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Theorem 4.1 — Stage-specific optimal prices

Proved
GaoImpatientMNL.Pricing.theorem_4_1

by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

multinomial-logitoperations-researchp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pricing

Let n,m≥1n,m\ge1n,m≥1, let α∈Rn\alpha\in\mathbb R^nα∈Rn, let β>0\beta>0β>0 be common to all products, and let 1=λ1≥⋯≥λm>01=\lambda_1\ge\cdots\ge\lambda_m>01=λ1​≥⋯≥λm​>0. Feasible sequences S∈FS\in\mathcal FS∈F have pairwise disjoint assortments, allowing empty stages and omitted products. Write Π(p,S)\Pi(p,S)Π(p,S) for the sequential revenue defined by the model, with every product price unrestricted in R\mathbb RR. For each fixed feasible sequence SSS, there exists a global maximizer p∗p^*p∗ over all real prices such that

i,j∈Sk ⟹ pi∗=pj∗.i,j\in S_k\ \Longrightarrow\ p_i^*=p_j^*.i,j∈Sk​ ⟹ pi∗​=pj∗​.

Existence of a maximizing vector is part of the conclusion. Empty stages require no price equality and omitted prices remain unrestricted.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: Products and stages numbered from one → Products and stages are Fin n and Fin m, numbered from zero; reason: This is a bijective reindexing; n and m are positive, and empty stages and omitted products remain feasible.
  • encoding: Common price sensitivity beta → Explicit beta > 0; reason: This is the economic price-sensitivity convention used in Appendix C and the rescaling in Appendix F; intrinsic utilities and input prices remain arbitrary reals.
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_GaoImpatientMNL_Pricing_Model
Formal statement
/- BEGIN IMPORTED LEAN FOR BLIND AUDIT
noncomputable section
namespace MultiStoreAssort.Pricing
variable {n : ℕ}
noncomputable def rev14 (a b : Fin n → ℝ) (S : Finset (Fin n)) (p : Fin n → ℝ) : ℝ :=
  (∑ k ∈ S, p k * Real.exp (a k - b k * p k)) / (1 + ∑ k ∈ S, Real.exp (a k - b k * p k))
end MultiStoreAssort.Pricing
end

open scoped BigOperators
noncomputable section
namespace GaoImpatientMNL.Pricing
def Parameters {n m : ℕ} (β : ℝ) (lam : Fin m → ℝ) : Prop :=
  0 < n ∧ 0 < m ∧ 0 < β ∧
    (∀ k, k.val = 0 → lam k = 1) ∧ (∀ k, 0 < lam k) ∧ Antitone lam
def Feasible {n m : ℕ} (S : Fin m → Finset (Fin n)) : Prop :=
  ∀ k h, k ≠ h → Disjoint (S k) (S h)
def attraction {n : ℕ} (α : Fin n → ℝ) (β : ℝ) (p : Fin n → ℝ)
    (s : Finset (Fin n)) : ℝ := ∑ i ∈ s, Real.exp (α i - β * p i)
def prefixWeight {n m : ℕ} (v : Fin n → ℝ) (S : Fin m → Finset (Fin n)) (k : Fin m) : ℝ :=
  ∑ h ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun h => h < k), ∑ i ∈ S h, v i
def choiceFormula {n m : ℕ} (v : Fin n → ℝ) (lam : Fin m → ℝ)
    (S : Fin m → Finset (Fin n)) (k : Fin m) (i : Fin n) : ℝ :=
  lam k * v i / ((1 + prefixWeight v S k) * (1 + prefixWeight v S k + ∑ j ∈ S k, v j))
def revenue {n m : ℕ} (α : Fin n → ℝ) (β : ℝ) (lam : Fin m → ℝ)
    (S : Fin m → Finset (Fin n)) (p : Fin n → ℝ) : ℝ :=
  ∑ k, (lam k * ∑ i ∈ S k, p i * Real.exp (α i - β * p i)) /
    ((1 + prefixWeight (fun i => Real.exp (α i - β * p i)) S k) *
      (1 + prefixWeight (fun i => Real.exp (α i - β * p i)) S k + attraction α β p (S k)))
def firstSequence (n m : ℕ) : Fin m → Finset (Fin n) :=
  fun k => if k.val = 0 then Finset.univ else ∅
def firstRevenue {n : ℕ} (α : Fin n → ℝ) (β : ℝ) (p : Fin n → ℝ) : ℝ :=
  MultiStoreAssort.Pricing.rev14 α (fun _ => β) Finset.univ p
def jointRevenues {n m : ℕ} (α : Fin n → ℝ) (β : ℝ) (lam : Fin m → ℝ) : Set ℝ :=
  {r | ∃ S : Fin m → Finset (Fin n), Feasible S ∧ ∃ p : Fin n → ℝ, r = revenue α β lam S p}
def jointValue {n m : ℕ} (α : Fin n → ℝ) (β : ℝ) (lam : Fin m → ℝ) : ℝ :=
  sSup (jointRevenues α β lam)
def firstValue {n : ℕ} (α : Fin n → ℝ) (β : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  sSup (Set.range (firstRevenue α β))
def IsPricingMax {n m : ℕ} (α : Fin n → ℝ) (β : ℝ) (lam : Fin m → ℝ)
    (S : Fin m → Finset (Fin n)) (p : Fin n → ℝ) : Prop :=
  ∀ p', revenue α β lam S p' ≤ revenue α β lam S p
def MaximaExist {n m : ℕ} (α : Fin n → ℝ) (β : ℝ) (lam : Fin m → ℝ) : Prop :=
  (jointRevenues α β lam).Nonempty ∧ BddAbove (jointRevenues α β lam) ∧
  (Set.range (firstRevenue α β)).Nonempty ∧ BddAbove (Set.range (firstRevenue α β)) ∧
  (∃ S p, Feasible S ∧ revenue α β lam S p = jointValue α β lam) ∧
  (∃ p, firstRevenue α β p = firstValue α β) ∧ 0 < jointValue α β lam
end GaoImpatientMNL.Pricing
END IMPORTED LEAN FOR BLIND AUDIT -/

