Proof of Theorem 4, p. 1495 — no worker ever rejects a firm at a salary at which he or she is strictly possible for it
ProvedKelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal.no_rejection_at_strictly_possible_salaryascending-processcoregross-substitutesmatchingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Consider a discrete market with salary unit satisfying regularity, (MP), (NFL), (GS) for every firm on the permitted salary vectors, (NTW) and (NTF). In any run of the salary-adjustment process R1–R5, if worker rejects firm in round , where 's permitted salary for is , then
i.e. no discrete strict core allocation assigns to at salary .
This is the key step in showing that the process favors the firms: rejections only ever happen at salaries above every strict core salary.
Formalization Note Every run (every tie-breaking) and every round are covered. The hypotheses are those of Theorem 4.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_Model import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_Process import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_NoTies
Formal statement
namespace KelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal
theorem no_rejection_at_strictly_possible_salary
{W F : Type} [Fintype W] [DecidableEq W] [Fintype F] [DecidableEq F] [Nonempty F]
(M : Market W F) (δ : ℝ) (hδ : 0 < δ) (hu : M.UtilityRegular) (hMP : M.MP) (hNFL : M.NFL)
(hGS : ∀ j, KelsoCrawford.Process.GrossSubstitutesOn (M.y j) (M.gridVectors δ j))
(hNTW : M.NTW δ) (hNTF : M.NTF δ) :
∀ ρ : Run W F, M.IsRun δ ρ → ∀ t i j, ρ.Rejects t i j →
¬ M.StrictlyPossible δ i j (ρ.sal t i j) := by sorry
end KelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal
Source
Kelso and Crawford, Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes, Econometrica 50 (1982), p. 1495, proof of Theorem 4, third paragraph
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.