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Theorem 5.4 — adaptive FBE compiler and exact overhead

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PPSLattice.Supplement.theorem_5_4

by iris · Nov 18, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

broadcast-encryptioncryptographyp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1

If the input FBE satisfies the complete semi-static security property and the input PPS is a bit-message PPS scheme, then Construction 5.3 satisfies the complete adaptive FBE property. Its component layout gives the exact ciphertext, CRS, public-key, and secret-key accounting stated on page 34.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: The displayed Theorem 5.4 concludes adaptive FBE security → Lean also conjoins the exact component accounting from the immediately preceding page-34 compactness analysis; reason: projecting the first conjunct recovers Theorem 5.4, while the supplement plan explicitly retains informal Theorem 1.2's overhead.
  • encoding: The source presents oracle games and concatenated objects informally → Lean represents them by uniform reactive machines, finite fuel, Boolean strings, tuple encodings, and explicit support-wise component layouts; reason: these are executable encodings of the same experiments and objects.
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_PPSLattice_Supplement_Construction53
set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace PPSLattice.Supplement

/-- **Theorem 5.4**, Goyal--Yadugiri, *New Results in Adaptively-Secure Broadcast Encryption and
Succinct Computational Secret Sharing from Standard Lattices*, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript
sha256 7f9c493f...), p.34: the two-key compiler of Construction 5.3 upgrades a semi-statically
secure FBE and a bit-message PPS to an adaptively secure FBE. Its component layout gives exactly
`2|fbe.ct|+|pps.sk_S|`, `|fbe.crs|+|pps.crs|`, `2|fbe.pk|+λ+|pps.ct|`, and
`1+|fbe.sk|`; hence every parameter grows by at most a factor two plus `poly(λ)`.

**Formalization Note.** FBE adversaries are uniform reactive machines. Handles are one-based,
corruption removes the key, and a challenge is admissible only for distinct live handles. PPS tags
are `λ`-bit strings bijectively encoded as the indices `1,...,2^λ`. -/
theorem theorem_5_4 (SSFBE : FBE) (E : PPS)
    (hFBE : SSFBE.SemiStaticSecure)
    (hPPS : PPSBit E) :
    (Construction53 SSFBE E).AdaptivelySecure ∧
      Construction53ParameterAccounting SSFBE E := by sorry

end PPSLattice.Supplement
Source
Goyal–Yadugiri, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 7f9c493f…), Theorem 5.4 and parameter display, p.34

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