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Theorem 1 — every finite game has a correlated equilibrium

Proved
HartSchmeidler.Finite.correlated_equilibrium_exists

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

correlated-equilibriumfinite-gamesgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let NNN be a finite set of players. For every i∈Ni\in Ni∈N, let SiS^iSi be a finite, nonempty set of pure strategies, and let hi:S→Rh^i:S\to\mathbb Rhi:S→R be an arbitrary real payoff function on S=∏j∈NSjS=\prod_{j\in N}S^jS=∏j∈N​Sj. There exists a probability vector ppp on SSS satisfying the correlated-equilibrium incentive inequalities:

∀i∈N ∀ri,ti∈Si,∑s−i∈S−ip(s−i,ri)[hi(s−i,ri)−hi(s−i,ti)]≥0.\forall i\in N\ \forall r^i,t^i\in S^i,\qquad \sum_{s^{-i}\in S^{-i}}p(s^{-i},r^i) \bigl[h^i(s^{-i},r^i)-h^i(s^{-i},t^i)\bigr]\ge0.∀i∈N ∀ri,ti∈Si,s−i∈S−i∑​p(s−i,ri)[hi(s−i,ri)−hi(s−i,ti)]≥0.

This is Hart and Schmeidler's finite-game existence theorem, which supplies the finite core for their later infinite-game results.

Formalization Note Each strategy set must be nonempty to admit a probability vector. An empty player set is allowed: its profile set has one element and the incentive conditions have no instances. Finiteness and decidable equality are Lean enumeration requirements; payoffs have no sign or normalization restriction.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_Finite_Game
Formal statement
namespace HartSchmeidler.Finite

/-- Theorem 1, p. 19: every finite game has a correlated equilibrium in
the sense of condition (1). -/
theorem correlated_equilibrium_exists {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    (S : ι → Type*) [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
    [∀ i, Nonempty (S i)] (h : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) :
    ∃ p : (∀ i, S i) → ℝ, IsCorrelatedEq h p := by sorry

end HartSchmeidler.Finite
Source
Hart and Schmeidler, Existence of Correlated Equilibria, Math. Oper. Res. 14 (1989), p. 19, Theorem 1 and condition (1); https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.14.1.18
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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