Equations (2)–(3), p. 9 — single-agent optimal effort and success rate
ProvedInnovAlloc.Optimal.equations_2_3best-responseinnovationp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1success-probability
Fix an innovator's share and a positive resource allocation . If the other agent receives no resources, the innovator maximizes over efforts . The unique maximizing effort is for and for . Its success probability is
The success probability is nondecreasing as the positive resource allocation grows. This gives the single-agent behavior used in the principal's one-agent investment calculation.
Formalization Note The paper's “increasing” is weak monotonicity here: the success rate stays zero until .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_InnovAlloc_Optimal_Model
Formal statement
namespace InnovAlloc.Optimal
/-- Equations (2)–(3), p. 9: the single-agent best response and its success rate. -/
theorem equations_2_3 (γ b : ℝ) (hγ : 0 < γ) (hγ1 : γ < 1) (hb : 0 < b) :
(∀ x : ℝ, 0 ≤ x →
((∀ z : ℝ, 0 ≤ z → γ * succ b z - z ≤ γ * succ b x - x) ↔
x = effortStar γ b)) ∧
succ b (effortStar γ b) =
(if γ * b ≤ 1 then 0 else 1 - 1 / (γ * b)) ∧
MonotoneOn (fun t : ℝ => succ t (effortStar γ t)) (Set.Ioi 0) := by sorry
end InnovAlloc.Optimal
Source
Gao, Fan, Huang & Chen, “Resource Allocation Among Competing Innovators”, SSRN preprint 3658157 (February 2021), p. 9, eqs. (2)–(3)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.