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Proposition 5, p. 22 — θ̂12 ∈ (0,1): below it supplier 1 sells only directly at some c > 0; above it, through both channels at some c < 0

Proved
NonExclEncroach.Channels.proposition_5

by mikedeng1 · Oct 19, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

dual-channelequilibriumnon-exclusive-resellerp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supplier-encroachment

There is a threshold θ^12∈(0,1)\hat\theta_{12}\in(0,1)θ^12​∈(0,1), the root of Num1\mathrm{Num1}Num1, such that:

  1. for every θ12∈(0,θ^12)\theta_{12}\in(0,\hat\theta_{12})θ12​∈(0,θ^12​) we have c2>0c_2>0c2​>0, and for every direct cost c∈(0,c2]c\in(0,c_2]c∈(0,c2​] the game has an equilibrium and in every equilibrium supplier 1 sells only through her direct channel (q1∗=0<y∗q_1^*=0<y^*q1∗​=0<y∗), even though her direct channel is less efficient than the reselling channel;
  2. for every θ12∈(θ^12,1)\theta_{12}\in(\hat\theta_{12},1)θ12​∈(θ^12​,1) we have c2<0c_2<0c2​<0; and for every θ12∈(θ^12,9/10]\theta_{12}\in(\hat\theta_{12},9/10]θ12​∈(θ^12​,9/10] and every direct cost c∈(c2,0)c\in(c_2,0)c∈(c2​,0) there is an equilibrium in which supplier 1 sells through both channels (q1∗>0q_1^*>0q1∗​>0 and y∗>0y^*>0y∗>0), even though her direct channel is more efficient than the reselling channel.

In symbols, with E(θ,c)\mathcal E(\theta,c)E(θ,c) the set of equilibria,

∃ θ^∈(0,1), Num1(θ^)=0:{θ<θ^, 0<c≤c2(θ) ⇒ E≠∅ and q1∗=0<y∗ on E,θ^<θ≤9/10, c2(θ)<c<0 ⇒ ∃ σ∈E: q1∗>0, y∗>0.\exists\,\hat\theta\in(0,1),\ \mathrm{Num1}(\hat\theta)=0:\quad \begin{cases}\theta<\hat\theta,\ 0<c\le c_2(\theta)\ \Rightarrow\ \mathcal E\ne\emptyset\ \text{and}\ q_1^*=0<y^*\ \text{on}\ \mathcal E,\\ \hat\theta<\theta\le 9/10,\ c_2(\theta)<c<0\ \Rightarrow\ \exists\,\sigma\in\mathcal E:\ q_1^*>0,\ y^*>0.\end{cases}∃θ^∈(0,1), Num1(θ^)=0:{θ<θ^, 0<c≤c2​(θ) ⇒ E=∅ and q1∗​=0<y∗ on E,θ^<θ≤9/10, c2​(θ)<c<0 ⇒ ∃σ∈E: q1∗​>0, y∗>0.​

With an exclusive reseller (θ12=0\theta_{12}=0θ12​=0) neither happens: the encroaching supplier always uses the reseller when c>0c>0c>0 and never when c≤0c\le0c≤0. Non-exclusivity reverses both conclusions, depending on how substitutable the two suppliers' products are.

Formalization Note The threshold is pinned as the root of Num1\mathrm{Num1}Num1, as in the paper's proof. The paper's "there exist positive (negative) values of ccc" is strengthened to every c∈(0,c2]c\in(0,c_2]c∈(0,c2​] (every c∈(c2,0)c\in(c_2,0)c∈(c2​,0)), which is what Lemma 4 gives; part (a) also asserts that every equilibrium has q1∗=0q_1^*=0q1∗​=0, as the paper's proof of Lemma 4 claims uniqueness for c≤c2c\le c_2c≤c2​. Part (b) asserts existence only, as in the paper, and is stated for θ12≤9/10\theta_{12}\le 9/10θ12​≤9/10: a numerical solution of the game finds that for θ12≥0.96\theta_{12}\ge0.96θ12​≥0.96 the R&DR\&DR&D prices of Table 1 are not an equilibrium at some negative ccc (for θ12≥0.98\theta_{12}\ge0.98θ12​≥0.98 at every tested c∈(c2,0)c\in(c_2,0)c∈(c2​,0)), because the reseller then prefers an order outside the region the paper's Lemmas 1–3 restrict to; whether some other equilibrium with q1∗>0q_1^*>0q1∗​>0 exists there is open. The standing range c0<c<c3c_0<c<c_3c0​<c<c3​ holds automatically for the costs in both parts.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_NonExclEncroach_Channels_Model
Formal statement
namespace NonExclEncroach.Channels

theorem proposition_5 :
    ∃ θhat : ℝ, 0 < θhat ∧ θhat < 1 ∧ num1 θhat = 0 ∧
      (∀ θ, 0 < θ → θ < θhat →
        0 < c2 θ ∧
        ∀ c, 0 < c → c ≤ c2 θ →
          (∃ σ, IsEquilibrium θ c σ) ∧
          ∀ σ, IsEquilibrium θ c σ → σ.q1 = 0 ∧ 0 < σ.y) ∧
      (∀ θ, θhat < θ → θ < 1 → c2 θ < 0) ∧
      (∀ θ, θhat < θ → θ ≤ 9 / 10 →
        ∀ c, c2 θ < c → c < 0 →
          ∃ σ, IsEquilibrium θ c σ ∧ 0 < σ.q1 ∧ 0 < σ.y) := by sorry

end NonExclEncroach.Channels
Source
Hotkar & Gilbert, Supplier Encroachment in a Non-Exclusive Reselling Channel, SSRN working paper 3238502, p. 22 (PDF 22), Proposition 5; proof: Online Technical Appendix p. 16 (PDF 49)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 19, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 19, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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