Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

Theorem 1 — full robust screening LP equivalence

Disproved
WangMinimaxRegret.Reformulation.theorem_1

by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

linear-optimizationmechanism-designoperations-researchp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let a≥0a\ge0a≥0, b∈R∪{+∞}b\in\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}b∈R∪{+∞}, a≤ba\le ba≤b, and let K≥0K\ge0K≥0 finite moments be consistent with a Borel probability law on I=[a,b]I=[a,b]I=[a,b] whose right-continuous CDF satisfies F(a)=0F(a)=0F(a)=0. The ambiguity class F\mathcal FF consists of all such laws with the specified finite moments. Let M\mathcal MM be the normalized, nonnegative, nondecreasing, right-continuous Stieltjes payments satisfying ∫I∩(0,x]t−1 dm(t)≤1\int_{I\cap(0,x]}t^{-1}\,dm(t)\le1∫I∩(0,x]​t−1dm(t)≤1 for every x∈Ix\in Ix∈I. Define the original competitive ratio from actual seller and posted-price revenues, and let VP=sup⁡m∈MC(m)V_P=\sup_{m\in\mathcal M}C(m)VP​=supm∈M​C(m).

Independently define (P-LP) to maximize real r≥0r\ge0r≥0 over m∈Mm\in\mathcal Mm∈M and arbitrary real price-indexed functions λk(p)\lambda_k(p)λk​(p) subject to

∑k=1K(xk−μk)λk(p)≤m(x)(p,x∈I, x<p),\sum_{k=1}^K(x^k-\mu_k)\lambda_k(p)\le m(x)\quad(p,x\in I,\ x<p),k=1∑K​(xk−μk​)λk​(p)≤m(x)(p,x∈I, x<p), rp+∑k=1K(xk−μk)λk(p)≤m(x)(p,x∈I, p≤x).rp+\sum_{k=1}^K(x^k-\mu_k)\lambda_k(p)\le m(x)\quad(p,x\in I,\ p\le x).rp+k=1∑K​(xk−μk​)λk​(p)≤m(x)(p,x∈I, p≤x).

Let its supremal value be VLPV_{LP}VLP​. The theorem asserts all of the following:

  1. VP=VLPV_P=V_{LP}VP​=VLP​.
  2. For every fixed m∈Mm\in\mathcal Mm∈M and real r≥0r\ge0r≥0, r≤C(m)r\le C(m)r≤C(m) if and only if there is a multiplier family λ\lambdaλ making (m,r,λ)(m,r,\lambda)(m,r,λ) LP feasible.
  3. Every optimal LP triple has r=VP=C(m)r=V_P=C(m)r=VP​=C(m) and mmm is an optimal original payment.
  4. Every optimal original payment lifts to an optimal LP triple with the same payment and r=C(m)r=C(m)r=C(m).
  5. The original supremum is attained if and only if the LP supremum is attained.

These are conditional optimizer assertions, not an unconditional existence claim. For finite positive benchmarks C(m)C(m)C(m) is the printed worst-case revenue quotient; otherwise the operational extension is the supremum of nonnegative rates satisfying rpF([p,∞))≤∫m dFrpF([p,\infty))\le\int m\,dFrpF([p,∞))≤∫mdF for every feasible law and finite price. No certificate is used to define C(m)C(m)C(m). The fixed-payment reading in clause 2 retains the source's substitution argument and its known counterexample; the counterexample alone does not disprove equality of the globally optimized values.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: real interval, payment functions, probability laws, and moment orders 1 through K → real-line Borel measures supported on the interval, Stieltjes functions extended by zero below a and constantly above finite b, and Fin K exponents i+1; reason: extensions only fix values outside the domain; all atoms and payment jumps are retained, including the payment atom at a>0
  • encoding: the seller knows moments of an actual valuation distribution → Consistent d requires a nonempty printed ambiguity class, with finite specified moments; reason: makes the standing information-consistency assumption explicit; no interiority, positive variance, or density is assumed
  • reading: the notation [a,b] also occurs with b=infinity later in the paper → b has type WithTop real; prices and valuations remain finite; hindsight revenue is a supremum, and the competitive ratio uses all price-wise revenue inequalities; reason: specifies the support-only unbounded cases where the printed ratio may be infinity/infinity; finite positive benchmarks retain the usual quotient
  • encoding: nonnegative revenue integrals and optimization infima/suprema → nonnegative extended integrals and ENNReal/EReal extrema; zero-tail laws impose no fractional constraint; reason: avoids nonintegrable real integrals defaulting to zero and empty real extrema; empty infima are positive infinity
  • reading: (P) is equivalent to (P-LP), with optimal ratio and payment identification → value equality, exact fixed-payment feasible projection, both optimizer transfers, and equivalence of attainment; reason: the substitution preceding Theorem 1 supports this full reading of equivalent; the fixed-payment counterexample is retained separately
  • encoding: K-tuples of real functions on the price interval → functions on the real line constrained only for prices in I; reason: unrestricted extension outside I changes no feasible price-indexed family
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_WangMinimaxRegret_Reformulation_Programs

