Proposition 3 — a stable joint-auditing coalition audits the common supplier, and too when
ProvedSupplierAudit.Joint.proposition_3Two competing buyers () share a common supplier and each has an independent supplier. They may form a coalition that audits jointly: it chooses efforts on , auditing at most two suppliers, and pays per audited supplier. The buyers still compete downstream. Assume the standing conditions of the model and the Sec. 4.3 scenario . Assume also the interior-effort condition of the unilateral benchmark. Write for the coalition's aggregate expected profit, for buyer 's expected profit excluding auditing costs, , and for the cost shares of eq. (3).
Stability. For every , every equilibrium of unilateral auditing (with the tie-breaking rule) and every optimal feasible joint plan :
and if , also for .
Optimal joint audits. There are thresholds such that, for every :
- if , an optimal plan audits and (, , ), and at it ;
- if , an optimal plan audits only (, , ), and at it ;
- if , auditing no supplier is optimal.
Unilateral auditing never audits the common supplier (Proposition 2). The joint-auditing coalition audits it whenever it audits anything, and the cost shares (3) leave both buyers equally well off.
Formalization Note "Yields the highest aggregate profit" means that some maximizer has the stated pattern; uniqueness is not claimed. Each firm's stability condition is stated against the symmetric unilateral equilibria only: against the asymmetric equilibrium of Proposition 2(ii), whose case the paper omits as "similar", it can fail (see the milestone on part (3) of the proof). "Higher" is stated as , which is what the proof gives. The interior-effort assumption of p. 10 is encoded as .
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SupplierAudit_Joint_Model
namespace SupplierAudit.Joint
/-- Proposition 3, pp. 13–14 (optimal joint-auditing decisions and cost sharing), under the
standing assumptions (`Params`), `β ∈ (0,1]`, the Sec. 4.3 scenario ordering and the interior-effort
assumption `ê_I < 1`.
Stability: at every optimal joint plan `x`, the coalition earns in aggregate at least what the buyers
earn in any unilateral equilibrium, and each buyer, after paying its share (3), earns at least its
profit in a symmetric unilateral equilibrium.
Structure: there are thresholds `K^L_c ≤ K^H_c` such that, for `0 ≤ K`, an optimal plan audits `S₁`
and `S_c` with `∆Π > 0` when `K < K^L_c`, only `S_c` with `∆Π = 0` when `K^L_c ≤ K < K^H_c`, and auditing
no supplier is optimal when `K ≥ K^H_c`. -/
theorem proposition_3 (P : SupplierAudit.Competition.Params) (hβ : 0 < P.β) (hscen : Scenario P) (hint : SupplierAudit.Competition.eHatI P < 1) :
(∀ K : ℝ, 0 ≤ K → ∀ s₁ s₂ : Strategy, IsEquilibrium P K s₁ s₂ →
∀ x ∈ Feasible, IsMaxOn (aggProfit P K) Feasible x →
unilProfit₁ P K s₁ s₂ + unilProfit₂ P K s₁ s₂ ≤ aggProfit P K x ∧
(s₁ = s₂ →
unilProfit₁ P K s₁ s₂ ≤ jointG₁ P x - Gamma₁ P K x ∧
unilProfit₂ P K s₁ s₂ ≤ jointG₂ P x - Gamma₂ P K x)) ∧
∃ KL KH : ℝ, KL ≤ KH ∧ ∀ K : ℝ, 0 ≤ K →
(K < KL → ∃ x ∈ Feasible, IsMaxOn (aggProfit P K) Feasible x ∧
0 < x.1 ∧ 0 < x.2.1 ∧ x.2.2 = 0 ∧ 0 < deltaPi P x) ∧
(KL ≤ K → K < KH → ∃ x ∈ Feasible, IsMaxOn (aggProfit P K) Feasible x ∧
x.1 = 0 ∧ 0 < x.2.1 ∧ x.2.2 = 0 ∧ deltaPi P x = 0) ∧
(KH ≤ K → IsMaxOn (aggProfit P K) Feasible (0, 0, 0)) := by sorry
end SupplierAudit.Joint
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.