Theorem 8 — the core of a convex game is its unique von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set
ProvedCoresConvexGames.Stability.core_is_unique_stable_setLet be a finite set of players and a game, i.e. a set function with . For a payoff vector and a coalition write . Suppose is convex: for all . A payoff vector is feasible if . The core is the set of feasible with for all . A vector dominates if there is a nonempty coalition with and for all . A set of feasible vectors is stable if every feasible vector is either a member of or dominated by a member of , but not both.
Then the core of is stable, and it is the only stable set:
That is, the core of a convex game is its unique von Neumann–Morgenstern solution. For general games stable sets need not exist and need not be unique, so convexity singles out a class where the two classical solution concepts coincide.
Formalization Note Players are Fin n (a relabelling of Shapley's arbitrary finite ), a game is f : Finset (Fin n) → ℝ, and the core is the published Supermodularity.Cooperative.Core Finset.univ f. Convexity is the published IsConvexGame f, which includes . Stable sets are defined over feasible vectors, as on the page (a footnote notes the classical imputation-based variant gives the same answer for the core).
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Supermodularity_Cooperative_IsConvexGame import Definitions.Def_Supermodularity_Cooperative_Core import Definitions.Def_CoresConvexGames_Stability_IsStableSet
namespace CoresConvexGames.Stability
open Supermodularity.Cooperative
/-- Shapley (1971), p. 24, Theorem 8: the core of a convex game is stable, and it is the
unique stable set (von Neumann–Morgenstern solution). -/
theorem core_is_unique_stable_set {n : ℕ} (f : Finset (Fin n) → ℝ) (hf : IsConvexGame f) :
IsStableSet f (Core Finset.univ f) ∧
∀ V : Set (Fin n → ℝ), IsStableSet f V → V = Core Finset.univ f := by sorry
end CoresConvexGames.Stability
Read-back
What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5
Throughout, is a natural number and is a set of players. Three names in the statement come from the accompanying definition bundle, and their Lean bodies are not part of the code under review:
- "convex game" (
IsConvexGame) - "core relative to a player set" (
Core) - "stable set" (
IsStableSet)
This read-back can only describe them by name and by type. Any further meaning they carry, such as supermodularity, the normalisation , efficiency, individual rationality, or internal and external stability, depends entirely on those definitions. The statement itself does not show it.
Data. The statement takes any function
which assigns a real number to every subset , including and . The statement does not itself require or monotonicity.
Hypothesis. is a convex game in the sense of the bundle's definition IsConvexGame. This is the only hypothesis.
Notation. Write
for the set Core gives when its player-set argument is the full set and the game is . is a set of payoff vectors .
Conclusion. The theorem asserts two things together:
- is a stable set for , in the sense of
IsStableSet. - For every subset , if is a stable set for , then
This is exact equality of sets. The quantifier ranges over all subsets of . The only restriction on is whatever IsStableSet itself imposes; the statement adds none, such as requiring to lie among the imputations.
So under the hypothesis, is stable and is the only stable set. The statement does not separately say that is nonempty. It follows only if IsStableSet rules out the empty set, or if its conditions force the empty set to fail them.
Degenerate cases.
- . There are no players. The only coalition is , and has exactly one point, the empty vector. is then a single real number . If that is a convex game, the theorem says is stable and is the only stable set. Since there is one point, is either that point or the empty set; which one depends on how
Coretreats . - . There are two coalitions, and , and payoff vectors are single real numbers.
- Empty core. Nothing in the statement stops from being empty unless the definitions do. If it is empty, the theorem says the empty set is stable and that every stable set is empty.
- Vacuous hypothesis. If
IsConvexGamecan never be satisfied by some , the theorem says nothing about that .
The statement uses no division, subtraction of natural numbers, integrals, suprema or extended-real arithmetic. Any junk-value behaviour of that kind could only come from inside the three bundle definitions.
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.