Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

Proposition 3 — a stable joint-auditing coalition audits the common supplier, and S1S_1S1​ too when K<KcLK<K^L_cK<KcL​

Proved
SupplierAudit.Joint.proposition_3

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auditingcoalition-stabilitygame-theoryjoint-auditingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain

Two competing buyers (0<β≤10<\beta\le10<β≤1) share a common supplier ScS_cSc​ and each has an independent supplier. They may form a coalition that audits jointly: it chooses efforts (ec1,ecc,ec2)∈[0,1]3(e_{c1},e_{cc},e_{c2})\in[0,1]^3(ec1​,ecc​,ec2​)∈[0,1]3 on S1,Sc,S2S_1,S_c,S_2S1​,Sc​,S2​, auditing at most two suppliers, and pays K1{ecj>0}+a2ecj2K\mathbf 1\{e_{cj}>0\}+\tfrac a2e_{cj}^2K1{ecj​>0}+2a​ecj2​ per audited supplier. The buyers still compete downstream. Assume the standing conditions of the model and the Sec. 4.3 scenario πb(0,0)≥πb(dM,0)≥πb(dM,dM)≥πb(2dM,dM)≥πb(2dM,2dM)\pi^b(0,0)\ge\pi^b(d_M,0)\ge\pi^b(d_M,d_M)\ge\pi^b(2d_M,d_M)\ge\pi^b(2d_M,2d_M)πb(0,0)≥πb(dM​,0)≥πb(dM​,dM​)≥πb(2dM​,dM​)≥πb(2dM​,2dM​). Assume also the interior-effort condition e^I<1\hat e_I<1e^I​<1 of the unilateral benchmark. Write Πb\Pi^bΠb for the coalition's aggregate expected profit, RibR^b_iRib​ for buyer BiB_iBi​'s expected profit excluding auditing costs, ΔΠ=R1b−R2b\Delta\Pi=R^b_1-R^b_2ΔΠ=R1b​−R2b​, and Γi\Gamma_iΓi​ for the cost shares of eq. (3).

Stability. For every K≥0K\ge0K≥0, every equilibrium (s1,s2)(s_1,s_2)(s1​,s2​) of unilateral auditing (with the tie-breaking rule) and every optimal feasible joint plan xxx:

Π1b(s1;s2)+Π2b(s2;s1)≤Πb(x),\Pi^b_1(s_1;s_2)+\Pi^b_2(s_2;s_1)\le\Pi^b(x),Π1b​(s1​;s2​)+Π2b​(s2​;s1​)≤Πb(x),

and if s1=s2s_1=s_2s1​=s2​, also Πib(si;si′)≤Rib(x)−Γi\Pi^b_i(s_i;s_{i'})\le R^b_i(x)-\Gamma_iΠib​(si​;si′​)≤Rib​(x)−Γi​ for i=1,2i=1,2i=1,2.

Optimal joint audits. There are thresholds KcL≤KcHK^L_c\le K^H_cKcL​≤KcH​ such that, for every K≥0K\ge0K≥0:

  1. if K<KcLK<K^L_cK<KcL​, an optimal plan audits S1S_1S1​ and ScS_cSc​ (ec1∗>0e^*_{c1}>0ec1∗​>0, ecc∗>0e^*_{cc}>0ecc∗​>0, ec2∗=0e^*_{c2}=0ec2∗​=0), and at it ΔΠ>0\Delta\Pi>0ΔΠ>0;
  2. if KcL≤K<KcHK^L_c\le K<K^H_cKcL​≤K<KcH​, an optimal plan audits only ScS_cSc​ (ec1∗=0e^*_{c1}=0ec1∗​=0, ecc∗>0e^*_{cc}>0ecc∗​>0, ec2∗=0e^*_{c2}=0ec2∗​=0), and at it ΔΠ=0\Delta\Pi=0ΔΠ=0;
  3. if K≥KcHK\ge K^H_cK≥KcH​, auditing no supplier is optimal.

Unilateral auditing never audits the common supplier (Proposition 2). The joint-auditing coalition audits it whenever it audits anything, and the cost shares (3) leave both buyers equally well off.

Formalization Note "Yields the highest aggregate profit" means that some maximizer has the stated pattern; uniqueness is not claimed. Each firm's stability condition is stated against the symmetric unilateral equilibria only: against the asymmetric equilibrium of Proposition 2(ii), whose case the paper omits as "similar", it can fail (see the milestone on part (3) of the proof). "Higher" is stated as ≥\ge≥, which is what the proof gives. The interior-effort assumption of p. 10 is encoded as e^I<1\hat e_I<1e^I​<1.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_SupplierAudit_Joint_Model
Formal statement
namespace SupplierAudit.Joint

/-- Proposition 3, pp. 13–14 (optimal joint-auditing decisions and cost sharing), under the
standing assumptions (`Params`), `β ∈ (0,1]`, the Sec. 4.3 scenario ordering and the interior-effort
assumption `ê_I < 1`.

Stability: at every optimal joint plan `x`, the coalition earns in aggregate at least what the buyers
earn in any unilateral equilibrium, and each buyer, after paying its share (3), earns at least its
profit in a symmetric unilateral equilibrium.

Structure: there are thresholds `K^L_c ≤ K^H_c` such that, for `0 ≤ K`, an optimal plan audits `S₁`
and `S_c` with `∆Π > 0` when `K < K^L_c`, only `S_c` with `∆Π = 0` when `K^L_c ≤ K < K^H_c`, and auditing
no supplier is optimal when `K ≥ K^H_c`. -/
theorem proposition_3 (P : SupplierAudit.Competition.Params) (hβ : 0 < P.β) (hscen : Scenario P) (hint : SupplierAudit.Competition.eHatI P < 1) :
    (∀ K : ℝ, 0 ≤ K → ∀ s₁ s₂ : Strategy, IsEquilibrium P K s₁ s₂ →
      ∀ x ∈ Feasible, IsMaxOn (aggProfit P K) Feasible x →
        unilProfit₁ P K s₁ s₂ + unilProfit₂ P K s₁ s₂ ≤ aggProfit P K x ∧
        (s₁ = s₂ →
          unilProfit₁ P K s₁ s₂ ≤ jointG₁ P x - Gamma₁ P K x ∧
          unilProfit₂ P K s₁ s₂ ≤ jointG₂ P x - Gamma₂ P K x)) ∧
    ∃ KL KH : ℝ, KL ≤ KH ∧ ∀ K : ℝ, 0 ≤ K →
      (K < KL → ∃ x ∈ Feasible, IsMaxOn (aggProfit P K) Feasible x ∧
          0 < x.1 ∧ 0 < x.2.1 ∧ x.2.2 = 0 ∧ 0 < deltaPi P x) ∧
      (KL ≤ K → K < KH → ∃ x ∈ Feasible, IsMaxOn (aggProfit P K) Feasible x ∧
          x.1 = 0 ∧ 0 < x.2.1 ∧ x.2.2 = 0 ∧ deltaPi P x = 0) ∧
      (KH ≤ K → IsMaxOn (aggProfit P K) Feasible (0, 0, 0)) := by sorry

end SupplierAudit.Joint
Source
Chen, Qi, Dawande, Supplier Centrality and Auditing Priority in Socially-Responsible Supply Chains, accepted manuscript (SSRN 2889889), Proposition 3, pp. 13–14; Sec. 4.3, p. 13; eq. (3), p. 14; proof pp. ec12–ec14 (PDF 40–42)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me