§4.1, p. 10, (4)–(5) — w^U(u) = ku²/2 + u/2 − c/6, the quantities at w^U(u), and Π^U_M(u), Π^U_R(u) = 2c²/(9u)
ProvedQualityEncroach.Uniform.wholesale_and_profits_given_uencroachmentp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chainwholesale-price
Let , and a quality be given, and let the quantities follow the subgame solution (3), and . Then:
- the manufacturer's profit
has the unique maximizer over
- the corresponding quantities are and ;
- the profits are
These are equations (4) and (5) of the paper.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_Uniform_Game
Formal statement
namespace QualityEncroach.Uniform
/-- §4.1, p. 10, (4)–(5): for a given quality `u > 0`, with the subgame quantities
`q^U_R(w, u)`, `q^U_M(w, u)` of (3), the manufacturer's profit is uniquely maximized over `w` at
`w^U(u) = ku²/2 + u/2 − c/6`; there `q^U_R = 2c/(3u)` and `q^U_M = −ku/2 − 5c/(6u) + 1/2`, and
the two profits are `Π^U_M(u)` and `Π^U_R(u) = 2c²/(9u)`. -/
theorem wholesale_and_profits_given_u (k c : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (u : ℝ) (hu : 0 < u) :
(∀ w : ℝ, w ≠ wU k c u →
mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, u, qUR k c w u, qUM k c w u⟩ <
mfrPayoff k c ⟨wU k c u, u, qUR k c (wU k c u) u, qUM k c (wU k c u) u⟩) ∧
qUR k c (wU k c u) u = 2 * c / (3 * u) ∧
qUM k c (wU k c u) u = -(k * u) / 2 - 5 * c / (6 * u) + 1 / 2 ∧
mfrPayoff k c ⟨wU k c u, u, qUR k c (wU k c u) u, qUM k c (wU k c u) u⟩ = PiUM k c u ∧
retailerPayoff ⟨wU k c u, u, qUR k c (wU k c u) u, qUM k c (wU k c u) u⟩ = PiUR c u := by sorry
end QualityEncroach.Uniform
Source
Ha, Long & Nasiry, Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment, authors' manuscript, SSRN 3970373, p. 10, §4.1, equations (4)–(5) and the display between them
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.