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Every coin of a reachable state has a value in [0, MAX_MONEY]

Proved
BitcoinSupply.values_in_range

by pitimespi · Oct 28, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

21-millionbitcoinbitcoin-mainnetconsensusformal-verificationinflationsupplyutxo

For every chain state SSS reachable from the genesis, ValuesInRange S.utxo: coins enter the ledger only as outputs of transactions that passed CheckTransaction, whose output loop enforces MoneyRange on each value.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSupply
open BitcoinSupply BitcoinBlockV2
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinSupply.values_in_range (S : ChainState) (hR : BitcoinBlockV2.Reachable S) :
    BitcoinSupply.ValuesInRange S.utxo := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: GetBlockSubsidy, ConnectBlock (the coinbase bound), UpdateCoins, src/validation.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/validation.cpp; CheckTxInputs (consensus/tx_verify.cpp); CheckTransaction (consensus/tx_check.cpp); AddCoin, SpendCoin (coins.cpp); MAX_MONEY (consensus/amount.h)
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinSupply.values_in_range

Statement

For every chain state SSS such that Reachable(S)\mathrm{Reachable}(S)Reachable(S) holds (expanded below),

∀ (k,c)∈S.utxo:0≤c.out.nValue  ∧  c.out.nValue≤2,100,000,000,000,000.\forall\, (k, c) \in S.\mathrm{utxo}:\quad 0 \le c.\mathrm{out}.\mathrm{nValue} \;\wedge\; c.\mathrm{out}.\mathrm{nValue} \le 2{,}100{,}000{,}000{,}000{,}000 .∀(k,c)∈S.utxo:0≤c.out.nValue∧c.out.nValue≤2,100,000,000,000,000.

That is, the value of every entry of the ledger of SSS lies in the closed interval [0,MAX_MONEY][0, \mathrm{MAX\_MONEY}][0,MAX_MONEY]. Both bounds are non-strict. The statement is about each entry individually; it says nothing about the sum of values, about repeated keys, or about heights or coinbase flags. For the initial state the ledger is empty and the claim is vacuous.

Chain states and what "reachable" means

A chain state SSS is a pair: a list of block headers S.headersS.\mathrm{headers}S.headers and a ledger S.utxoS.\mathrm{utxo}S.utxo. A ledger is a finite list of pairs (k,c)(k, c)(k,c) with kkk an outpoint (a byte list k.hashk.\mathrm{hash}k.hash and a natural number k.nk.nk.n) and ccc a coin (c.out,c.height,c.isCoinbase)(c.\mathrm{out}, c.\mathrm{height}, c.\mathrm{isCoinbase})(c.out,c.height,c.isCoinbase), whose output c.outc.\mathrm{out}c.out carries an integer value c.out.nValuec.\mathrm{out}.\mathrm{nValue}c.out.nValue and a byte-list script. Nothing in the type forbids repeated keys in a ledger. S.nextHeightS.\mathrm{nextHeight}S.nextHeight is the length of S.headersS.\mathrm{headers}S.headers; S.tipHeightS.\mathrm{tipHeight}S.tipHeight is that length minus one (natural-number subtraction, so 000 for an empty list); the tip is the last header (the fixed genesis header if the list is empty).

Other notation used below:

  • getCoin(L,p)\mathrm{getCoin}(L, p)getCoin(L,p): the coin of the first entry of ledger LLL with key ppp, if any; haveCoin(L,p)\mathrm{haveCoin}(L,p)haveCoin(L,p) is true iff one exists; accessCoin(L,p)\mathrm{accessCoin}(L,p)accessCoin(L,p) is that coin, or a dummy coin of value −1-1−1 when absent.
  • isCoinBase(tx)\mathrm{isCoinBase}(tx)isCoinBase(tx): txtxtx has exactly one input and its outpoint is null (hash === 32 zero bytes, index =232−1= 2^{32}-1=232−1).
  • valueOut(tx)=∑o∈tx.vouto.nValue\mathrm{valueOut}(tx) = \sum_{o \in tx.\mathrm{vout}} o.\mathrm{nValue}valueOut(tx)=∑o∈tx.vout​o.nValue (integer sum).
  • txid(tx)\mathrm{txid}(tx)txid(tx): double SHA-256 of the witness-stripped serialization of txtxtx. A script is unspendable iff it is non-empty with first byte 0x6a0x6a0x6a, or longer than 10,00010{,}00010,000 bytes.
  • updateCoins(L,tx,h)\mathrm{updateCoins}(L, tx, h)updateCoins(L,tx,h): if txtxtx is not a coinbase, first delete from LLL, for each input in order, every entry whose key equals that input's outpoint; then for each output ojo_joj​ of txtxtx (index j=0,1,…j = 0, 1, \dotsj=0,1,…): if its script is unspendable, nothing; otherwise delete every entry with key (txid(tx),j)(\mathrm{txid}(tx), j)(txid(tx),j) and prepend ((txid(tx),j),(oj,h,isCoinBase(tx)))\big((\mathrm{txid}(tx), j), (o_j, h, \mathrm{isCoinBase}(tx))\big)((txid(tx),j),(oj​,h,isCoinBase(tx))).
  • MAX_MONEY=2,100,000,000,000,000\mathrm{MAX\_MONEY} = 2{,}100{,}000{,}000{,}000{,}000MAX_MONEY=2,100,000,000,000,000 (integer). "vvv is in money range" means 0≤v≤MAX_MONEY0 \le v \le \mathrm{MAX\_MONEY}0≤v≤MAX_MONEY.
  • coreSubsidy(h)\mathrm{coreSubsidy}(h)coreSubsidy(h) for h∈Nh \in \mathbb{N}h∈N, with q=⌊h/210,000⌋q = \lfloor h/210{,}000 \rfloorq=⌊h/210,000⌋: 000 if q≥64q \ge 64q≥64, else ⌊5,000,000,000/2q⌋\lfloor 5{,}000{,}000{,}000 / 2^{q} \rfloor⌊5,000,000,000/2q⌋ (already 000 once q≥33q \ge 33q≥33).

