§4, p. 31 — Pareto optimality implies citizens' sovereignty
ProvedStrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.cs_of_poarrowp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1paretosocial-choice
Let , , and let be a strict social welfare function on the committee and the alternative set . If satisfies Pareto optimality (PO), then it satisfies citizens' sovereignty (CS): for all distinct there is a strict ballot set with
The paper uses this observation to conclude that the social welfare function Gibbard builds from a strategy-proof voting procedure, which is Pareto optimal, also satisfies CS.
Formalization Note The paper's observation carries no cardinality conditions; the standing hypotheses , of §4 are kept. CS is read for . Definitions as in StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.Basic.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Correspondence_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
theorem cs_of_po {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
(hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
(u : StrongProfile ι A → StrongOrder A) (hpo : PO u) :
CS u := by sorry
end StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), §4, p. 31 ("Observe that if a social welfare function satisfies PO, then it also satisfies CS"), used p. 33
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.