open MeasureTheory Set
open scoped ENNReal NNReal
set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
/-
Imported dependency source, reproduced verbatim for the standalone blind audit.

import Mathlib

open MeasureTheory Set
open scoped ENNReal NNReal
set_option autoImplicit false
noncomputable section

namespace WangMinimaxRegret.Reformulation

/-- A nonnegative measure linear program, with finite real constraint integrals
and a possibly infinite nonnegative objective. No probability normalization is implicit. -/
structure MeasureLP (ι : Type) where
  carrier : Set ℝ
  cost : ℝ → ℝ≥0∞
  test : ι → ℝ → ℝ
  target : ι → ℝ

def MeasureLP.Feasible {ι : Type} (L : MeasureLP ι) (H : Measure ℝ) : Prop :=
  IsFiniteMeasure H ∧ H L.carrierᶜ = 0 ∧
    ∀ i, Integrable (L.test i) H ∧ (∫ x, L.test i x ∂H) = L.target i

def MeasureLP.objective {ι : Type} (L : MeasureLP ι) (H : Measure ℝ) : ℝ≥0∞ :=
  ∫⁻ x, L.cost x ∂H

def MeasureLP.value {ι : Type} (L : MeasureLP ι) : ℝ≥0∞ :=
  ⨅ H : Measure ℝ, ⨅ (_ : L.Feasible H), L.objective H

end WangMinimaxRegret.Reformulation

import Mathlib

open MeasureTheory Set
open scoped ENNReal NNReal
set_option autoImplicit false
noncomputable section

namespace WangMinimaxRegret.Reformulation

structure Data where
  a : ℝ
  b : WithTop ℝ
  nonneg_a : 0 ≤ a
  ordered : (a : WithTop ℝ) ≤ b
  K : ℕ
  mu : Fin K → ℝ

def interval (d : Data) : Set ℝ := {x | d.a ≤ x ∧ (x : WithTop ℝ) ≤ d.b}

/-- The law's right-continuous CDF; laws below are Borel measures on the real line. -/
def cdf (F : Measure ℝ) (x : ℝ) : ℝ≥0∞ := F (Iic x)

/-- Display (2), which does not impose F(a)=0. Order zero is total mass one. -/
def MomentLaw (d : Data) (F : Measure ℝ) : Prop :=
  IsProbabilityMeasure F ∧ F (interval d)ᶜ = 0 ∧
    ∀ i : Fin d.K, Integrable (fun x : ℝ => x ^ (i.val + 1)) F ∧
      (∫ x : ℝ, x ^ (i.val + 1) ∂F) = d.mu i

/-- The printed ambiguity class, including its lower-endpoint restriction. -/
def Ambiguous (d : Data) (F : Measure ℝ) : Prop :=
  MomentLaw d F ∧ cdf F d.a = 0

def Consistent (d : Data) : Prop := ∃ F : Measure ℝ, Ambiguous d F

/-- Cumulative allocation from the payment Stieltjes measure. Integrate only at
positive valuations; the zero atom is forbidden by the payment normalization. -/
def allocation (d : Data) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (x : ℝ) : ℝ≥0∞ :=
  ∫⁻ t in interval d ∩ Ioc 0 x, ENNReal.ofReal (1 / t) ∂m.measure

/-- The payment's zero/constant extensions only specify values outside the valuation domain.
StieltjesFunction supplies monotonicity and right continuity, without finite total variation. -/
def IsPayment (d : Data) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) : Prop :=
  m 0 = 0 ∧ (∀ x : ℝ, x < d.a → m x = 0) ∧
  (∀ x y : ℝ, d.b ≤ (x : WithTop ℝ) → d.b ≤ (y : WithTop ℝ) → m x = m y) ∧
  (∀ x ∈ interval d, 0 ≤ m x) ∧
  ∀ x ∈ interval d, allocation d m x ≤ 1

