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Theorem 4 — every game in graph function form has a unique fair allocation rule

Proved
CooperationGraphs.FairRule.theorem_4

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cooperation-graphscooperative-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let www be a game in graph function form on a finite player set NNN: for every graph ggg on NNN and every connected component S∈N/gS\in N/gS∈N/g, w(S,g)⊆RSw(S,g)\subseteq\mathbb R^Sw(S,g)⊆RS is a closed, comprehensive, proper subset of RS\mathbb R^SRS. Then there is a unique function Y:GR→RNY:GR\to\mathbb R^NY:GR→RN satisfying the efficiency condition

(Yn(g))n∈S∈∂w(S,g)for all g∈GR, S∈N/g,(14)(Y_n(g))_{n\in S}\in\partial w(S,g)\qquad\text{for all } g\in GR,\ S\in N/g,\tag{14}(Yn​(g))n∈S​∈∂w(S,g)for all g∈GR, S∈N/g,(14)

and the equity condition

Yn(g)−Yn(g∖n:m)=Ym(g)−Ym(g∖n:m)for all g∈GR, n:m∈g.(10)Y_n(g)-Y_n(g\setminus n{:}m)=Y_m(g)-Y_m(g\setminus n{:}m)\qquad\text{for all } g\in GR,\ n{:}m\in g.\tag{10}Yn​(g)−Yn​(g∖n:m)=Ym​(g)−Ym​(g∖n:m)for all g∈GR, n:m∈g.(10)

This is the non-transferable-utility generalization of Theorem 1: a characteristic function game vvv is the graph function game w(S,g)={r∈RS∣∑n∈Srn≤vS}w(S,g)=\{r\in\mathbb R^S\mid\sum_{n\in S}r_n\le v_S\}w(S,g)={r∈RS∣∑n∈S​rn​≤vS​}.

Formalization Note. The paper assumes a nonempty player set, stated as 0<n0<n0<n. ∂\partial∂ is the topological frontier in RS\mathbb R^SRS = ↥S → ℝ. Uniqueness is among all functions Y:GR→RNY:GR\to\mathbb R^NY:GR→RN; condition (7) is not imposed (it is replaced by (14)). The paper's NNN is nonempty; for N=∅N=\emptysetN=∅ the statement holds trivially, so no nonemptiness hypothesis is needed.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CooperationGraphs_FairRule_Basic
Formal statement
namespace CooperationGraphs.FairRule

open Finset
open scoped Classical

/-- Theorem 4 (p. 10): every game `w` in graph function form has a unique fair allocation rule
`Y : GR → ℝ^N`, i.e. a unique `Y` satisfying the efficiency condition (14) and the equity
condition (10). -/
theorem theorem_4 {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (G : GraphFunctionGame n) :
    ∃! Y : Rule n, IsEfficientGF G Y ∧ IsEquitable Y := by sorry

end CooperationGraphs.FairRule
Source
Myerson, Graphs and Cooperation in Games, Discussion Paper No. 246 (Sept. 1976), Theorem 4, p. 10
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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