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Soundness observation, p. 2 — in any optimal allocation vertex items go to vertex agents and i(e) goes to a(e)

Proved
NSWApxHard.Reduction.optimal_observation

by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

exchange-argumentnash-social-welfarep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1soundness

Let GGG be a 3-regular graph on NNN vertices, let α∈(1/3,1/2)\alpha\in(1/3,1/2)α∈(1/3,1/2), and consider the reduced instance with kkk vertex items. In every allocation xxx of maximum Nash social welfare,

  1. each vertex item is assigned to some vertex agent a(v)a(v)a(v), and
  2. each edge item i(e)i(e)i(e) is assigned to the corresponding edge agent a(e)a(e)a(e).

This normal form is the first step of the soundness analysis; Lemmas 2.2–2.4 build on it.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: c_min N vertex items → any number k of vertex items; reason: the observation does not depend on the number of vertex items, and k = c_min N is the page's case.
  • reading: the section's standing assumptions (G 3-regular, "Let α be a constant in (1/3, 1/2)", p. 2) → explicit hypotheses; reason: the sentence relies on them without repeating them.
  • encoding: a 3-regular graph with N vertices → a graph on Fin N, N = 0 allowed; reason: for N = 0 there are no items and the claim is empty, so no instance of the page changes.
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_NSWApxHard_Reduction_Instance
Formal statement
namespace NSWApxHard.Reduction

/-- Observation (Lee, p. 2): in any optimal allocation of the reduced instance, each vertex item
is assigned to some vertex agent, and each edge item `i(e)` to the edge agent `a(e)`. -/
theorem optimal_observation {N : ℕ} (G : SimpleGraph (Fin N)) [DecidableRel G.Adj] (k : ℕ)
    (α : ℝ) (hG : IsCubic G) (hα₁ : 1 / 3 < α) (hα₂ : α < 1 / 2)
    (x : Item G k → Agent G) (hx : IsOptimal (redUtil G k α) x) :
    (∀ j : Fin k, ∃ v : Fin N, x (Sum.inl j) = Sum.inl v) ∧
      ∀ e : Edge G, x (Sum.inr (Sum.inl e)) = Sum.inr e := by sorry

end NSWApxHard.Reduction
Source
Lee, APX-Hardness of Maximizing Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items, arXiv:1507.01159v1, p. 2, §2, Soundness (first observation)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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