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Minimal perfect systems are Latin squares with equiprobable keys

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ShannonSecrecy.perfect_secrecy_latin_square

by Lucas · Sep 22, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

combinatoricscryptographyinformation-theory

Shannon 1949, §10, p. 681. Perfect systems in which the number of cryptograms, the number of messages, and the number of keys are all equal are characterized by the properties that (1) each message is connected to each cryptogram by exactly one line, and (2) all keys are equally likely; thus the matrix representation of the system is a "Latin square".

Concretely: let a finite secrecy system have perfect secrecy and satisfy ∣M∣=∣K∣=∣E∣|M| = |K| = |E|∣M∣=∣K∣=∣E∣. Then

  1. for every message MMM and every cryptogram EEE there is exactly one key kkk with TkM=ET_k M = ETk​M=E, and
  2. all keys have the same a priori probability (necessarily 1/∣K∣1/|K|1/∣K∣).

Consequently the ∣M∣×∣E∣|M| \times |E|∣M∣×∣E∣ table whose (M,E)(M, E)(M,E) entry is the unique key carrying MMM to EEE is a Latin square: each key occurs exactly once in each row and once in each column. This identifies the minimal perfect systems — those meeting the bound "as many keys as messages" — up to relabelling.

Formalization Note "Exactly one line from MMM to EEE" is the unique-existence of a key kkk with TkM=ET_k M = ETk​M=E; "all keys equally likely" is stated as the equality of the a priori probabilities of any two keys, from which the value 1/∣K∣1/|K|1/∣K∣ follows by normalization. The cardinality hypotheses are exactly Shannon's "the number of cryptograms, the number of messages, and the number of keys are all equal".

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_shannon_secrecy_system
Formal statement
namespace ShannonSecrecy

theorem perfect_secrecy_latin_square
    {M K E : Type*} [Fintype M] [Fintype K] [Fintype E] [DecidableEq E]
    (C : Cipher M K E) (h : PerfectSecrecy C)
    (hMK : Fintype.card M = Fintype.card K) (hKE : Fintype.card K = Fintype.card E) :
    (∀ (m : M) (e : E), ∃! k : K, C.encipher k m = e) ∧
      ∀ k k' : K, C.keyProb k = C.keyProb k' := by sorry

end ShannonSecrecy
Source
C. E. Shannon, "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems", Bell System Technical Journal 28(4):656-715, 1949; https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1949.tb00928.x, p. 681 (Part II, §10 Perfect Secrecy, the paragraph characterizing perfect systems as Latin squares)
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · Aristotle (Harmonic) — NON-BLIND: same agent that drafted the statement

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Let MMM, KKK, EEE be finite types with decidable equality on EEE, and let CCC be a cipher: injective maps Tk:M→ET_k : M \to ETk​:M→E for k∈Kk \in Kk∈K, weights P(k)≥0P(k) \ge 0P(k)≥0 with ∑kP(k)=1\sum_k P(k) = 1∑k​P(k)=1. Assume:

  1. CCC has the perfect-secrecy property — for every p:M→Rp : M \to \mathbb{R}p:M→R with p≥0p \ge 0p≥0 and ∑mp(m)=1\sum_m p(m) = 1∑m​p(m)=1, for every eee with nonzero total probability Qp(e)Q_p(e)Qp​(e), and for every mmm, the a posteriori ratio (∑k:Tk(m)=ep(m)P(k))/Qp(e)\big(\sum_{k : T_k(m) = e} p(m)P(k)\big)/Q_p(e)(∑k:Tk​(m)=e​p(m)P(k))/Qp​(e) equals p(m)p(m)p(m);
  2. #M=#K\#M = \#K#M=#K;
  3. #K=#E\#K = \#E#K=#E.

The conclusion is a conjunction:

  • (i) for every message mmm and every cryptogram eee there exists a unique key kkk with Tk(m)=eT_k(m) = eTk​(m)=e — existence and uniqueness, for every pair, with no exclusion of any mmm or eee;
  • (ii) for all keys k,k′k, k'k,k′, P(k)=P(k′)P(k) = P(k')P(k)=P(k′); that is, the key weights are constant. The common value is not named in the statement, although constancy together with ∑kP(k)=1\sum_k P(k) = 1∑k​P(k)=1 pins it down.

Degenerate case: if all three types are empty — excluded here, since ∑kP(k)=1\sum_{k} P(k) = 1∑k​P(k)=1 forces KKK to be nonempty — both clauses would be vacuous. With #K≥1\#K \ge 1#K≥1 the cardinality hypotheses force MMM and EEE to be nonempty as well, so clause (i) has content. Nothing in the conclusion mentions a Latin square or a matrix; it is the pair of properties (i) and (ii) only.

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