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Lemma 8.1.2(ii) — both strategies of a mixed Nash equilibrium are worst-case optimal

Proved
MatousekLP.ZeroSum.nash_worstCaseOptimal

by mikedeng1 · Oct 3, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorynash-equilibriump2o-batch-b23bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-bookp2o-v1zero-sum-games

Let MMM be a real m×nm \times nm×n payoff matrix of a zero-sum game, m,n≥1m, n \ge 1m,n≥1. If the pair (x~,y~)(\tilde{\mathbf x}, \tilde{\mathbf y})(x~,y~​) of mixed strategies is a mixed Nash equilibrium (x~\tilde{\mathbf x}x~ is a best response against y~\tilde{\mathbf y}y~​ and y~\tilde{\mathbf y}y~​ is a best response against x~\tilde{\mathbf x}x~), then x~\tilde{\mathbf x}x~ is worst-case optimal for Alice and y~\tilde{\mathbf y}y~​ is worst-case optimal for Bob:

β(x~)=max⁡xβ(x),α(y~)=min⁡yα(y).\beta(\tilde{\mathbf x}) = \max_{\mathbf x}\beta(\mathbf x), \qquad \alpha(\tilde{\mathbf y}) = \min_{\mathbf y}\alpha(\mathbf y).β(x~)=xmax​β(x),α(y~​)=ymin​α(y).

Together with the minimax theorem this gives: a pair of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium if and only if both strategies are worst-case optimal.

Formalization Note Worst-case optimality of x~\tilde{\mathbf x}x~ is stated as: x~\tilde{\mathbf x}x~ is a mixed strategy and β(x)≤β(x~)\beta(\mathbf x) \le \beta(\tilde{\mathbf x})β(x)≤β(x~) for every mixed strategy x\mathbf xx; symmetrically for y~\tilde{\mathbf y}y~​.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MatousekLP_ZeroSum_Game
Formal statement
namespace MatousekLP.ZeroSum

theorem nash_worstCaseOptimal {m n : ℕ} (hm : 1 ≤ m) (hn : 1 ≤ n)
    (M : Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ) (xt : Fin m → ℝ) (yt : Fin n → ℝ)
    (h : IsMixedNash M xt yt) :
    IsWorstCaseOptimalAlice M xt ∧ IsWorstCaseOptimalBob M yt := by sorry

end MatousekLP.ZeroSum
Source
Matoušek & Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer 2007, p. 136, Lemma 8.1.2(ii)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 5, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 5, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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