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Propositions 3–5 / proof of Theorem 1, p. 1025 — ROM's allocation and payments are feasible for the robust auction LP (5)

Proved
RobustAuction.ROM.rom_feasible

by mikedeng1 · Oct 13, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auctionsmechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1robust-optimization

Let U\mathcal UU be a set of n×mn\times mn×m valuation matrices with nonnegative entries and let B1,…,Bn≥0B_1,\dots,B_n\ge 0B1​,…,Bn​≥0 be the budgets. Take any choice of optimal solutions of the problems (12), (13), (14) of Algorithm ROM.a and (16), (17) of Algorithm ROM.b. Let ava^{\mathbf v}av and pvp^{\mathbf v}pv be the resulting allocation (20) and payments (21). Then (a,p)(a,p)(a,p) satisfies every constraint of the robust auction design LP (5) other than the revenue constraints (5)–(6). For all v∈U\mathbf v\in\mathcal Uv∈U:

  1. (7) ∑i∈Naijv≤1\sum_{i\in\mathcal N}a^{\mathbf v}_{ij}\le 1∑i∈N​aijv​≤1 for all j∈Mj\in\mathcal Mj∈M;
  2. av≥0a^{\mathbf v}\ge 0av≥0;
  3. (8) for every buyer iii and every report ui\mathbf u_iui​ with (ui,v−i)∈U(\mathbf u_i,\mathbf v_{-i})\in\mathcal U(ui​,v−i​)∈U,
∑j∈Mvij aij(ui,v−i)−pi(ui,v−i)−∑j∈Mvij aijv+piv≤0;\sum_{j\in\mathcal M}v_{ij}\,a^{(\mathbf u_i,\mathbf v_{-i})}_{ij}-p^{(\mathbf u_i,\mathbf v_{-i})}_i-\sum_{j\in\mathcal M}v_{ij}\,a^{\mathbf v}_{ij}+p^{\mathbf v}_i\le 0;j∈M∑​vij​aij(ui​,v−i​)​−pi(ui​,v−i​)​−j∈M∑​vij​aijv​+piv​≤0;
  1. (9) piv≤Bip^{\mathbf v}_i\le B_ipiv​≤Bi​ for all i∈Ni\in\mathcal Ni∈N;
  2. (10) piv≤∑j∈Mvij aijvp^{\mathbf v}_i\le\sum_{j\in\mathcal M}v_{ij}\,a^{\mathbf v}_{ij}piv​≤∑j∈M​vij​aijv​ for all i∈Ni\in\mathcal Ni∈N.

The robust optimal mechanism is thus a feasible, incentive compatible, budget feasible and individually rational mechanism for every uncertainty set. This is the feasibility half of the paper's Theorem 1, whose proof states that "the feasibility follows from Propositions 3–5".

Formalization Note Nonnegative valuations and budgets are the model's standing assumptions, made explicit. No finiteness, boundedness or convexity of U\mathcal UU is assumed; the existence of the optimal solutions is part of the hypothesis. The optimality half of Theorem 1, which asserts that ROM maximizes the worst case revenue, is false as printed and is not asserted here.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_RobustAuction_ROM_AuctionLP
import Definitions.Def_RobustAuction_ROM_Mechanism
Formal statement
namespace RobustAuction.ROM

/-- Propositions 3–5 combined (Bandi–Bertsimas 2014, proof of Theorem 1, p. 1025: "the
feasibility follows from Propositions 3–5"): ROM's allocation (20) and payments (21) satisfy
every constraint of the robust auction LP (5) other than the revenue constraints (5)–(6) —
(7), `x ≥ 0`, (8), (9) and (10) — for every choice of optimal solutions of (12)–(14), (16),
(17). Valuations in `U` and budgets are nonnegative (standing assumptions of the model). -/
theorem rom_feasible {n m : ℕ} (U : Set (Fin n → Fin m → ℝ)) (B : Fin n → ℝ)
    (hU : ∀ u ∈ U, ∀ i j, 0 ≤ u i j) (hB : ∀ i, 0 ≤ B i)
    (d : ROMData n m) (hd : IsROM U B d) :
    IsFeasibleMechanism U B (alloc U d) (pay U d) := by sorry

end RobustAuction.ROM
Source
Bandi, Bertsimas, Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach, Math. Oper. Res. 39(4):1012–1038 (2014), p. 1025 (PDF p. 15), proof of Theorem 1(a) ("the feasibility follows from Propositions 3–5"); Propositions 3–5, pp. 1021–1023 (PDF pp. 11–13); constraints (7)–(10), p. 1017
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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