Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

Theorem 6.2 — an efficient ψ is the Shapley value on G iff Γ(ψ, c, v) is a potential game for every v ∈ G(N)

Proved
MondererShapley.Participation.theorem_6_2

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cooperative-gamesgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1potential-gamesshapley-value

Let NNN be a finite set of players, ψ\psiψ an efficient solution on G=⋃S∈2NG(S)G = \bigcup_{S \in 2^N} G(S)G=⋃S∈2N​G(S) and c∈RNc \in \mathbb R^Nc∈RN. Then ψ\psiψ is the Shapley value on GGG, i.e.

ψ(w)(i)=φi(w)for every coalition S, every w∈G(S) and every i∈S,\psi(w)(i) = \varphi_i(w) \qquad \text{for every coalition } S,\ \text{every } w \in G(S) \text{ and every } i \in S,ψ(w)(i)=φi​(w)for every coalition S, every w∈G(S) and every i∈S,

if and only if the participation game Γ(ψ,c,v)\Gamma(\psi, c, v)Γ(ψ,c,v) is a potential game for every v∈G(N)v \in G(N)v∈G(N).

This is the global characterisation of the Shapley value in Section 6, a corollary of Theorem 6.1.

Formalization Note A game on SSS is any w : Finset ι → ℝ with w ∅ = 0, and ψ(w)\psi(w)ψ(w) for w∈G(S)w \in G(S)w∈G(S) is ψ S w (see the definition Solution); a game in G(N)G(N)G(N) is any v with v ∅ = 0. The Shapley value is shapleyOn S w.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_ClosedPath_IsPotentialGame
import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_shapleyOn
import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_participationPayoff
Formal statement
namespace MondererShapley.Participation

/-- Theorem 6.2: an efficient solution `ψ` is the Shapley value on `G = ∪_{S ∈ 2^N} G(S)` iff
`Γ(ψ, c, v)` is a potential game for every `v ∈ G(N)`. -/
theorem theorem_6_2 {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (ψ : Solution ι)
    (hψ : IsEfficient ψ) (c : ι → ℝ) :
    (∀ (S : Finset ι) (w : Finset ι → ℝ), w ∅ = 0 → ∀ i ∈ S, ψ S w i = shapleyOn S w i) ↔
      ∀ v : Finset ι → ℝ, v ∅ = 0 →
        MondererShapley.ClosedPath.IsPotentialGame (Y := fun _ : ι => Bool) (participationPayoff ψ c v) := by sorry

end MondererShapley.Participation
Source
Monderer and Shapley, Potential Games, Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996), p. 137 (PDF p. 14), Theorem 6.2
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me