (hJ0 : virtualValue V vstar = 0) (M : Mechanism V.N)
(hM : M.IsFeasible C V.vbar) (hmono : HasMonotoneAllocation V M) (hzero : HasZeroSurplusAtZero V M)
(hic : IsIncentiveCompatible V M) :
expRevenue V M ≤ expRevenue V (listPrice V.N vstar) := by sorry
end RevenueManagement
Source
Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer 2004, DOI 10.1007/b139000, p. 263, Proposition 6.1 and Sect. 6.2.6.1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.