/-- The economic direct-mechanism inequalities, independently of the payment budget. -/
def DirectICIR (d : Data) (q m : ℝ → ℝ) : Prop :=
  (∀ x ∈ interval d, 0 ≤ q x ∧ q x ≤ 1) ∧
  (∀ x ∈ interval d, 0 ≤ x * q x - m x) ∧
  ∀ x ∈ interval d, ∀ y ∈ interval d, x * q y - m y ≤ x * q x - m x

end WangMinimaxRegret.Reformulation

import Definitions.Def_WangMinimaxRegret_Reformulation_Model

open MeasureTheory Set
open scoped ENNReal NNReal
set_option autoImplicit false
noncomputable section

namespace WangMinimaxRegret.Reformulation

def tail (F : Measure ℝ) (p : ℝ) : ℝ≥0∞ := F (Ici p)

def revenue (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (F : Measure ℝ) : ℝ≥0∞ :=
  ∫⁻ x, ENNReal.ofReal (m x) ∂F

def priceRevenue (F : Measure ℝ) (p : ℝ) : ℝ≥0∞ :=
  ENNReal.ofReal p * tail F p

def benchmark (d : Data) (F : Measure ℝ) : ℝ≥0∞ :=
  ⨆ p ∈ interval d, priceRevenue F p

/-- Operational ratio, defined entirely from actual revenues, even for infinite benchmarks. -/
def competitiveRatio (d : Data) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) : ℝ≥0∞ :=
  ⨆ r : ℝ≥0, ⨆ (_ : ∀ F : Measure ℝ, Ambiguous d F →
    ∀ p ∈ interval d, (r : ℝ≥0∞) * priceRevenue F p ≤ revenue m F), (r : ℝ≥0∞)

/-- Used only under finite, strictly positive benchmark hypotheses. -/
def quotientRatio (d : Data) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) : ℝ≥0∞ :=
  ⨅ F : Measure ℝ, ⨅ (_ : Ambiguous d F), revenue m F / benchmark d F

def originalValue (d : Data) : EReal :=
  ⨆ m : StieltjesFunction ℝ, ⨆ (_ : IsPayment d m), (competitiveRatio d m : EReal)

def OriginalOptimal (d : Data) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) : Prop :=
  IsPayment d m ∧ (competitiveRatio d m : EReal) = originalValue d

/-- Zero-tail laws impose no constraint: the empty infimum is positive infinity. -/
def fractionalValue (laws : Set (Measure ℝ)) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (p : ℝ) : ℝ≥0∞ :=
  ⨅ F ∈ laws, ⨅ (_ : 0 < tail F p), revenue m F / tail F p

def HypographFeasible (d : Data) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (r : ℝ) : Prop :=
  IsPayment d m ∧ ∀ p ∈ interval d,
    ((r * p : ℝ) : EReal) ≤ (fractionalValue {F | Ambiguous d F} m p : EReal)

def hypographValue (d : Data) : EReal :=
  ⨆ m : StieltjesFunction ℝ, ⨆ r : ℝ, ⨆ (_ : HypographFeasible d m r), (r : EReal)

end WangMinimaxRegret.Reformulation

import Definitions.Def_WangMinimaxRegret_Reformulation_MeasureLP
import Definitions.Def_WangMinimaxRegret_Reformulation_Revenue

open MeasureTheory Set
open scoped ENNReal NNReal
set_option autoImplicit false
noncomputable section

namespace WangMinimaxRegret.Reformulation

/-- Equation (3) as a measure LP. The none row is tail mass one; the some rows
are centered moments. The redundant k=0 equation is identically zero. -/
def homogenizedLP (d : Data) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (p : ℝ) : MeasureLP (Option (Fin d.K)) where
  carrier := interval d
  cost := fun x => ENNReal.ofReal (m x)
  test := fun i => match i with
    | none => (Ici p).indicator (fun _ => (1 : ℝ))
    | some j => fun x => x ^ (j.val + 1) - d.mu j
  target := fun i => match i with
    | none => 1
    | some _ => 0

def scaleToTail (F : Measure ℝ) (p : ℝ) : Measure ℝ := (tail F p)⁻¹ • F

def normalizeMass (H : Measure ℝ) : Measure ℝ := (H univ)⁻¹ • H

def momentPolynomial (d : Data) (lam : Fin d.K → ℝ) (x : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  ∑ i : Fin d.K, (x ^ (i.val + 1) - d.mu i) * lam i

/-- The two distinct half-interval inequalities of (4). -/
def DualFeasible (d : Data) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (p theta : ℝ)
    (lam : Fin d.K → ℝ) : Prop :=
  (∀ x ∈ interval d, x < p → momentPolynomial d lam x ≤ m x) ∧
  ∀ x ∈ interval d, p ≤ x → theta + momentPolynomial d lam x ≤ m x

def dualValue (d : Data) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (p : ℝ) : EReal :=
  ⨆ theta : ℝ, ⨆ lam : Fin d.K → ℝ, ⨆ (_ : DualFeasible d m p theta lam),
    (theta : EReal)

/-- Price-indexed multipliers have no regularity restriction. -/
def LPFeasible (d : Data) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (r : ℝ)
    (lam : ℝ → Fin d.K → ℝ) : Prop :=
  IsPayment d m ∧ 0 ≤ r ∧ ∀ p ∈ interval d, DualFeasible d m p (r * p) (lam p)

def lpValue (d : Data) : EReal :=
  ⨆ m : StieltjesFunction ℝ, ⨆ r : ℝ, ⨆ lam : ℝ → Fin d.K → ℝ,
    ⨆ (_ : LPFeasible d m r lam), (r : EReal)

def LPOptimal (d : Data) (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (r : ℝ)
    (lam : ℝ → Fin d.K → ℝ) : Prop :=
  LPFeasible d m r lam ∧ (r : EReal) = lpValue d

end WangMinimaxRegret.Reformulation

-/

namespace WangMinimaxRegret.Reformulation

theorem theorem_1 (d : Data) (hc : Consistent d) :
    originalValue d = lpValue d ∧
    (∀ (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (r : ℝ), IsPayment d m → 0 ≤ r →
      ((r : EReal) ≤ (competitiveRatio d m : EReal) ↔
        ∃ lam : ℝ → Fin d.K → ℝ, LPFeasible d m r lam)) ∧
    (∀ (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (r : ℝ) (lam : ℝ → Fin d.K → ℝ),
      LPOptimal d m r lam →
        (r : EReal) = originalValue d ∧
        (r : EReal) = (competitiveRatio d m : EReal) ∧ OriginalOptimal d m) ∧
    (∀ m : StieltjesFunction ℝ, OriginalOptimal d m →
      ∃ (r : ℝ) (lam : ℝ → Fin d.K → ℝ),
        (r : EReal) = (competitiveRatio d m : EReal) ∧ LPOptimal d m r lam) ∧
    ((∃ m : StieltjesFunction ℝ, OriginalOptimal d m) ↔
      ∃ (m : StieltjesFunction ℝ) (r : ℝ) (lam : ℝ → Fin d.K → ℝ), LPOptimal d m r lam) := by sorry

end WangMinimaxRegret.Reformulation
Source
Wang, Liu and Zhang (2024), Minimax Regret Robust Screening with Moment Information, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0072, Section 2, p. 9, Theorem 1 and (P-LP)
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5

Fix problem data ddd consisting of:

  • a real number a≥0a \ge 0a≥0;
  • an upper endpoint b∈R∪{+∞}b \in \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}b∈R∪{+∞} with a≤ba \le ba≤b;
  • a natural number KKK (possibly 000);
  • real numbers μ0,…,μK−1\mu_0, \dots, \mu_{K-1}μ0​,…,μK−1​.

Write I={x∈R:a≤x≤b}I = \{x \in \mathbb{R} : a \le x \le b\}I={x∈R:a≤x≤b}. This is [a,b][a,b][a,b] if bbb is finite and [a,∞)[a,\infty)[a,∞) if b=+∞b = +\inftyb=+∞.

Laws. All laws FFF are Borel measures on R\mathbb{R}R. Call FFF ambiguous if all of the following hold:

  • FFF is a probability measure;
  • F(R∖I)=0F(\mathbb{R} \setminus I) = 0F(R∖I)=0;
  • for each i∈{0,…,K−1}i \in \{0,\dots,K-1\}i∈{0,…,K−1}, the function x↦xi+1x \mapsto x^{i+1}x↦xi+1 is FFF-integrable and ∫xi+1 dF(x)=μi\int x^{i+1}\,dF(x) = \mu_i∫xi+1dF(x)=μi​;
  • F((−∞,a])=0F\big((-\infty, a]\big) = 0F((−∞,a])=0.

Together with the support condition, the last requirement says FFF has no atom at aaa. The hypothesis Consistent(d)\mathrm{Consistent}(d)Consistent(d) asserts that at least one ambiguous law exists.

Payments. A payment is a function m:R→Rm : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}m:R→R that is nondecreasing and right-continuous, with Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure dmdmdm. No finite total variation is assumed. It must also satisfy:

  • m(0)=0m(0) = 0m(0)=0;
  • m(x)=0m(x) = 0m(x)=0 for every x<ax < ax<a;
  • if bbb is finite, m(x)=m(y)m(x) = m(y)m(x)=m(y) for all real x,y≥bx, y \ge bx,y≥b (this condition is vacuous when b=+∞b = +\inftyb=+∞);
  • m(x)≥0m(x) \ge 0m(x)≥0 for all x∈Ix \in Ix∈I;
  • for every x∈Ix \in Ix∈I, the allocation
qm(x)=∫I∩(0,x]1t dm(t)q_m(x) = \int_{I \cap (0,x]} \frac{1}{t}\, dm(t)qm​(x)=∫I∩(0,x]​t1​dm(t)

satisfies qm(x)≤1q_m(x) \le 1qm​(x)≤1. Here qm(x)q_m(x)qm​(x) is computed as an extended nonnegative integral in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].

Competitive ratio. For a law FFF and price ppp, define:

  • the tail TF(p)=F([p,∞))T_F(p) = F([p,\infty))TF​(p)=F([p,∞));
  • the price revenue max⁡(p,0) TF(p)∈[0,∞]\max(p,0)\, T_F(p) \in [0,\infty]max(p,0)TF​(p)∈[0,∞];
  • the revenue R(m,F)=∫max⁡(m(x),0) dF(x)∈[0,∞]R(m,F) = \int \max(m(x),0)\, dF(x) \in [0,\infty]R(m,F)=∫max(m(x),0)dF(x)∈[0,∞].

The competitive ratio CR(m)∈[0,∞]\mathrm{CR}(m) \in [0,\infty]CR(m)∈[0,∞] is the supremum of all r∈[0,∞)r \in [0,\infty)r∈[0,∞) such that

r⋅p TF(p)≤R(m,F)r \cdot p\, T_F(p) \le R(m,F)r⋅pTF​(p)≤R(m,F)

for every ambiguous FFF and every p∈Ip \in Ip∈I. Arithmetic here is in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with 0⋅∞=00 \cdot \infty = 00⋅∞=0. The value r=0r = 0r=0 always qualifies. CR(m)=+∞\mathrm{CR}(m) = +\inftyCR(m)=+∞ is possible when the admissible rrr are unbounded.

The original value is

Vorig=sup⁡m paymentCR(m)∈[−∞,+∞],V_{\mathrm{orig}} = \sup_{m \text{ payment}} \mathrm{CR}(m) \in [-\infty, +\infty],Vorig​=m paymentsup​CR(m)∈[−∞,+∞],

with the empty supremum equal to −∞-\infty−∞. A payment mmm is original-optimal if CR(m)=Vorig\mathrm{CR}(m) = V_{\mathrm{orig}}CR(m)=Vorig​, with both sides viewed as extended reals.

Dual LP. For λ∈RK\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^Kλ∈RK, define

Pλ(x)=∑i=0K−1(xi+1−μi) λi.P_\lambda(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{K-1} (x^{i+1} - \mu_i)\,\lambda_i .Pλ​(x)=i=0∑K−1​(xi+1−μi​)λi​.

A pair (θ,λ)(\theta, \lambda)(θ,λ) is dual feasible at price ppp for mmm if both of the following hold:

  • Pλ(x)≤m(x)P_\lambda(x) \le m(x)Pλ​(x)≤m(x) for all x∈Ix \in Ix∈I with x<px < px<p;
  • θ+Pλ(x)≤m(x)\theta + P_\lambda(x) \le m(x)θ+Pλ​(x)≤m(x) for all x∈Ix \in Ix∈I with x≥px \ge px≥p.

A triple (m,r,Λ)(m, r, \Lambda)(m,r,Λ) is LP-feasible if all of the following hold:

  • mmm is a payment;
  • rrr is a real number with r≥0r \ge 0r≥0;
  • Λ\LambdaΛ is any function from R\mathbb{R}R to RK\mathbb{R}^KRK, with no measurability or regularity required;
  • for every p∈Ip \in Ip∈I, the pair (rp,Λ(p))(r p, \Lambda(p))(rp,Λ(p)) is dual feasible at price ppp for mmm.

