Equation (11), p. 24 — Π_A, Π_B ≥ 0 iff V − I − π_F + (2/3)b − (1/3)(s^Imp − s^RB) ≥ 0
ProvedAlliancePortfolio.Sharing.eq_11alliancesknowledge-sharingp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1shapley-value
In the alliance portfolio with players , let be the Shapley values of the Table 1 game and let the net payoffs of the partners be and , where is each partner's knowledge-sharing cost.
Then the knowledge-sharing constraints of both "weak" partners hold if and only if
This condition drives the comparative statics of Proposition 5 and the lower end of the interval in Proposition 6.
Formalization Note The equivalence holds for all real parameters, so no hypotheses are needed.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Supermodularity_Cooperative_ShapleyValue import Definitions.Def_AlliancePortfolio_Sharing_Model
Formal statement
namespace AlliancePortfolio.Sharing
theorem eq_11 (V I b πF sImp sRB : ℝ) :
(0 ≤ netPayoff V I b πF sImp sRB A ∧ 0 ≤ netPayoff V I b πF sImp sRB B) ↔
0 ≤ V - I - πF + (2 / 3) * b - (1 / 3) * (sImp - sRB) := by sorry
end AlliancePortfolio.Sharing
Source
Arora, Belenzon & Patacconi, Knowledge sharing in alliances and alliance portfolios, author manuscript of January 24, 2020 (Management Science 2021, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2020.3614), p. 24, equation (11)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.