Reachable\mathrm{Reachable}Reachable is the least predicate on chain states such that

  1. the initial state S0=([genesisHeader], [ ])S_0 = ([\mathrm{genesisHeader}],\ [\,])S0​=([genesisHeader], []) is reachable: its header list holds the single fixed mainnet genesis header and its ledger is empty (the genesis coinbase output is not in it);
  2. if SSS is reachable and there exist a block bbb (a header plus a list of transactions b.vtxb.\mathrm{vtx}b.vtx), an integer ttt (the "local clock", unconstrained — any integer may be chosen for each step), a state S′S'S′ and undo data undo\mathit{undo}undo with validate(S,b,t)=accept(S′,undo)\mathrm{validate}(S, b, t) = \mathrm{accept}(S', \mathit{undo})validate(S,b,t)=accept(S′,undo), then S′S'S′ is reachable.

validate(S,b,t)=accept(S′,undo)\mathrm{validate}(S, b, t) = \mathrm{accept}(S', \mathit{undo})validate(S,b,t)=accept(S′,undo) holds exactly when steps (a)–(d) below all succeed; then S′=(S.headers+ ⁣ ⁣+[b.header], u)S' = (S.\mathrm{headers} \mathbin{+\!\!+} [b.\mathrm{header}],\ u)S′=(S.headers++[b.header], u) with uuu the ledger produced in step (d), so S′.nextHeight=S.nextHeight+1S'.\mathrm{nextHeight} = S.\mathrm{nextHeight} + 1S′.nextHeight=S.nextHeight+1.

(a) Header acceptance. The header's compact target bits\mathrm{bits}bits decodes to a valid target TTT and the header's double-SHA-256 hash, read as a little-endian number, is ≤T\le T≤T; b.header.prevBlockb.\mathrm{header}.\mathrm{prevBlock}b.header.prevBlock equals the hash of the tip of SSS; bits\mathrm{bits}bits equals the difficulty SSS requires (the PoW mission's next-work rule applied to the tip and the first header of its 2016-block period); b.header.time>mtp(S)b.\mathrm{header}.\mathrm{time} > \mathrm{mtp}(S)b.header.time>mtp(S), the median-time-past of the tip computed from the header times of SSS; b.header.time≤t+7,200b.\mathrm{header}.\mathrm{time} \le t + 7{,}200b.header.time≤t+7,200; and the version is not outdated (not version <2< 2<2 once height 227,931227{,}931227,931 is active after the tip height, nor <3< 3<3 for 363,725363{,}725363,725, nor <4< 4<4 for 388,381388{,}381388,381).

(b) Context-free block check. The same proof-of-work test; b.vtxb.\mathrm{vtx}b.vtx is non-empty; the Merkle root over the txids equals the header's Merkle root and is not flagged mutated; 4⋅∣b.vtx∣≤4,000,0004 \cdot |b.\mathrm{vtx}| \le 4{,}000{,}0004⋅∣b.vtx∣≤4,000,000 and 4⋅4 \cdot4⋅ (witness-stripped serialized size of bbb) ≤4,000,000\le 4{,}000{,}000≤4,000,000; the first transaction is a coinbase and every later transaction is not; every transaction txtxtx passes the transaction check: non-empty inputs and non-empty outputs; 4⋅4 \cdot4⋅ (its witness-stripped size) ≤4,000,000\le 4{,}000{,}000≤4,000,000; every output value lies in [0,MAX_MONEY][0, \mathrm{MAX\_MONEY}][0,MAX_MONEY] and every prefix sum of the output values is in money range (hence valueOut(tx)∈[0,MAX_MONEY]\mathrm{valueOut}(tx) \in [0, \mathrm{MAX\_MONEY}]valueOut(tx)∈[0,MAX_MONEY]); the inputs' outpoints are pairwise distinct; a coinbase's first input scriptSig has length in [2,100][2, 100][2,100], and a non-coinbase has no null input outpoint; finally 4⋅4 \cdot4⋅ (the block's legacy sigop count) ≤80,000\le 80{,}000≤80,000.

