Proposition 6 (iii), p. 14 — no positive transfers suffice
ProvedMultiItemRev.TwoIID.proposition_6_iiimechanism-designno-positive-transferp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue
For a random valuation of at least one good, restricting to feasible, incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanisms with nonnegative payments does not change optimal revenue:
This permits the proof of Theorem B to work with payments that are nonnegative everywhere.
Formalization Note The random valuation is represented by a probability law. Payment measurability is part of admissibility, as allowed by footnote 12, and the two suprema use extended nonnegative revenue values.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MultiItemRev_TwoIID_Model open MeasureTheory open scoped NNReal ENNReal
Formal statement
namespace MultiItemRev.TwoIID
theorem proposition_6_iii {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Nonempty ι]
(μ : Measure (ι → ℝ≥0)) [IsProbabilityMeasure μ] :
Rev μ = ⨆ (M : MultiItemRev.Decomp.Mechanism ι) (_ : IsAdmissible M ∧ MultiItemRev.Decomp.IsNPT M),
(expRevenue μ M).toENNReal := by sorry
end MultiItemRev.TwoIID
Source
Hart and Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, arXiv:1204.1846v3, p. 14, Proposition 6 (iii)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.