Lemma 2 — under acquihiring the bid v_s − w̲ is accepted if v_a > v_s, the bid fails if v_a < v_s; efficiency cases
ProvedAcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline.lemma_2Consider the baseline model with and , and suppose the acquirer chooses acquihiring: it bids a price for the startup, and whichever firm then employs the worker makes her a wage offer.
In every continuation equilibrium in undominated strategies, with bid :
- if , the acquirer bids , the bid is accepted, and the acquirer employs the worker at wage ;
- if , the bid is declined and the startup retains the worker at wage .
Continuation equilibria exist in both cases, and when the bid is an equilibrium bid. The outcome is efficient (total surplus equal to ) if or , and inefficient, with surplus
if .
The acquirer only needs to compensate the startup for its retention profit , never the employee for her lost private benefit; this is what makes acquihiring attractive to the acquirer and harmful to the employee.
Formalization Note. When the equilibrium bid is not unique: every bid below is declined and gives the acquirer . The page's "the acquirer offers " is therefore stated as the existence of an equilibrium with that bid, while "the offer is declined" holds for every equilibrium.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AcquihiringMonopsony_Baseline_Model
namespace AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline
/-- Lemma 2 (pp. 5–6): under acquihiring, in every continuation equilibrium, if `v_a > v_s` the
acquirer bids `v_s − w̲`, the bid is accepted and the acquirer pays the wage `w̲`; if
`v_a < v_s` the bid is declined and the startup pays the wage `w̲`. Continuation equilibria
exist in both cases, and when `v_a < v_s` the bid `v_a − w̲` is an equilibrium bid. The outcome
is efficient if `v_a ≥ v_s + b` or `v_a < v_s`, and inefficient if `v_s < v_a < v_s + b`. -/
theorem lemma_2 (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
(∀ σ : AHProfile, IsAHEquilibrium P σ →
(P.vs < P.va → σ.p = P.vs - P.wl ∧ σ.acceptBid σ.p = true ∧ σ.wa = P.wl) ∧
(P.va < P.vs → σ.acceptBid σ.p = false ∧ σ.ws = P.wl) ∧
(P.va < P.vs → surplus P (σ.acceptBid σ.p) = max P.va (P.vs + P.b)) ∧
(P.vs + P.b ≤ P.va → surplus P (σ.acceptBid σ.p) = max P.va (P.vs + P.b)) ∧
(P.vs < P.va → P.va < P.vs + P.b →
surplus P (σ.acceptBid σ.p) < max P.va (P.vs + P.b))) ∧
(P.vs < P.va → ∃ σ : AHProfile, IsAHEquilibrium P σ) ∧
(P.va < P.vs → ∃ σ : AHProfile, IsAHEquilibrium P σ ∧ σ.p = P.va - P.wl) := by sorry
end AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.