The message-dependent intermediary model and
DefinitionLotteryInterm_IID_Supplement_MessageDependentIn the message-dependent model (§2.1) the intermediary's auction may depend on the menu option a bidder asks for. By the revelation principle it is a direct mechanism: for each report profile and bidder it specifies the probability that is forwarded, with ; the probability that receives the item and expected payment to the seller, with
so the forwarded option may be a lottery over menu options; and an expected fee to the intermediary. Bidder of type reporting has interim utility . Admissibility requires measurability, integrability, Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality.
A best response is an admissible mechanism maximizing the expected fee revenue . The seller's revenue from it is , and
with value when no best response exists, the convention of the published (ties against the seller, Assumption 3.2).
These definitions are used by Theorem 5.1.
Formalization Note Per-bidder pairs in represent the forwarding lotteries: the mean of a lottery over options lies in the convex hull of the options, and every hull point is the mean of a finite lottery.
import Definitions.Def_LotteryInterm_IID_Supplement_GeneralMenu
open MeasureTheory
namespace LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement
/-- A direct mechanism of the intermediary in the message-dependent model (§2.1).
For a report profile `v` and bidder `i`: `selection v i` is the probability that `i`
is forwarded; `allocation v i` and `sellerPayment v i` are `i`'s probability of
receiving the item and expected payment to the seller, through the menu option the
intermediary forwards (which may depend on the reports); `fee v i` is `i`'s expected
payment to the intermediary. -/
structure MDMechanism (n : ℕ) where
selection : (Fin n → ℝ) → Fin n → ℝ
allocation : (Fin n → ℝ) → Fin n → ℝ
sellerPayment : (Fin n → ℝ) → Fin n → ℝ
fee : (Fin n → ℝ) → Fin n → ℝ
/-- At most one bidder is forwarded, and the forwarded bidder's (allocation, seller
payment) is the selection probability times a lottery over menu options: a point of
the convex hull of the options (randomization over options is allowed). -/
def MDFeasible {n : ℕ} (O : GenMenu) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
(∀ v i, 0 ≤ M.selection v i) ∧
(∀ v, (∑ i, M.selection v i) ≤ 1) ∧
(∀ v i, ∃ o ∈ convexHull ℝ O.options,
M.allocation v i = M.selection v i * o.1 ∧ M.sellerPayment v i = M.selection v i * o.2)
def MDWellDefined {n : ℕ} (μ : Measure (Fin n → ℝ)) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
(∀ i, Measurable (fun v => M.selection v i)) ∧
(∀ i, Measurable (fun v => M.allocation v i)) ∧
(∀ i, Measurable (fun v => M.sellerPayment v i)) ∧
(∀ i, Measurable (fun v => M.fee v i)) ∧
(∀ i, Integrable (fun v => M.allocation v i) μ) ∧
(∀ i, Integrable (fun v => M.sellerPayment v i) μ) ∧
(∀ i, Integrable (fun v => M.fee v i) μ) ∧
(∀ i t, Integrable (fun v => M.allocation (Function.update v i t) i) μ) ∧
(∀ i t, Integrable (fun v => M.sellerPayment (Function.update v i t) i) μ) ∧
(∀ i t, Integrable (fun v => M.fee (Function.update v i t) i) μ)
/-- Interim utility of bidder `i` with true value `t` who reports `report`. -/
noncomputable def mdInterimUtility {n : ℕ} (μ : Measure (Fin n → ℝ)) (M : MDMechanism n)
(i : Fin n) (report t : ℝ) : ℝ :=
(∫ v, M.allocation (Function.update v i report) i ∂μ) * t
- (∫ v, M.sellerPayment (Function.update v i report) i ∂μ)
- (∫ v, M.fee (Function.update v i report) i ∂μ)
def MDBIC {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
∀ i, ∀ᵐ t ∂(D i).law, ∀ report : ℝ,
mdInterimUtility (prior D) M i report t ≤ mdInterimUtility (prior D) M i t t
def MDInterimIR {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
∀ i, ∀ᵐ t ∂(D i).law, 0 ≤ mdInterimUtility (prior D) M i t t
def MDAdmissible {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (O : GenMenu) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
MDFeasible O M ∧ MDWellDefined (prior D) M ∧ MDBIC D M ∧ MDInterimIR D M
/-- Expected fee revenue of the intermediary. -/
noncomputable def mdFeeRevenue {n : ℕ} (μ : Measure (Fin n → ℝ)) (M : MDMechanism n) : ℝ :=
∫ v, ∑ i, M.fee v i ∂μ
/-- Expected revenue of the seller. -/
noncomputable def mdSellerRevenue {n : ℕ} (μ : Measure (Fin n → ℝ)) (M : MDMechanism n) : ℝ :=
∫ v, ∑ i, M.sellerPayment v i ∂μ
noncomputable def mdOptFee {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (O : GenMenu) : EReal :=
sSup {r | ∃ M : MDMechanism n, MDAdmissible D O M ∧ (mdFeeRevenue (prior D) M : EReal) = r}
def MDBestResponse {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (O : GenMenu) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
MDAdmissible D O M ∧ (mdFeeRevenue (prior D) M : EReal) = mdOptFee D O
/-- `RandMD(O)`: the seller's revenue against the worst intermediary best response,
`⊥` if there is none (the convention of the published `RandMI`). -/
noncomputable def RandMD {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (O : GenMenu) : EReal := by
classical
exact if ∃ M, MDBestResponse D O M then
sInf {r | ∃ M, MDBestResponse D O M ∧ (mdSellerRevenue (prior D) M : EReal) = r}
else ⊥
end LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement