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Proposition 3(a), p. 1348 (σ_ε = 0) — for ω < 1 the optimal forecast q*_QF is strictly positive, finite, and the unique solution of (3)

Proved
TsayQF.EffQF.proposition_3a

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

newsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1quantity-flexibilitysupply-chain

Let p>m>0p > m > 0p>m>0, u<mu < mu<m, s≥0s \ge 0s≥0 be the cost data and u<c<p+su < c < p+su<c<p+s the transfer price. Let μ\muμ have law ν\nuν with finite variance and a differentiable, strictly increasing distribution function Θ\ThetaΘ; with σε=0\sigma_\varepsilon = 0σε​=0 demand equals μ\muμ. Take a QF contract with 0≤ω<10 \le \omega < 10≤ω<1 and α≥−ω\alpha \ge -\omegaα≥−ω. The retailer's forecast objective is

πR(q)=Eμ{G(μ⊥[q(1−ω),q(1+α)]∣μ)},q≥0,\pi_R(q) = E_\mu\{G(\mu\perp[q(1-\omega),q(1+\alpha)]\mid\mu)\}, \qquad q \ge 0,πR​(q)=Eμ​{G(μ⊥[q(1−ω),q(1+α)]∣μ)},q≥0,

where the EM builds q(1+α)q(1+\alpha)q(1+α). Write G′(r∣μ)G'(r\mid\mu)G′(r∣μ) for p+s−cp+s-cp+s−c if r<μr<\mur<μ and u−cu-cu−c if r≥μr\ge\mur≥μ. Assume

(1−ω)(c−u)Θ(0)<(1+α)(p+s−c)(1−Θ(0)).(1-\omega)(c-u)\Theta(0) < (1+\alpha)(p+s-c)(1-\Theta(0)).(1−ω)(c−u)Θ(0)<(1+α)(p+s−c)(1−Θ(0)).

Then equation (3),

(1+α)∫μ≥q(1+α)G′(q(1+α)∣μ) dΘ(μ)=−(1−ω)∫μ≤q(1−ω)G′(q(1−ω)∣μ) dΘ(μ),(1+\alpha)\int_{\mu \ge q(1+\alpha)} G'(q(1+\alpha)\mid\mu)\,d\Theta(\mu) = -(1-\omega)\int_{\mu\le q(1-\omega)} G'(q(1-\omega)\mid\mu)\,d\Theta(\mu),(1+α)∫μ≥q(1+α)​G′(q(1+α)∣μ)dΘ(μ)=−(1−ω)∫μ≤q(1−ω)​G′(q(1−ω)∣μ)dΘ(μ),

has exactly one solution q>0q > 0q>0, and a forecast q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 maximizes πR\pi_RπR​ over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) if and only if q>0q > 0q>0 and qqq solves (3). In particular the optimal forecast qQF∗q^*_{QF}qQF∗​ exists, is strictly positive and finite, and is the unique solution of (3).

The left side of (3) is the retailer's expected marginal benefit of raising the forecast (more guaranteed availability), the right side its expected marginal cost (a larger minimum purchase); the condition is the QF analogue of the newsvendor fractile.

Formalization Note. This is the instance σε=0\sigma_\varepsilon = 0σε​=0 of the printed statement, whose integration regions read μ+zεσε≥q(1+α)\mu + z_\varepsilon\sigma_\varepsilon \ge q(1+\alpha)μ+zε​σε​≥q(1+α) and μ+zεσε≤q(1−ω)\mu + z_\varepsilon\sigma_\varepsilon \le q(1-\omega)μ+zε​σε​≤q(1−ω). At σε=0\sigma_\varepsilon=0σε​=0, G(⋅∣μ)G(\cdot\mid\mu)G(⋅∣μ) is piecewise linear and G′G'G′ is taken as its right derivative; its value on the Θ\ThetaΘ-null diagonal r=μr = \mur=μ does not affect (3), which then reads (1+α)(p+s−c)(1−Θ(q(1+α)))=(1−ω)(c−u)Θ(q(1−ω))(1+\alpha)(p+s-c)(1-\Theta(q(1+\alpha))) = (1-\omega)(c-u)\Theta(q(1-\omega))(1+α)(p+s−c)(1−Θ(q(1+α)))=(1−ω)(c−u)Θ(q(1−ω)). The displayed hypothesis on Θ(0)\Theta(0)Θ(0) is the explicit form of the paper's presumption that μ\muμ is almost certainly nonnegative (under which Θ(0)=0\Theta(0) = 0Θ(0)=0 and the hypothesis holds); it is exactly what makes the optimal forecast strictly positive. The EM's production is fixed at q(1+α)q(1+\alpha)q(1+α), as §6.1 does after Proposition 2. The price range u<c<p+su<c<p+su<c<p+s generalizes the standing m<c<pm<c<pm<c<p, because the mission applies the result at c=cˉ(ψ)c=\bar c(\psi)c=cˉ(ψ).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_TsayQF_EffQF_Model

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
Formal statement
namespace TsayQF.EffQF

/-- Proposition 3(a), p. 1348, at `σ_ε = 0`: when `ω < 1`, the retailer's optimal forecast
`q*_QF` is strictly positive and finite, and is the unique solution of (3). -/
theorem proposition_3a (D : Data) (ν : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
    (hΘ : StrictMono (cdf ν)) (hΘd : Differentiable ℝ (cdf ν)) (hν : MemLp id 2 ν)
    (c : ℝ) (hcu : D.u < c) (hcp : c < D.p + D.s)
    (α ω : ℝ) (hω0 : 0 ≤ ω) (hω1 : ω < 1) (hα : -ω ≤ α)
    (h0 : (1 - ω) * (c - D.u) * cdf ν 0 < (1 + α) * (D.p + D.s - c) * (1 - cdf ν 0)) :
    let eq3 : ℝ → Prop := fun q =>
      (1 + α) * ∫ μ in Set.Ici (q * (1 + α)), Gderiv D c (q * (1 + α)) μ ∂ν =
        -((1 - ω) * ∫ μ in Set.Iic (q * (1 - ω)), Gderiv D c (q * (1 - ω)) μ ∂ν)
    (∃! q, 0 < q ∧ eq3 q) ∧
      ∀ q, 0 ≤ q → (IsMaxOn (forecastProfit D ν c α ω) (Set.Ici 0) q ↔ (0 < q ∧ eq3 q)) := by sorry

end TsayQF.EffQF
Source
Tsay, The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives, Management Science 45(10) (1999), p. 1348, Proposition 3(a), display (3) (instance σ_ε = 0)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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