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Proof of Theorem 1 — product strategy earns zero

Proved
HartSchmeidler.Finite.product_strategy_payoff_zero

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

correlated-equilibriumfinite-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1product-strategies

Let yyy be a lottery over all triples (i,ri,ti)(i,r^i,t^i)(i,ri,ti) in the auxiliary game. Suppose that, for each player iii, xix^ixi is a probability vector on SiS^iSi satisfying equation (2) for the nonnegative slice yi(ri,ti)=y(i,ri,ti)y^i(r^i,t^i)=y(i,r^i,t^i)yi(ri,ti)=y(i,ri,ti) and every s−is^{-i}s−i. Set x(s)=∏j∈Nxj(sj)x(s)=\prod_{j\in N}x^j(s^j)x(s)=∏j∈N​xj(sj). Then

x∈Δ(S),∑s∈S∑cx(s)y(c)A(s,c)=0.x\in\Delta(S),\qquad \sum_{s\in S}\sum_c x(s)y(c)A(s,c)=0.x∈Δ(S),s∈S∑​c∑​x(s)y(c)A(s,c)=0.

This is the product-strategy calculation closing the nonnegative-response condition in the proof of Theorem 1.

Formalization Note Each xix^ixi is required to be a lottery, and the yiy^iyi are slices of one global lottery. The calculation uses the exact auxiliary payment appearing in the correspondence milestone.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_Finite_Game
Formal statement
namespace HartSchmeidler.Finite

open Finset

/-- Proof of Theorem 1, p. 20: the product of the playerwise lotteries is
a mixed strategy of player I, and equation (2) makes its payoff zero. -/
theorem product_strategy_payoff_zero {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ j, Fintype (S j)] [∀ j, DecidableEq (S j)]
    [∀ j, Nonempty (S j)] (h : ι → (∀ j, S j) → ℝ)
    (y : Deviation S → ℝ) (hy : AGT.IsLottery y)
    (x : ∀ i, S i → ℝ) (hx : ∀ i, AGT.IsLottery (x i))
    (hbalance : ∀ (i : ι) (s : ∀ j, S j),
      ∑ r : S i, x i r * ∑ t : S i, y ⟨i, (r, t)⟩ *
        (h i (Function.update s i r) - h i (Function.update s i t)) = 0) :
    AGT.IsLottery (fun r : ∀ j, S j => ∏ j, x j (r j)) ∧
      (∑ r, ∑ c, (∏ j, x j (r j)) * y c * auxPayoff h r c) = 0 := by sorry

end HartSchmeidler.Finite
Source
Hart and Schmeidler, Existence of Correlated Equilibria, Math. Oper. Res. 14 (1989), p. 20, proof of Theorem 1 (‘Define x(r)’ through ‘which equals zero by (2)’); https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.14.1.18
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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