Proof of Lemma 7, p. 26 — in every Nash equilibrium of , and
ProvedFixpNash.Bubelis.v2_pos_v3_nonneggame-theorynash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be the gadget of Lemma 7 for coefficients (no hypothesis on is needed), and let be a mixed Nash equilibrium of . Let and be the expected payoffs of the auxiliary players 2 and 3 in . Then
These two signs are what the rest of the proof of Lemma 7 uses to force the strategy of player 2.
Formalization Note , are AGT.expectedPayoff (gadget c) x at aux2, aux3; the Nash equilibrium is AGT.IsMixedNash. The root hypotheses of Lemma 7 are not needed and are omitted.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_Bubelis_Gadget
Formal statement
namespace FixpNash.Bubelis
/-- Proof of Lemma 7, p. 26: in every Nash equilibrium `x` of the gadget `G_f`, the equilibrium
payoff `v₂` of player 2 is positive and the equilibrium payoff `v₃` of player 3 is nonnegative. -/
theorem v2_pos_v3_nonneg {m : ℕ} (c : Fin (m + 1) → ℝ) (x : ∀ p, Strat m p → ℝ)
(hx : AGT.IsMixedNash (gadget c) x) :
0 < AGT.expectedPayoff (gadget c) x .aux2 ∧ 0 ≤ AGT.expectedPayoff (gadget c) x .aux3 := by sorry
end FixpNash.Bubelis
Source
Etessami & Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, author manuscript (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)), proof of Lemma 7, p. 26
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.