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Theorem 1 (Gibbard–Satterthwaite) — a strict voting procedure with at least three possible outcomes is strategy-proof iff it is dictatorial

Proved
StrategyProofArrow.Dictatorship.theorem_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

dictatorshipgibbard-satterthwaitep2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofnessvoting

Consider a strict committee ⟨In,Sm,vnm,Tp⟩\langle I_n,S_m,v^{nm},T_p\rangle⟨In​,Sm​,vnm,Tp​⟩: n≥1n\ge 1n≥1 individuals, mmm alternatives, every preference and every ballot a strong order, and a strict voting procedure vnmv^{nm}vnm whose range TpT_pTp​ has ppp elements, with m≥p≥3m\ge p\ge 3m≥p≥3. Then

vnm is strategy-proof  ⟺  vnm is dictatorial,v^{nm}\ \text{is strategy-proof}\iff v^{nm}\ \text{is dictatorial},vnm is strategy-proof⟺vnm is dictatorial,

where dictatorial means that some individual iii exists such that, at every strict ballot set B∈ρmnB\in\rho^n_mB∈ρmn​, vnm(B)v^{nm}(B)vnm(B) is the alternative of the range TpT_pTp​ that BiB_iBi​ ranks highest.

The dictatorship is relative to the range: when Tp⊊SmT_p\subsetneq S_mTp​⊊Sm​ the dictator obtains their best alternative among those the procedure can select, not their best alternative overall (a partial dictatorship). With Tp=SmT_p=S_mTp​=Sm​ the theorem is the classical Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem. The bound p≥3p\ge 3p≥3 cannot be lowered: with two possible outcomes, majority voting between them is strategy-proof and not dictatorial.

Formalization Note n=n=n= Fintype.card ι, p=p=p= (range f).ncard, where range f collects the values of f at strict ballot sets only. m≥pm\ge pm≥p holds automatically, so m≥3m\ge 3m≥3 follows from p≥3p\ge 3p≥3 and is not a separate hypothesis. Strategy-proofness is AGT.IncentiveCompatible. The paper's dictator function fTif^i_TfTi​ is any single-valued selection from iii's maximal elements of TpT_pTp​; for strict ballots that element is unique, and Dictatorial f says that f(B)f(B)f(B) is it.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Dictatorship_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Dictatorship

open AGT

/-- **Theorem 1 (Gibbard–Satterthwaite)** (Satterthwaite, p. 11). For a strict committee with
`n ≥ 1` individuals whose strict voting procedure has a range `T_p` of `p ≥ 3` alternatives
(so `m ≥ p ≥ 3`), the procedure is strategy-proof if and only if it is dictatorial: some
individual always obtains their most preferred alternative of the range. -/
theorem theorem_1 {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι]
    (hn : 1 ≤ Fintype.card ι)
    (f : (ι → A → A → Prop) → A) (hp : 3 ≤ (range f).ncard) :
    IncentiveCompatible f ↔ Dictatorial f := by sorry

end StrategyProofArrow.Dictatorship
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), Theorem 1, p. 11
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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