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(20) — the mean error recursion uk+1≤auk+N αmax⁡,ku_{k+1}\le a u_k+\sqrt N\,\alpha_{\max,k}uk+1​≤auk​+N​αmax,k​ of Algorithm 1

Proved
LeiBR.Sync.eq_20

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

best-responseconvergence-ratep2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1stochastic-approximation

Assume Assumptions 1 and 2, μ>0\mu>0μ>0, and let x∗x^*x∗ be a Nash equilibrium. Let {xk}\{x_k\}{xk​} be generated by Algorithm 1 (abstract form) for a filtration {Fk}\{\mathcal F_k\}{Fk​}, from a deterministic x0∈Xx_0\in Xx0​∈X, with deterministic accuracies αi,k≥0\alpha_{i,k}\ge0αi,k​≥0 in (8). Put a=∥Γ∥a=\|\Gamma\|a=∥Γ∥, αmax⁡,k=max⁡iαi,k\alpha_{\max,k}=\max_i\alpha_{i,k}αmax,k​=maxi​αi,k​ and

uk=E[∥(∥x1,k−x1∗∥⋮∥xN,k−xN∗∥)∥].u_k=\mathbb E\left[\left\|\begin{pmatrix}\|x_{1,k}-x_1^*\|\\ \vdots\\ \|x_{N,k}-x_N^*\|\end{pmatrix}\right\|\right].uk​=E​​​∥x1,k​−x1∗​∥⋮∥xN,k​−xN∗​∥​​​​.

Then

uk+1≤a uk+N αmax⁡,k∀k≥0.u_{k+1}\le a\,u_k+\sqrt N\,\alpha_{\max,k}\qquad\forall k\ge0 .uk+1​≤auk​+N​αmax,k​∀k≥0.

This one-step recursion is the core of the geometric rate (Proposition 4): the exact BR contracts by aaa, and the inexactness enters only additively.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_LeiBR_Sync_NashGame
import Definitions.Def_LeiBR_Sync_StochGame
import Definitions.Def_LeiBR_Sync_Algorithm1

open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace LeiBR.Sync

/-- (20), proof of Proposition 4, p. 9: for Algorithm 1 with deterministic accuracies
`α_{i,k} ≥ 0`, `u_k = E‖(‖x_{i,k} - x*_i‖)_i‖` satisfies
`u_{k+1} ≤ a u_k + √N α_{max,k}` for all `k ≥ 0`, where `a = ‖Γ‖` and
`α_{max,k} = max_i α_{i,k}`. -/
theorem eq_20
    {N : ℕ} {n : Fin N → ℕ} {Ω : Type*} [mΩ : MeasurableSpace Ω] (P : Measure Ω)
    [IsProbabilityMeasure P] {d : ℕ} (ξ : Ω → EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d))
    (X : ∀ i : Fin N, Set (Strat n i)) (ψ : Fin N → Profile n → EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) → ℝ)
    (gψ : ∀ i : Fin N, Profile n → EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) → Strat n i) (M : Fin N → ℝ)
    (hA1 : Assumption1 P ξ X ψ gψ M) (μ : ℝ) (hμ : 0 < μ)
    (hA2 : Assumption2 X (payoff P ξ ψ) μ)
    (xhat : Profile n → Profile n) (hxhat : IsProxBR X (payoff P ξ ψ) μ xhat)
    (xs : Profile n) (hxs : IsNashEq X (payoff P ξ ψ) xs)
    (F : Filtration ℕ mΩ) (α : Fin N → ℕ → ℝ) (hα : ∀ i k, 0 ≤ α i k)
    (x0 : Profile n) (x : ℕ → Ω → Profile n) (hx : IsAlg1 P F X xhat α x0 x) :
    ∀ k : ℕ, ∫ ω, blockDist (x (k + 1) ω) xs ∂P ≤
      specNorm (Gamma X (payoff P ξ ψ) μ) * ∫ ω, blockDist (x k ω) xs ∂P +
        Real.sqrt N * ⨆ i : Fin N, α i k := by sorry

end LeiBR.Sync
Source
Lei, Shanbhag, Pang & Sen, On Synchronous, Asynchronous, and Randomized Best-Response Schemes for Stochastic Nash Games, arXiv:1704.04578v2, §3.3, proof of Proposition 4, (20), p. 9; α_max,k from p. 8
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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