namespace GaoImpatientMNL.Pricing

theorem theorem_4_1 {n m : ℕ} (α : Fin n → ℝ) (β : ℝ) (lam : Fin m → ℝ)
    (h : Parameters (n := n) β lam) (S : Fin m → Finset (Fin n)) (hS : Feasible S) :
    ∃ p : Fin n → ℝ, IsPricingMax α β lam S p ∧
      ∀ k, ∀ i ∈ S k, ∀ j ∈ S k, p i = p j := by sorry

end GaoImpatientMNL.Pricing
Source
Gao et al., DOI 10.1287/opre.2021.2127, Theorem 4.1, PDF p.12, printed p.12, held source.pdf.
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5

Data. Take n,m∈Nn,m\in\mathbb{N}n,m∈N, α∈Rn\alpha\in\mathbb{R}^nα∈Rn, β∈R\beta\in\mathbb{R}β∈R and λ∈Rm\lambda\in\mathbb{R}^mλ∈Rm (indices zero-based), satisfying:

  • n>0n>0n>0 and m>0m>0m>0;
  • β>0\beta>0β>0;
  • λ0=1\lambda_0=1λ0​=1, every λk>0\lambda_k>0λk​>0, and λ\lambdaλ non-increasing.

Let S:[m]→2[n]S:[m]\to2^{[n]}S:[m]→2[n] have pairwise disjoint stages.

Conclusion. There exists p∈Rnp\in\mathbb{R}^np∈Rn such that:

  1. ppp maximizes, over all of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, the function
R(p)=∑k=0m−1λk∑i∈Skpieαi−βpi(1+Wk)(1+Wk+∑i∈Skeαi−βpi),Wk=∑h<k∑i∈Sheαi−βpi;R(p)=\sum_{k=0}^{m-1}\frac{\lambda_k\sum_{i\in S_k}p_ie^{\alpha_i-\beta p_i}}{(1+W_k)(1+W_k+\sum_{i\in S_k}e^{\alpha_i-\beta p_i})},\qquad W_k=\sum_{h<k}\sum_{i\in S_h}e^{\alpha_i-\beta p_i};R(p)=k=0∑m−1​(1+Wk​)(1+Wk​+∑i∈Sk​​eαi​−βpi​)λk​∑i∈Sk​​pi​eαi​−βpi​​,Wk​=h<k∑​i∈Sh​∑​eαi​−βpi​;
  1. within each stage, all offered products share one price: pi=pjp_i=p_jpi​=pj​ for all i,j∈Ski,j\in S_ki,j∈Sk​.

The statement asserts existence of one such maximizer. It does not assert that every maximizer has equal within-stage prices, nor anything about prices across different stages or of products in no stage.

Degenerate cases. If every SkS_kSk​ is empty, R≡0R\equiv0R≡0 and any ppp witnesses the claim. Stages with at most one product make the equal-price condition trivial for that stage. The cases n=0n=0n=0, m=0m=0m=0 and β≤0\beta\le0β≤0 are excluded by hypothesis.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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