The LP value VLP∈[−∞,+∞]V_{\mathrm{LP}} \in [-\infty,+\infty]VLP​∈[−∞,+∞] is the supremum of rrr over all LP-feasible triples, again with the empty supremum equal to −∞-\infty−∞. A triple is LP-optimal if it is LP-feasible and the real number rrr equals VLPV_{\mathrm{LP}}VLP​. In particular, an LP-optimal triple requires VLPV_{\mathrm{LP}}VLP​ to be finite.

Statement. For every ddd satisfying Consistent(d)\mathrm{Consistent}(d)Consistent(d), all five of the following hold:

  1. Vorig=VLPV_{\mathrm{orig}} = V_{\mathrm{LP}}Vorig​=VLP​ as extended reals.
  2. For every payment mmm and every real r≥0r \ge 0r≥0:
r≤CR(m)  ⟺  there exists Λ:R→RK with (m,r,Λ) LP-feasible.r \le \mathrm{CR}(m) \iff \text{there exists } \Lambda : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}^K \text{ with } (m,r,\Lambda) \text{ LP-feasible}.r≤CR(m)⟺there exists Λ:R→RK with (m,r,Λ) LP-feasible.
  1. For every LP-optimal triple (m,r,Λ)(m,r,\Lambda)(m,r,Λ): r=Vorigr = V_{\mathrm{orig}}r=Vorig​, r=CR(m)r = \mathrm{CR}(m)r=CR(m), and mmm is original-optimal.
  2. For every original-optimal mmm, there exist a real rrr and a function Λ\LambdaΛ with r=CR(m)r = \mathrm{CR}(m)r=CR(m) and (m,r,Λ)(m,r,\Lambda)(m,r,Λ) LP-optimal. This forces CR(m)\mathrm{CR}(m)CR(m) to be finite.
  3. An original-optimal payment exists if and only if an LP-optimal triple exists.

Degenerate cases. If a=ba = ba=b, then I={a}I = \{a\}I={a}. A probability measure supported on {a}\{a\}{a} must have F((−∞,a])=1≠0F((-\infty,a]) = 1 \ne 0F((−∞,a])=1=0, so no ambiguous law exists, Consistent(d)\mathrm{Consistent}(d)Consistent(d) fails, and the theorem says nothing. It is likewise vacuous whenever the moments μi\mu_iμi​ admit no ambiguous law.

If K=0K = 0K=0, there are no moment constraints:

  • ambiguous laws are exactly the probability measures on III without an atom at aaa;
  • R0\mathbb{R}^0R0 has a single element, so Pλ≡0P_\lambda \equiv 0Pλ​≡0 and Λ\LambdaΛ carries no information;
  • dual feasibility at ppp reduces to m(x)≥0m(x) \ge 0m(x)≥0 on I∩(−∞,p)I \cap (-\infty, p)I∩(−∞,p) and rp≤m(x)r p \le m(x)rp≤m(x) on I∩[p,∞)I \cap [p,\infty)I∩[p,∞).

If b=+∞b = +\inftyb=+∞, the constancy condition on payments is vacuous and prices range over all of [a,∞)[a,\infty)[a,∞).

If a=0a = 0a=0, the price p=0p = 0p=0 belongs to III:

  • its price revenue is 000, so it constrains nothing in CR\mathrm{CR}CR;
  • its dual condition is r⋅0+PΛ(0)(x)≤m(x)r \cdot 0 + P_{\Lambda(0)}(x) \le m(x)r⋅0+PΛ(0)​(x)≤m(x) on all of III;
  • the allocation integral always excludes the point 000.

Prices p∈Ip \in Ip∈I with TF(p)=0T_F(p) = 0TF​(p)=0 impose nothing on CR\mathrm{CR}CR for that FFF.

The constant-zero function satisfies every payment condition, so the suprema defining VorigV_{\mathrm{orig}}Vorig​ and VLPV_{\mathrm{LP}}VLP​ range over nonempty sets in the sense of their defining conditions.

Since CR(m)\mathrm{CR}(m)CR(m) may equal +∞+\infty+∞ and rrr in items 3–4 is real, items 3–5 imply the following. If Vorig=+∞V_{\mathrm{orig}} = +\inftyVorig​=+∞, then no LP-optimal triple and no original-optimal payment can exist. Similarly, a payment with CR(m)=+∞\mathrm{CR}(m) = +\inftyCR(m)=+∞ is never paired with an LP-optimal triple in item 4.

Finally, in item 2, when CR(m)=+∞\mathrm{CR}(m) = +\inftyCR(m)=+∞ the left side holds for every r≥0r \ge 0r≥0. In that case the item asserts that LP-feasible Λ\LambdaΛ exist for every such rrr.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me