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Lemma 1 — for q ∈ [0,1), M_q is BIC, EPIR, has nonnegative payments and S(q) ≥ U(q)/g_n(q)

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MoneyBurningSurplus.Harmonic.Supplement.lemma_1

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theorymechanism-designmoney-burningp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1

Let n≥2n\ge2n≥2 agents have finite type sets TiT_iTi​ of nonnegative valuations on a nonempty finite outcome set OOO, with a product prior D=∏iDiD=\prod_iD_iD=∏i​Di​ giving every type positive mass fi(a)>0f_i(a)>0fi​(a)>0. Let AAA be any allocation algorithm, mapping every report profile to a distribution on OOO, with interim values Gi(a,b)G_i(a,b)Gi​(a,b) as in (6). Fix a rule seli(a)∈arg⁡max⁡bGi(a,b)\mathrm{sel}_i(a)\in\arg\max_bG_i(a,b)seli​(a)∈argmaxb​Gi​(a,b), and an admissible LP choice: for every q∈(0,1)q\in(0,1)q∈(0,1) and every agent, a row-saturated optimum xiqx_i^qxiq​ of the assignment LP (7) and an optimum (uiq,πiq)(u_i^q,\pi_i^q)(uiq​,πiq​) of its dual (8), together with the level-zero convention πi0=0\pi_i^0=0πi0​=0, ui0(a)=max⁡bGi(a,b)u_i^0(a)=\max_bG_i(a,b)ui0​(a)=maxb​Gi​(a,b). Let MqM_qMq​ be the fixed-level mechanism of steps 2–4 of the Bayesian harmonic-sampling mechanism, and let

U(q)=∑i∑a∈Tifi(a)uiq(a),gn(q)=∑k=0n−1(1−q)k.U(q)=\sum_i\sum_{a\in T_i}f_i(a)u_i^q(a),\qquad g_n(q)=\sum_{k=0}^{n-1}(1-q)^k.U(q)=i∑​a∈Ti​∑​fi​(a)uiq​(a),gn​(q)=k=0∑n−1​(1−q)k.

Then for every q∈[0,1)q\in[0,1)q∈[0,1):

  1. MqM_qMq​ is Bayesian incentive compatible: for every agent iii and types a,b∈Tia,b\in T_ia,b∈Ti​, the interim expected utility Ev−i∼D−iE[a(o)−pi]\mathbb E_{v_{-i}\sim D_{-i}}\mathbb E[a(o)-p_i]Ev−i​∼D−i​​E[a(o)−pi​] of true type aaa is at least as large reporting aaa as reporting bbb;
  2. MqM_qMq​ is ex-post individually rational: at truthful reports, every realization of positive probability gives every agent vi(o)−pi≥0v_i(o)-p_i\ge0vi​(o)−pi​≥0;
  3. every such realization charges nonnegative payments;
  4. the expected residual surplus S(q)S(q)S(q) of MqM_qMq​ under truthful reports v∼Dv\sim Dv∼D satisfies
S(q)≥U(q)gn(q).(15)S(q)\ge\frac{U(q)}{g_n(q)}.\tag{15}S(q)≥gn​(q)U(q)​.(15)

This fixed-level bound is what both the discretized and the continuous versions of Theorem 3 average over the participation level.

Formalization Note A realization of MqM_qMq​ is a triple (set of agents, surrogate profile, outcome); at q=0q=0q=0 the set is the singleton of the chosen agent. All expectations are finite sums over these triples and over the prior. The LP choice is a fixed family of functions of the level; the statement holds for every admissible family, and Theorem 3 asserts that such families exist.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: agents N = {1,…,n} with n ≥ 2, nonnegative valuations on a nonempty finite outcome set O → Fin n with 2 ≤ n, real-valued functions O → ℝ with pointwise nonnegativity carried by the domain, Fintype O, Nonempty O, DecidableEq O; reason: relabeling and decidable finite membership change no instance
  • generalization: type sets T_i whose elements are valuations → finite types Ty i with a valuation map val i (not required to be injective) and masses f i; reason: the paper's setting is the case of an injective map, and the claims do not use injectivity
  • encoding: an allocation algorithm A, possibly randomized, A^r(v) with fresh randomness r → its outcome distribution A(v), a probability vector on O at every report profile; reason: the mechanism and all four claims depend on A only through these distributions
  • encoding: choose an optimum x_i^q with every row saturated and an optimal dual (u_i^q, π_i^q), report-independently; at q = 0, π_i^0 = 0 and u_i^0(a) = max_b G_i(a,b) → universally quantified families x, u, π satisfying IsAdmissibleLPChoice on (0,1) and IsLevelZeroConvention; reason: the lemma holds for whatever choice is fixed; the families take no reports
  • encoding: the q = 0 surrogate ṽ_I ∈ argmax_b G_I(v_I, b) → a universally quantified fixed rule sel with IsArgmaxRule; reason: any fixed choice from the argmax
  • encoding: BIC, EPIR over the support, nonnegative payments, and S(q) as an expectation over v ∼ D and the mechanism → IsBIC, IsLotteryEPIR and HasLotteryNonnegPayments on seeds of positive probability, and lotterySurplus, as finite sums; reason: these are §2's and App. C.1's definitions for a finite-support prior and a finite lottery
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MoneyBurningSurplus_Harmonic_Supplement_Bayes
Formal statement
namespace MoneyBurningSurplus.Harmonic.Supplement

theorem lemma_1
    {n : ℕ} (hn : 2 ≤ n) {O : Type*} [Fintype O] [Nonempty O] [DecidableEq O]
    {Ty : Fin n → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (Ty i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (Ty i)]
    (val : (i : Fin n) → Ty i → O → ℝ) (f : (i : Fin n) → Ty i → ℝ)
    (hprior : IsFiniteProductPrior val f)
    (A : ((i : Fin n) → Ty i) → O → ℝ) (hA : IsAllocAlgorithm A)
    (sel : (i : Fin n) → Ty i → Ty i) (hsel : IsArgmaxRule val f A sel)
    (x : ℝ → (i : Fin n) → Ty i → Ty i → ℝ) (u π : ℝ → (i : Fin n) → Ty i → ℝ)
    (hLP : IsAdmissibleLPChoice val f A x u π) (h0 : IsLevelZeroConvention val f A u π)
    (q : ℝ) (hq0 : 0 ≤ q) (hq1 : q < 1) :
    IsBIC val f (levelProb f A x sel q) levelOut (levelPay val f A π q) ∧
    IsLotteryEPIR val (levelProb f A x sel q) levelOut (levelPay val f A π q) ∧
    HasLotteryNonnegPayments (levelProb f A x sel q) (levelPay val f A π q) ∧
    dualUtility f u q / gNorm n q ≤
      lotterySurplus val f (levelProb f A x sel q) levelOut (levelPay val f A π q) := by sorry

end MoneyBurningSurplus.Harmonic.Supplement
Source
Tomer Ezra, Money Burning Mechanism Design: From Welfare to Surplus, STOC 2027 submission #585 (October 2026), https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/585.pdf, Lemma 1 and equation (15), PDF p. 23 (printed p. 22); mechanism steps 1–4 and payment (14), PDF p. 23 (printed p. 22); LP (7), dual (8), level-zero convention, (11) and (12), PDF p. 22 (printed p. 21); proof PDF pp. 23–24 (printed pp. 22–23)

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