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Sec. 5.1, p. 15 — under a standard buy-back the retailer's optimal refund is r* = b

Proved
SuReturns.Coordination.sec51_buyback_optimal_refund

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

buy-backconsumer-returnsoptimal-refundp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Consider a retailer under a standard buy-back contract with wholesale price www and buy-back price bbb, facing consumers with valuation law ν\nuν (finite mean) and nonnegative market demand X∼DX \sim DX∼D. Its profit is (14),

ΠR(p,q,r)=[(p−b)Gˉ(r)+(p−r)G(r)] S(p,q,r)−(w−b)q,\Pi_R(p,q,r) = [(p-b)\bar G(r) + (p-r)G(r)]\,S(p,q,r) - (w-b)q,ΠR​(p,q,r)=[(p−b)Gˉ(r)+(p−r)G(r)]S(p,q,r)−(w−b)q,

where S(p,q,r)S(p,q,r)S(p,q,r) is expected sales under the demand rule (6) (consumers buy iff p≤Emax⁡(V,r)p \le E\max(V,r)p≤Emax(V,r)). Then for every stock q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, the refund r∗=br^* = br∗=b together with the price Emax⁡(V,b)E\max(V,b)Emax(V,b) is optimal:

ΠR(p,q,r)≤ΠR(Emax⁡(V,b), q, b)for all p, r∈R, q≥0.\Pi_R(p,q,r) \le \Pi_R\big(E\max(V,b),\,q,\,b\big) \qquad \text{for all } p,\ r \in \mathbb R,\ q \ge 0.ΠR​(p,q,r)≤ΠR​(Emax(V,b),q,b)for all p, r∈R, q≥0.

This is the observation that a standard buy-back distorts the retailer's returns policy: the supply chain's optimal refund is the salvage value sss, but the retailer's is the buy-back price bbb, which differs from sss whenever the buy-back is used for coordination (b>sb > sb>s).

Formalization Note The statement holds for every www and bbb, and for each fixed qqq; only the optimality of r∗=br^* = br∗=b (with the matching price) is stated, not its uniqueness and not the paper's further remark that buy-backs fail to coordinate unless b=sb = sb=s. Demand is assumed nonnegative (D((−∞,0))=0D((-\infty,0)) = 0D((−∞,0))=0) and stocks q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, as the paper's quantities are; without them the profit is unbounded.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_SuReturns_Coordination_Model

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
Formal statement
namespace SuReturns.Coordination

theorem sec51_buyback_optimal_refund (ν D : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
    [IsProbabilityMeasure D] (hν : Integrable (fun v => v) ν) (hD0 : D (Set.Iio 0) = 0)
    (w b : ℝ) :
    ∀ p r q : ℝ, 0 ≤ q →
      retailerBuyback ν D w b p q r ≤ retailerBuyback ν D w b (SuReturns.PartialRefunds.reservationPrice ν b) q b := by sorry

end SuReturns.Coordination
Source
Su, Consumer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance, SSRN 1020451 (version of August 2008), p. 15, Sec. 5.1 (after (14)–(15))
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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