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Lemma 5 — when ϵ(k)→0\epsilon^{(k)}\to0ϵ(k)→0, extremizing bid pairs of limiting width <c<c<c exist (inside any subsequence)

Proved
LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic.lemma_5

by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bayes-nash-equilibriumfirst-price-auctionmulti-unit-auctionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1price-of-anarchy

Let H>0H>0H>0 and κ>0\kappa>0κ>0. Consider a sequence of kkk-unit first-price auctions with n(k)>kn(k)>kn(k)>k agents satisfying Assumption 1, and a sequence of ϵ(k)\epsilon^{(k)}ϵ(k)-approximate Bayes–Nash equilibria E(k)E^{(k)}E(k) satisfying Assumptions 3 and 4 with ϵ(k)→0\epsilon^{(k)}\to0ϵ(k)→0. Then for every subsequence sss of unit counts and every c>0c>0c>0 there are a sequence of bid pairs {b‾(k),b‾(k)}\{\underline b^{(k)},\overline b^{(k)}\}{b​(k),b(k)} and a further subsequence (A(s(θ(l))))l(A^{(s(\theta(l)))})_l(A(s(θ(l))))l​ along which the pairs are extremizing and

lim⁡l→∞(b‾(s(θ(l)))−b‾(s(θ(l))))<c.\lim_{l\to\infty}\big(\overline b^{(s(\theta(l)))}-\underline b^{(s(\theta(l)))}\big)<c.l→∞lim​(b(s(θ(l)))−b​(s(θ(l))))<c.

At s=ids=\mathrm{id}s=id this is the printed Lemma 5. In the limit of exact equilibria, the critical bid becomes deterministic along subsequences. Corollary 1 needs this inside an arbitrary subsequence (INSIGHTS I1).

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: a strategy is a map E_i : V_i → Δ(ℝ≥0) from values to bid distributions → a Markov kernel E i : Kernel ℝ ℝ with E i v ((−∞, 0)) = 0 for every v; reason: measurability in v is what makes the marginal bid distribution ∫ E_{i,v} dV_i defined; a law on ℝ with no mass below 0 is a law on ℝ≥0
  • encoding: a sequence of k-unit auctions (A^(k))_{k∈ℕ} with n(k) > k agents; subsequences (A^(k_l)) → n : ℕ → ℕ with k < n k, agents Fin (n k), value laws V k and kernels E k indexed by the unit count k (k = 0 included); a subsequence is a strictly increasing φ : ℕ → ℕ and the auction φ l has φ l units; reason: Lean indexing; the term k = 0 does not affect any limit
  • reading: Assumption 1(a): every value is at most H almost surely (values are non-negative in the model; 1(b) is stated on [0, H]) → V_i([0, H]) = 1 together with the density bound of 1(b), and 0 < H, 0 < κ; reason: the paper's values are non-negative (its bound O(A^(k)) ≥ kζ and W ≥ 0 use it, and p. 6 fixes H > 0, κ > 0); under Assumption 3 alone non-negativity is not implied, so it is read into Assumption 1
  • reading: E_{b∼E_{i,v}}[u_i(v, b)] ≥ sup_{b≥0} u_i(v, b) − ϵ for every v ∈ supp(V_i) → for every v ∈ supp(V_i): b ↦ u_i(v, b) is E_{i,v}-integrable and u_i(v, b) − ϵ ≤ ∫ u_i(v, ·) dE_{i,v} for every b ≥ 0; reason: the ∀ b form is equivalent to the sup form; integrability makes explicit that the paper's expectation is finite (it holds automatically when bids are bounded on the support, as under Assumptions 2 and 3)
  • generalization: the hypothesis and conclusion refer to subsequences of the whole sequence (A^(k)) → they refer to subsequences of an arbitrary starting subsequence s (StrictMono); the conclusion's subsequence is s ∘ θ; reason: needed by Corollary 1's proof (INSIGHTS I1); at s = id this is exactly the printed lemma, so it specializes to the source
  • encoding: Let ϵ := lim_{k→∞} ϵ^(k) and suppose ϵ = 0 → Tendsto εs atTop (𝓝 0); reason: same hypothesis
  • encoding: lim_{l→∞} (b̄^(k_l) − b̲^(k_l)) < c (the limit exists) → ∃ L, Tendsto ((b̄^(k_l) − b̲^(k_l))) atTop (𝓝 L) ∧ L < c; reason: the printed limit is assumed to exist
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Model
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Assumptions
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Extremizing

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory Filter Topology
Formal statement
namespace LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic

theorem lemma_5 (H κ : ℝ) (hH : 0 < H) (hκ : 0 < κ)
    (n : ℕ → ℕ) (V : ∀ k, Fin (n k) → Measure ℝ) (E : ∀ k, Fin (n k) → Kernel ℝ ℝ)
    (εs : ℕ → ℝ)
    (hseq : IsAuctionSequence n V E) (hA1 : ∀ k, Assumption1 H κ (V k))
    (hBNE : ∀ k, IsApproxBNE k (V k) (E k) (εs k))
    (hA3 : Assumption3 n V E) (hA4 : ∀ k, IsAtomless (V k) (E k))
    (hε : Tendsto εs atTop (𝓝 0)) :
    ∀ s : ℕ → ℕ, StrictMono s → ∀ c : ℝ, 0 < c →
      ∃ (lo hi : ℕ → ℝ) (θ : ℕ → ℕ), StrictMono θ ∧ IsExtremizing n V E lo hi (s ∘ θ) ∧
        ∃ L : ℝ, Tendsto (fun l => hi (s (θ l)) - lo (s (θ l))) atTop (𝓝 L) ∧ L < c := by sorry

end LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic
Source
Hartline, Shah, vonAllmen, Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large Supply, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of November 3, 2026, sha256 2ad8363b…), p. 21, Lemma 5 (proof p. 22)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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