Lemma 1 — is a weighted potential game with potential and weights
ProvedBayesRouting.VOI.weighted_potentialp2o-batch-p200bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1potential-gamerouting-game
Consider a Bayesian routing game with weighted potential
Then is continuously differentiable, every type probability is positive, and for every strategy profile , population , type and route ,
That is, is a weighted potential game in the sense of Sandholm, with positive type-specific weights . This identity is what links equilibria to minimizers of .
Formalization Note The partial derivative is stated as a HasDerivAt of at , for every in the whole coordinate space (not only on ). Positivity of uses the added full-support assumption on the prior.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_BayesRouting_VOI_Game import Definitions.Def_BayesRouting_VOI_Potential
Formal statement
namespace BayesRouting.VOI
/-- **Lemma 1** (Wu, Amin, Ozdaglar, Oper. Res. 69(1) 2021, p. 154). `Γ(λ)` is a weighted
potential game (8) with potential `Φ` (9) and weights `γ(t^i) = Pr(t^i)`: `Φ` is continuously
differentiable, every weight `Pr(t^i)` is positive, and for every strategy profile `q` the
partial derivative of `Φ` in the coordinate `q^i_r(t^i)` is `Pr(t^i) 𝔼[c_r(q) | t^i]`. -/
theorem weighted_potential {I : Type} [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (T i)]
[∀ i, DecidableEq (T i)] [∀ i, Nonempty (T i)] {S E R : Type} [Fintype S] [Fintype E]
[DecidableEq E] [Fintype R] [DecidableEq R] [Nonempty R]
(G : Game I T S E R) :
ContDiff ℝ 1 (potential G) ∧
∀ (i : I) (ti : T i), 0 < typeProb G i ti ∧
∀ (q : (k : I) → T k → R → ℝ) (r : R),
HasDerivAt (fun x => potential G (setCoord q i ti r x))
(typeProb G i ti * expCost G q i ti r) (q i ti r) := by sorry
end BayesRouting.VOI
Source
Wu, Amin, Ozdaglar, Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, Oper. Res. 69(1) 2021, p. 154, Lemma 1 (with definition (8), pp. 153-154)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.