Lemma 1 — under direct hiring the acquirer hires at v_s + b if v_a > v_s + b, else the startup retains at v_a − b; efficient
ProvedAcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline.lemma_1Consider the baseline model with values , private benefit and wage floor , satisfying and . Suppose the acquirer chooses direct hiring, so that the acquirer and the startup compete in wages for the employee.
Then in every continuation equilibrium in undominated strategies, with equilibrium offers and :
- if , the acquirer hires the employee, at wage ;
- if , the startup retains the employee, at wage ;
- the outcome is efficient, i.e. its total surplus is
Moreover, when , such a continuation equilibrium exists.
This is the asymmetric Bertrand outcome of the wage competition: the firm with the higher willingness to pay (counting the employee's private benefit in the startup's favour) wins her at the rival's reservation level. It determines the acquirer's and the employee's payoffs from direct hiring, which Proposition 1 compares with acquihiring.
Formalization Note. Uniqueness of the outcome is stated for every equilibrium profile, including the employee's acceptance rule off the path. The existence clause is the reading of "the continuation equilibrium" on the page; the knife edge , which the lemma does not cover, is excluded from it, while the efficiency clause is stated there as well.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AcquihiringMonopsony_Baseline_Model
namespace AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline
/-- Lemma 1 (p. 5): under direct hiring, in every continuation equilibrium the acquirer hires
the employee at wage `v_s + b` if `v_a > v_s + b`, the startup retains her at wage `v_a − b`
if `v_a < v_s + b`, and the outcome maximizes total surplus; a continuation equilibrium exists
whenever `v_a ≠ v_s + b`. -/
theorem lemma_1 (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
(∀ σ : DHProfile, IsDHEquilibrium P σ →
(P.vs + P.b < P.va → σ.acceptA σ.wa σ.ws = true ∧ σ.wa = P.vs + P.b) ∧
(P.va < P.vs + P.b → σ.acceptA σ.wa σ.ws = false ∧ σ.ws = P.va - P.b) ∧
surplus P (σ.acceptA σ.wa σ.ws) = max P.va (P.vs + P.b)) ∧
(P.va ≠ P.vs + P.b → ∃ σ : DHProfile, IsDHEquilibrium P σ) := by sorry
end AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.