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Main Theorem, proof — summing over the partition gives the ex-ante inequality

Proved
Aumann1987.BayesRational.sum_over_partition

by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bayesian-rationalitycorrelated-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp1ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let (Ω,p,(Pj),s)(\Omega,p,(\mathcal P^j),\mathbf s)(Ω,p,(Pj),s) be an information system for a game with payoffs hhh, let player iii be Bayes rational at every state, and let g:Ω→Sig:\Omega\to S^ig:Ω→Si be constant on every element of Pi\mathcal P^iPi. Then

∑ω∈Ωp(ω) hi(s−i(ω),g(ω)) ≤ ∑ω∈Ωp(ω) hi(s(ω)),\sum_{\omega\in\Omega}p(\omega)\,h^i\big(\mathbf s^{-i}(\omega),g(\omega)\big)\ \le\ \sum_{\omega\in\Omega}p(\omega)\,h^i(\mathbf s(\omega)),ω∈Ω∑​p(ω)hi(s−i(ω),g(ω)) ≤ ω∈Ω∑​p(ω)hi(s(ω)),

that is, Ehi(s−i,g)≤Ehi(s)E h^i(\mathbf s^{-i},g)\le E h^i(\mathbf s)Ehi(s−i,g)≤Ehi(s).

This is the law of total expectation over Pi\mathcal P^iPi applied to the cell-wise inequality; it turns interim rationality into the ex-ante inequality of Definition 2.1.

Formalization Note. The prior need not have full support; states in null cells contribute nothing to either side.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_Aumann1987_BayesRational_CorrelatedEquilibrium
import Definitions.Def_Aumann1987_BayesRational_InformationSystem
Formal statement
namespace Aumann1987.BayesRational

/-- **Main Theorem, proof — summing over the partition** (Aumann 1987, Econometrica 55, Sect. 3,
unnumbered step of the proof of the Main Theorem, p. 8, PDF p. 9): "multiplying both sides by
`Prob P` and summing over all `P` in `𝒫ⁱ` yields `E(hⁱ(s)) ≥ Ehⁱ(s⁻ⁱ, gⁱ)`."

In an information system `I` with common prior `p`, if player `i` is Bayes rational at every
state and `g : Ω → Sⁱ` is constant on every element of `𝒫ⁱ`, then
`Ehⁱ(s⁻ⁱ, gⁱ) ≤ Ehⁱ(s)`, the expectations being taken with respect to `p`.

**Formalization Note.** The prior need not have full support: states in cells of probability `0`
contribute nothing to either side, and Bayes rationality there is vacuous (see `condExp`). -/
theorem sum_over_partition {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] {S : ι → Type*}
    {Ω : Type*} [Fintype Ω] (h : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (I : InformationSystem Ω S) (i : ι)
    (hrat : ∀ ω, IsBayesRationalAt h I.p I.P I.s i ω)
    (g : Ω → S i) (hg : ∀ ω ω', (I.P i).r ω ω' → g ω = g ω') :
    expPayoff h I.p (deviate I.s i g) i ≤ expPayoff h I.p I.s i := by sorry

end Aumann1987.BayesRational
Source
Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica 55 (1987), DOI 10.2307/1911154, p. 8 (PDF p. 9), Main Theorem, proof
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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