Lemma A.4 — δⁱ*δʲ = 0 (i ≠ j); δ*D(g) = ∑ᵢ δⁱ*δⁱ(γⁱgⁱ); δⁱ*δⁱ(γⁱh) = γⁱ δⁱ*δⁱ(h)
ProvedDecompGames.Duplication.lemma_A_4flowsgame-decompositionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1
Let be a finite set of players; player has a finite strategy set , and is the set of strategy profiles. A game is a vector of payoff functions ; is the space of games. For let be a strictly positive measure on , the product measure, , and let be a co-measure vector, a strictly positive function of .
With the gradients (A.13), their adjoints (A.15), and (A.18):
- (a) For all players and all , (A.19).
- (b) For every game , (A.20).
- (c) For every player and every , (A.21).
These identities reduce to a sum of one-player Laplacians, which Proposition A.8 needs.
Differences from the source:
- generalization: standing assumptions n ≥ 2 players and |Sⁱ| ≥ 2 strategies for every player (p. 7) → any finite type of players ι and any finite strategy sets S i, of any size; reason: the result holds without these assumptions (with an empty Sⁱ the space of profiles is empty and every game is 0); every instance of the source is an instance of the Lean statement
- encoding: μⁱ a strictly positive finite measure on Sⁱ → μ i : S i → ℝ, the point masses, with 0 < μ i a for all a (IsMeasureVec); reason: a measure on a finite set is determined by its point masses; μⁱ(Sⁱ) is mass μ i = ∑ₐ μ i a
- encoding: γⁱ a co-measure, a strictly positive measure on S⁻ⁱ (Definition 2.1) → γ i : (∀ j, S j) → ℝ positive with γ i (Function.update s i a) = γ i s (IsCoMeasureVec); reason: functions on S⁻ⁱ are exactly the functions on S that do not depend on the coordinate sⁱ
- encoding: statements over s⁻ⁱ ∈ S⁻ⁱ and profiles (tⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) → statements over full profiles s : ∀ j, S j, with (tⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) written Function.update s i tⁱ; reason: the coordinate sⁱ of s is overwritten, so the quantifier ranges over the same subprofiles
- encoding: δⁱ* the adjoint of δⁱ, characterized by (A.14); δ* = ∑ᵢ δⁱ* → deltaStar μ i, defined by the explicit formula (A.15); deltaStarAll = ∑ᵢ deltaStar μ i; reason: Proposition A.3 (a milestone of this mission) states that the formula is the adjoint on flows, and every flow appearing here (δⁱh, D(g)) is skew-symmetric
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_DecompGames_Duplication_Operators
Formal statement
namespace DecompGames.Duplication
open Finset
/-- Lemma A.4, p. 28: (a) `δⁱ*δʲ = 0` for `i ≠ j` (A.19); (b) `δ*D(g) = ∑_{i ∈ N} δⁱ*δⁱ(γⁱgⁱ)`
(A.20); (c) `δⁱ*δⁱ(γⁱh) = γⁱ δⁱ*δⁱ(h)` (A.21). -/
theorem lemma_A_4 {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] {S : ι → Type}
[∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
(μ : ∀ i, S i → ℝ) (hμ : IsMeasureVec μ)
(γ : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (hγ : IsCoMeasureVec γ) :
(∀ i j : ι, i ≠ j → ∀ h : (∀ k, S k) → ℝ, deltaStar μ i (delta μ j h) = 0) ∧
(∀ g : Game ι S, deltaStarAll μ (embed μ γ g) =
fun s => ∑ i, deltaStar μ i (delta μ i (coScale γ i (g i))) s) ∧
(∀ (i : ι) (h : (∀ k, S k) → ℝ),
deltaStar μ i (delta μ i (coScale γ i h)) = coScale γ i (deltaStar μ i (delta μ i h))) := by sorry
end DecompGames.Duplication
Source
Abdou, Pnevmatikos, Scarsini & Venel, Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations, arXiv:1901.06048v2, p. 28, Lemma A.4, (A.19)–(A.21)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.