Theorem 6.2 — an efficient ψ is the Shapley value on G iff Γ(ψ, c, v) is a potential game for every v ∈ G(N)
ProvedMondererShapley.Participation.theorem_6_2cooperative-gamesgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1potential-gamesshapley-value
Let be a finite set of players, an efficient solution on and . Then is the Shapley value on , i.e.
if and only if the participation game is a potential game for every .
This is the global characterisation of the Shapley value in Section 6, a corollary of Theorem 6.1.
Formalization Note A game on is any w : Finset ι → ℝ with w ∅ = 0, and for is ψ S w (see the definition Solution); a game in is any v with v ∅ = 0. The Shapley value is shapleyOn S w.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_ClosedPath_IsPotentialGame import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_shapleyOn import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_participationPayoff
Formal statement
namespace MondererShapley.Participation
/-- Theorem 6.2: an efficient solution `ψ` is the Shapley value on `G = ∪_{S ∈ 2^N} G(S)` iff
`Γ(ψ, c, v)` is a potential game for every `v ∈ G(N)`. -/
theorem theorem_6_2 {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (ψ : Solution ι)
(hψ : IsEfficient ψ) (c : ι → ℝ) :
(∀ (S : Finset ι) (w : Finset ι → ℝ), w ∅ = 0 → ∀ i ∈ S, ψ S w i = shapleyOn S w i) ↔
∀ v : Finset ι → ℝ, v ∅ = 0 →
MondererShapley.ClosedPath.IsPotentialGame (Y := fun _ : ι => Bool) (participationPayoff ψ c v) := by sorry
end MondererShapley.Participation
Source
Monderer and Shapley, Potential Games, Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996), p. 137 (PDF p. 14), Theorem 6.2
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.