Theorem 2.4(1) / Proposition 2.9: is optimal given any version of
OpenMFGLiquidation.Nash.proposition_2_9Let be a solution of the conditional mean-field FBSDE (2.3) for the representative player's data , in the class of Theorem 2.4:
and assume the standing Assumption 2.3. Put (the strategy (2.2)) and let be any -progressive version of
Then is an optimal control for the representative player given : and, for every admissible ,
where is the conditional cost of the representative player.
This is item 1 of Theorem 2.4 (proved in Proposition 2.9), restated over the definitions of the Nash-equilibrium chapter (Section 3) so that it applies to each player of the -player game, whose data is a representative-player data set. It is the inequality " by Proposition 2.9" used in the proof of Theorem 3.3 (p. 23).
Formalization Note. The solution is any solution in the class of Theorem 2.4 (unique by that theorem), so the statement is Theorem 2.4(1) for the solution at hand. It coincides with the optimality conjunct of MFGLiquidation.Equilibrium.theorem_2_4, over the chapter-3 copies of the definitions (MFGLiquidation.Nash.*).
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MFGLiquidation_Nash_Setting import Definitions.Def_MFGLiquidation_Nash_Game open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory Filter Topology Peng1990.SMP open scoped ENNReal NNReal
namespace MFGLiquidation.Nash
theorem proposition_2_9
{Ω : Type*} [MeasurableSpace Ω] {k : ℕ} (P : Measure Ω) [IsProbabilityMeasure P]
(D : Data Ω k) (hD : D.Standing P) (hA : D.Assumption23 P hD)
(X Y : ℝ≥0 → Ω → ℝ) (Z : Fin (k + 1) → ℝ≥0 → Ω → ℝ)
(hsol : SolvesFBSDE23InClass hD X Y Z)
(μ : ℝ≥0 → Ω → ℝ)
(hμ : IsCondExpVersion (filtF0 hD) P D.T (fun t ω => Y t ω / (2 * D.η t ω)) μ) :
IsOptimal hD μ (fun t ω => Y t ω / (2 * D.η t ω)) := by sorry
end MFGLiquidation.Nash