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Corollary 4.2 — with latencies ℓe(x)=aex\ell_e(x)=a_exℓe​(x)=ae​x, a feasible flow is optimal iff it is at Nash equilibrium

Proved
SelfishRouting.Linear.corollary_4_2

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

linear-latencynash-equilibriumoptimal-flowp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1selfish-routing

Let every edge latency be proportional to its congestion, ℓe(x)=aex\ell_e(x)=a_exℓe​(x)=ae​x with ae≥0a_e\ge 0ae​≥0, let the rates rir_iri​ be positive and the route incidences 0/10/10/1. Then for every flow fff feasible for the rates rrr,

f is optimal  ⟺  f is at Nash equilibrium.f\ \text{is optimal}\iff f\ \text{is at Nash equilibrium}.f is optimal⟺f is at Nash equilibrium.

In such networks selfish routing loses nothing: the price of anarchy is exactly 111.

Formalization Note The latencies are the linear latencies with be=0b_e=0be​=0. "For any rate vector rrr" is the universal quantification over positive rates. Routes are 0/10/10/1 incidence columns (a disclosed generalization).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_KellyStochasticNetworks_Wardrop
import Definitions.Def_SelfishRouting_Linear_Model
import Definitions.Def_SelfishRouting_Linear_LinearLatency
Formal statement
namespace SelfishRouting.Linear

open KellyStochasticNetworks

/-- Corollary 4.2 (p. 15): if every latency is `ℓ_e(x) = a_e x`, then for any rates a feasible
flow is optimal iff it is at Nash equilibrium. -/
theorem corollary_4_2 {J R Sd : ℕ} (A : Fin J → Fin R → ℝ) (hA : ∀ j r, A j r = 0 ∨ A j r = 1)
    (s : Fin R → Fin Sd) (rate : Fin Sd → ℝ) (hrate : ∀ i, 0 < rate i)
    (a : Fin J → ℝ) (ha : ∀ j, 0 ≤ a j)
    (x : Fin R → ℝ) (hx : x ∈ wardropFeasible s rate) :
    IsOptimalFlow A s (linLatency a (fun _ => 0)) rate x ↔
      SelfishRouting.Bicriteria.IsNashFlow A s (linLatency a (fun _ => 0)) rate x := by sorry

end SelfishRouting.Linear
Source
Roughgarden & Tardos, How Bad is Selfish Routing?, J. ACM 49(2) (2002), author's manuscript of 5 Dec 2001, p. 15, Corollary 4.2
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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