Proposition 1, p. 3344 — under price discrimination the equilibrium numbers of buyers and of sellers both increase
ProvedTwoSidedPD.Baseline.proposition1_participationcomparative-staticsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-discriminationtwo-sided-markets
Consider the baseline two-sided platform with , and Assumption 1. Let be any maximizer of the uniform-pricing profit and any maximizer of the discriminatory profit . Then
In words: under price discrimination, the equilibrium number of both buyers and sellers increases compared with uniform pricing. This is the paper's first main result, and the buyer part of Proposition 2(i) is its corollary.
Formalization Note. The statement quantifies over all optima; their existence is the content of the two equilibrium milestones (displays (12) and (13)–(15)).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline
theorem proposition1_participation (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
(hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
∀ (x : ℝ × ℝ) (y : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ), IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x → IsDiscrOpt v b θH θL y →
x.1 < y.1 ∧ x.2 < y.2.1 + y.2.2 := by sorry
end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), p. 3344, §4.1.3, Proposition 1 (proof: App. A.1, pp. 3351–3352)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.