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Lemma A.6 — Finite linear program

Proved
SecondBestTrade.HalfEfficiency.finite_linear_program

by mikedeng1 · Nov 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theorymechanism-designp2o-batch-stoc27ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

For the finite market, Program (P) has finitely many allocation and transfer variables and a finite linear-inequality presentation with linear objective. The number of variables is (∣E∣+∣I∣+∣J∣)∣TI×TJ∣(|E|+|I|+|J|)|T_I\times T_J|(∣E∣+∣I∣+∣J∣)∣TI​×TJ​∣. Moreover,

0 is feasible,GFT(x)≤FB for every feasible point,∃(x,p) feasible:GFT(x)=OPT(P).0\text{ is feasible},\qquad \mathrm{GFT}(x)\le\mathrm{FB}\text{ for every feasible point},\qquad\exists(x,p)\text{ feasible}:\mathrm{GFT}(x)=\mathrm{OPT}(P).0 is feasible,GFT(x)≤FB for every feasible point,∃(x,p) feasible:GFT(x)=OPT(P).

In particular the optimum is attained even though signed transfers need not be bounded. The finite inequality presentation and attainment are conclusions, rather than market assumptions.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: finite agent, trade and support sets with product-prior expectations → Fin labels, an injective nonnegative-vector support embedding, and finite product-weighted sums; reason: bijections cover every finite source market, and summing an overwritten own coordinate multiplies by its total probability one
  • encoding: buyer payments and seller receipts have opposite utility signs → one signed-payment carrier with seller transfer equal to minus its receipt; reason: this is a bijective change of payment coordinates; the original mechanism still has nonnegative payments and receipts
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_SecondBestTrade_HalfEfficiency_Mechanisms

open scoped BigOperators NNReal
open MeasureTheory
set_option autoImplicit false
noncomputable section
Formal statement
namespace SecondBestTrade.HalfEfficiency

/-- Lemma A.6, printed p. 21 (PDF p. 22). -/
theorem finite_linear_program (N : Market) :
    finiteLPPresentation N ∧
    Fintype.card (Variable N) = (N.ne + N.nb + N.ns) * Fintype.card (Profile N) ∧
    programFeasible N (zeroSigned N) ∧
    (∀ m : SignedMechanism N, programFeasible N m → GFT N m.q ≤ FB N) ∧
    ∃ m : SignedMechanism N, programFeasible N m ∧ GFT N m.q = OPT N := by sorry

end SecondBestTrade.HalfEfficiency
Source
Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Kangning Wang, Jinzhao Wu, Renzhe Xu, STOC 2027 submission #529 (October 2026), Lemma A.6 — Finite linear program, printed p. 21 (PDF p. 22)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Nov 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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