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Theorem 4.1 — the optimal DSIC auction needs Ω(nm)\Omega(\sqrt{nm})Ω(nm​) extra bidders to exceed the optimal BIC revenue

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DSICCompComp.Supplement.theorem_4_1

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

competition-complexitymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1revenue-maximization

Sell mmm independent items to additive bidders whose value vectors are drawn iid from a product distribution D=D1×⋯×DmD = D_1 \times \cdots \times D_mD=D1​×⋯×Dm​ on R≥0m\mathbb R_{\ge 0}^mR≥0m​. Write RevND(D)\mathrm{Rev}^{\mathcal D}_N(D)RevND​(D) for the revenue of the optimal DSIC/IR mechanism with NNN bidders and RevnB(D)\mathrm{Rev}^{\mathcal B}_n(D)RevnB​(D) for the revenue of the optimal BIC/BIR mechanism with nnn bidders.

Theorem. There exist absolute constants μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 and C>0C > 0C>0 such that for all n,mn, mn,m with 2≤m≤μn2 \le m \le \mu n2≤m≤μn there is a product distribution DDD over mmm items with

Revn+cD(D)  <  RevnB(D)for every integer 0≤c<Cnm.\mathrm{Rev}^{\mathcal D}_{n+c}(D) \;<\; \mathrm{Rev}^{\mathcal B}_n(D) \qquad \text{for every integer } 0 \le c < C\sqrt{nm}.Revn+cD​(D)<RevnB​(D)for every integer 0≤c<Cnm​.

In words: Ω(nm)\Omega(\sqrt{nm})Ω(nm​) additional additive bidders with iid values from DDD are necessary for the revenue of the best DSIC auction to reach that of the best BIC auction with nnn bidders. Together with the known O(nm)O(\sqrt{nm})O(nm​) upper bound for selling separately (a DSIC mechanism), this shows that the DSIC-versus-BIC competition complexity for additive bidders over independent items is Θ(nm)\Theta(\sqrt{nm})Θ(nm​) in this range (Corollary 4.2). The distribution is chosen before ccc; no regularity is required of it.

Formalization Note RevD\mathrm{Rev}^{\mathcal D}RevD is the base mission's published optRevDSIC (the published RevDS: DSIC and IR at every value profile, measurable payments) and RevB\mathrm{Rev}^{\mathcal B}RevB is optRevBIC; both are suprema in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞].

Differences from the source:

  • reading: Ω(√nm) additional bidders are necessary for the revenue of the best DSIC auction to exceed that of the best BIC auction → every c ∈ ℕ with c < C·√(nm) has Rev^D_{n+c}(D) < Rev^B_n(D) (strict); reason: the paper uses 'exceed' for ≥ in its own proof (Appendix D, p.37: 'if Rev^D_{n+c} ≥ Rev^B_n, that is, if the revenue of the best DSIC auction ... exceeds that of the best BIC auction ..., then c ≥ Ω(√nm)') and in Definition 2.1; the non-strict reading c < C√(nm) ⇒ Rev^D_{n+c} ≤ Rev^B_n is the weaker one and is satisfied by every point-mass distribution
  • reading: Ω(√nm) → an absolute constant C > 0, quantified with µ before n and m; reason: standard meaning of Ω, the same shape as the published goal Theorem 3.1
  • reading: the set 𝒟 of DSIC/IR mechanisms (defined on p.6 without reference to the distribution: DSIC 'for all bidders i, values v_i and v'i, and value profiles v{-i}') → the base mission's optRevDSIC (the published RevDS): feasible mechanisms that are DSIC and IR at every value profile in ℝ≥0^{n×m}; reason: the page defines 𝒟 independently of D, quantifying over all values; this is the class the published goal uses
  • encoding: expected revenue E[Σ_i p_i(v)] of a DSIC/IR mechanism → measurable payments required in RevDS; reason: the expectation is defined only for measurable payments; the convention of the published goal
  • generalization: ℬ(D): BIC/BIR mechanisms with respect to D → IsAdmissibleBIC: additionally measurable payments and integrable interim-utility integrands; reason: the extra clauses shrink ℬ(D), so Rev^B_n(D) can only decrease; Rev^D_{n+c} < Rev^B_n for the smaller class implies it for the page's class
  • encoding: E_{v_{-i}∼D^{n-1}}[…] → Bochner integral against the full profile law D^n of an integrand that ignores the i-th coordinate; reason: the i-th coordinate's law is a probability measure, so the two integrals agree
  • encoding: Rev^M_n(D) and the suprema Rev^D, Rev^B → expRevenueN (∫⁺ − ∫⁻ in EReal) truncated at 0 per mechanism, suprema in ℝ≥0∞; reason: the zero mechanism lies in both classes with revenue 0, so truncation does not change either supremum; same convention as the published goal
  • encoding: a distribution over m independent items, bidders iid → D : Fin m → ProbabilityMeasure ℝ≥0, profile law Measure.pi (profileLaw); 0-based bidders and items; reason: the base mission's published convention
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_DSICCompComp_optRevDSIC
import Definitions.Def_DSICCompComp_Supplement_optRevBIC

open MeasureTheory
open scoped NNReal ENNReal
Formal statement
namespace DSICCompComp

namespace Supplement

/-- Theorem 4.1 (Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, *The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items*, STOC 2027
submission, manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…,
Theorem 4.1, p.16 (pdf p.17)): there exists some constant `µ > 0` such that for all
`2 ≤ m ≤ µn`, there exists a distribution over `m` independent items such that `Ω(√(nm))`
additional additive bidders with iid values from the distribution are necessary for the revenue of
the best DSIC auction to exceed that of the best BIC auction with `n` bidders.

Lean reading: there are absolute constants `µ > 0` and `C > 0` such that for all `n, m` with
`2 ≤ m ≤ µn` there is a product distribution `D = D_1 × ⋯ × D_m` such that every `c ∈ ℕ` with
`c < C√(nm)` has `Rev^𝒟_{n+c}(D) < Rev^B_n(D)`.

**Formalization Note** "Exceed" is `≥`, as the paper's own proof uses it (Appendix D, p.37: "if
`Rev^𝒟_{n+c} ≥ Rev^B_n`, that is, if the revenue of the best DSIC auction ... exceeds that of the
best BIC auction ..., then `c ≥ Ω(√nm)`") and as Definition 2.1 does; so "necessary" is the strict
`<` for every `c < C√(nm)`. The distribution is chosen before `c`; `µ` and `C` before `n`, `m`.
`Rev^𝒟` is the base mission's `optRevDSIC` (the published `RevDS`: DSIC/IR at every profile in
`ℝ≥0^{n×m}`, measurable payments) and `Rev^B` is `optRevBIC`. No regularity is required of `D`. -/
theorem theorem_4_1 :
    ∃ μ : ℝ, 0 < μ ∧ ∃ C : ℝ, 0 < C ∧
      ∀ n m : ℕ, 2 ≤ m → (m : ℝ) ≤ μ * n →
        ∃ D : Fin m → ProbabilityMeasure ℝ≥0,
          ∀ c : ℕ, (c : ℝ) < C * Real.sqrt ((n : ℝ) * m) →
            optRevDSIC (n + c) D < optRevBIC n D := by sorry

end Supplement

end DSICCompComp
Source
Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…), Theorem 4.1, p.16 (pdf p.17); BIC/BIR and Rev^B_n, Section 2, pp.5–6 (pdf pp.6–7); 'exceed' as used in Appendix D, p.37 (pdf p.38)

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