(c) Contextual block check. With h=S.nextHeighth = S.\mathrm{nextHeight}h=S.nextHeight: every transaction is final at height hhh against a cutoff time (the tip's median time past if CSV is active after the tip height, else the header's time); if the BIP34 height-in-coinbase rule is active, the first transaction's first input scriptSig begins with the push of hhh; the witness-commitment/malleation test for the segwit activation status passes; the block weight is ≤4,000,000\le 4{,}000{,}000≤4,000,000.

(d) Connect. Let h=S.nextHeighth = S.\mathrm{nextHeight}h=S.nextHeight and let HHH be the hash of b.headerb.\mathrm{header}b.header.

  • If HHH equals the fixed mainnet genesis hash, the result is (S.utxo,[ ])(S.\mathrm{utxo}, [\,])(S.utxo,[]): the ledger is unchanged and the transactions of bbb are not applied, although the header is still appended.

  • Otherwise, if the BIP30 scan applies to (S,h,H)(S, h, H)(S,h,H) (it applies unless bbb is one of the two listed repeat blocks or the BIP34 activation header is present in SSS with the expected hash, and always applies from height 1,983,7021{,}983{,}7021,983,702), then for every transaction txtxtx of bbb and every index j<∣tx.vout∣j < |tx.\mathrm{vout}|j<∣tx.vout∣, no entry of S.utxoS.\mathrm{utxo}S.utxo has key (txid(tx),j)(\mathrm{txid}(tx), j)(txid(tx),j). Then the transactions of bbb are processed in order by a loop whose state is (ledger LLL, fees FFF, sigop cost, undo list), starting from (S.utxo,0,0,[ ])(S.\mathrm{utxo}, 0, 0, [\,])(S.utxo,0,0,[]):

    • if txtxtx is a coinbase, FFF and the undo list are unchanged;
    • otherwise, on the current ledger LLL: every input outpoint must have an entry in LLL; scanning the inputs in order, the coin found for each must not be (flagged coinbase with h−˙c.height<100h \mathbin{\dot-} c.\mathrm{height} < 100h−˙​c.height<100, natural-number subtraction truncated at 000), its value must be in money range and the running sum of coin values must be in money range; the total input value VinV_{in}Vin​ must satisfy Vin≥valueOut(tx)V_{in} \ge \mathrm{valueOut}(tx)Vin​≥valueOut(tx) with Vin−valueOut(tx)V_{in} - \mathrm{valueOut}(tx)Vin​−valueOut(tx) in money range; then F+(Vin−valueOut(tx))F + (V_{in} - \mathrm{valueOut}(tx))F+(Vin​−valueOut(tx)) must be in money range, the BIP68 sequence-lock rule must hold, the undo list gains the coins spent, and FFF becomes F+Vin−valueOut(tx)F + V_{in} - \mathrm{valueOut}(tx)F+Vin​−valueOut(tx);
    • in either case the accumulated sigop cost (including this transaction's) must be ≤80,000\le 80{,}000≤80,000, a non-coinbase must have every input script verify under the block's script flags, and the ledger becomes updateCoins(L,tx,h)\mathrm{updateCoins}(L, tx, h)updateCoins(L,tx,h).

    After the loop, with final fees FFF and ledger uuu, it is required that

valueOut(tx0)  ≤  F+coreSubsidy(h),\mathrm{valueOut}(tx_0) \;\le\; F + \mathrm{coreSubsidy}(h),valueOut(tx0​)≤F+coreSubsidy(h),

where tx0tx_0tx0​ is the first transaction of bbb; the result is then (u,undo list)(u, \text{undo list})(u,undo list).

Edge cases the statement includes

  • Only the two bounds on each entry's value are asserted; the heights and coinbase flags of the entries are unconstrained by the conclusion.
  • If a ledger reachable by the rules above contained two entries with the same key, both would have to satisfy the bounds.
  • The step hypothesis of reachability existentially quantifies the block, the clock value ttt, and the undo data; the theorem holds for every state obtained by any such sequence of steps, with any clock values.
  • A block whose header hashes to the genesis hash, if it passes (a)–(c), leaves the ledger unchanged while advancing nextHeight\mathrm{nextHeight}nextHeight.
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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