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Lemma 1 — under direct hiring the acquirer hires at v_s + b if v_a > v_s + b, else the startup retains at v_a − b; efficient

Proved
AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline.lemma_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

acquihiringbertrand-competitionmonopsonyp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1wage-competition

Consider the baseline model with values va,vsv_a, v_sva​,vs​, private benefit bbb and wage floor w‾\underline{w}w​, satisfying b>0b > 0b>0 and min⁡{va,vs}>b+w‾\min\{v_a, v_s\} > b + \underline{w}min{va​,vs​}>b+w​. Suppose the acquirer chooses direct hiring, so that the acquirer and the startup compete in wages for the employee.

Then in every continuation equilibrium in undominated strategies, with equilibrium offers waw_awa​ and wsw_sws​:

  1. if va>vs+bv_a > v_s + bva​>vs​+b, the acquirer hires the employee, at wage wa=vs+bw_a = v_s + bwa​=vs​+b;
  2. if va<vs+bv_a < v_s + bva​<vs​+b, the startup retains the employee, at wage ws=va−bw_s = v_a - bws​=va​−b;
  3. the outcome is efficient, i.e. its total surplus is
max⁡{va, vs+b}.\max\{v_a,\ v_s + b\}.max{va​, vs​+b}.

Moreover, when va≠vs+bv_a \neq v_s + bva​=vs​+b, such a continuation equilibrium exists.

This is the asymmetric Bertrand outcome of the wage competition: the firm with the higher willingness to pay (counting the employee's private benefit in the startup's favour) wins her at the rival's reservation level. It determines the acquirer's and the employee's payoffs from direct hiring, which Proposition 1 compares with acquihiring.

Formalization Note. Uniqueness of the outcome is stated for every equilibrium profile, including the employee's acceptance rule off the path. The existence clause is the reading of "the continuation equilibrium" on the page; the knife edge va=vs+bv_a = v_s + bva​=vs​+b, which the lemma does not cover, is excluded from it, while the efficiency clause is stated there as well.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_AcquihiringMonopsony_Baseline_Model
Formal statement
namespace AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline

/-- Lemma 1 (p. 5): under direct hiring, in every continuation equilibrium the acquirer hires
the employee at wage `v_s + b` if `v_a > v_s + b`, the startup retains her at wage `v_a − b`
if `v_a < v_s + b`, and the outcome maximizes total surplus; a continuation equilibrium exists
whenever `v_a ≠ v_s + b`. -/
theorem lemma_1 (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
    (∀ σ : DHProfile, IsDHEquilibrium P σ →
      (P.vs + P.b < P.va → σ.acceptA σ.wa σ.ws = true ∧ σ.wa = P.vs + P.b) ∧
      (P.va < P.vs + P.b → σ.acceptA σ.wa σ.ws = false ∧ σ.ws = P.va - P.b) ∧
      surplus P (σ.acceptA σ.wa σ.ws) = max P.va (P.vs + P.b)) ∧
    (P.va ≠ P.vs + P.b → ∃ σ : DHProfile, IsDHEquilibrium P σ) := by sorry

end AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline
Source
Bar-Isaac, Johnson, Nocke, Acquihiring for Monopsony Power, CRC TR 224 DP No. 500 (Jan. 2024), p. 5 (PDF 6), Lemma 1
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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