Lemma 3 and equations (11)–(12): optimal revenue share
ProvedTokenFinance.OptToken.lemma_3monopolyp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue-sharingtoken-financing
Let be marginal cost and the number of units pre-sold to investors. Give those investors the fraction of the tokens issued after production. Then . For every demand intercept such that the monopoly quantity exceeds , the entrepreneur's time-one payoff from any output is at most her payoff at :
This is the incentive calculation behind the contract's revenue share. Formalization Note This statement concerns the high-demand case treated before the paper introduces the low-demand refund terms; both quantities range over .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TokenFinance_Debt_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TokenFinance.OptToken
theorem lemma_3 (c t : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (ht : 0 < t) :
0 < TokenFinance.Debt.alphaT c t ∧ TokenFinance.Debt.alphaT c t < 1 ∧
∀ x q : ℝ, t < (x - c) / 2 → t < q →
(1 - TokenFinance.Debt.alphaT c t) * (q - t) * (x - q) - c * q ≤
(1 - TokenFinance.Debt.alphaT c t) * ((x - c) / 2 - t) * (x - (x - c) / 2) -
c * ((x - c) / 2) := by sorry
end TokenFinance.OptToken
Source
Malinova & Park, Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity, SSRN 3286825 (version of June 1, 2023), pp. 21–22 (PDF pp. 22–23), Lemma 3 and (11)–(12)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.